

1967

CONFIDENTIAL



FO 1016/781 ✓

File No. 1091

VOL II

Name of File—

MIDDLE EAST SITUATION

C.A.R. / ISRAEL DISPUTE

NO MINUTES TO BE WRITTEN HERE

| RECORD OF WEEDING | | |
|----------------------------------|----------|------|
| | INITIALS | DATE |
| 2 YEARS | | |
| 5 YEARS (CONSULAR POSTS ONLY) | | |
| 10 YEARS | | |



LAST Year's File No.

NEXT Year's File No.

CONFIDENTIAL

1073/4/33/67
1 Rm
2 PA
Z 170747Z

FM ASOLHY NR 408

TO ZZ ASOLLJ

GR 360

From London

K9717

R 170747Z

FM ASOLHY NR 790

TO RR ASOLDQ 49717

GR 360

(THIS TEL WAS FLASH TO
THE ACTION ADDRESSEES)

3
ADDRESSED TO PARIS TEL NO 883 OF 17 NOVEMBER AND TO OTTAWA
TOKYO COPENHAGEN LAGOS NEW DELHI SOFIA BEIRUT JEDDA KUWAIT
RABAT TUNIS TRIPOLI KHARTOUM BUENOS AIRES RIO DE JANEIRO
ADDIS ABABA CAIRO REPEATED FOR INFO BAHRAIN TEHERAN RAWALPINDI
ANKARA AND SAVING TO UKDEL NATO.

MIDDLE EAST .

FOLLOWING IS TEXT OF UK DRAFT RESOLUTION TABLED IN THE SECURITY
COUNCIL AS GIVEN IN UKMIS TELEGRAM NO 3231 TO FOREIGN OFFICE
OF 15 NOVEMBER.

BEGINS.

(A) THE SECURITY COUNCIL .

(1) EXPRESSING ITS CONTINUING CONCERN WITH THE GRAVE SITUATION
IN THE MIDDLE EAST.

(2) EMPHASISING THE INADMISSIBILITY OF THE ACQUISITION OF TERRITORY BY WAR AND THE NEED TO WORK FOR A JUST AND LASTING PEACE IN WHICH EVERY STATE IN THE AREA CAN LIVE IN SECURITY.

(3) EMPHASISING FURTHER THAT ALL MEMBER STATES IN THEIR ACCEPTANCE OF THE CHARTER OF THE UNITED NATIONS HAVE UNDERTAKEN A COMMITMENT TO ACT IN ACCORDANCE WITH ARTICLE 2 OF THE CHARTER.

1. AFFIRMS THAT THE FULFILMENT OF CHARTER PRINCIPLES REQUIRES THE ESTABLISHMENT OF A JUST AND LASTING PEACE IN THE MIDDLE EAST WHICH SHOULD INCLUDE THE APPLICATION OF BOTH THE FOLLOWING PRINCIPLES

(I) WITHDRAWAL OF ISRAELI ARMED FORCES FROM TERRITORIES OCCUPIED IN THE RECENT CONFLICT COLON

(II) TERMINATION OF ALL CLAIMS OR STATES OF BELLIGERENCY AND RESPECT FOR AND ACKNOWLEDGEMENT OF THE SOVEREIGNTY, TERRITORIAL INTEGRITY AND POLITICAL INDEPENDENCE OF EVERY STATE IN THE AREA AND THEIR RIGHT TO LIVE IN PEACE WITHIN SECURE AND RECOGNISED BOUNDARIES FREE FROM THREATS OR ACTS OF FORCE COLON

2. AFFIRMS FURTHER THE NECESSITY

(A) FOR GUARANTEEING FREEDOM OF NAVIGATION THROUGH INTERNATIONAL WATERWAYS IN THE AREA COLON

(B) FOR ACHIEVING A JUST SETTLEMENT OF THE REFUGEE PROBLEM COLON

(C) FOR GUARANTEEING THE TERRITORIAL INVIOABILITY AND POLITICAL INDEPENDENCE OF EVERY STATE IN THE AREA, THROUGH MEASURES INCLUDING THE ESTABLISHMENT OF DEMILITARIZED ZONES COLON

3. REQUEST THE SECRETARY GENERAL TO DESIGNATE A SPECIAL REPRESENTATIVE TO PROCEED TO THE MIDDLE EAST TO ESTABLISH AND MAINTAIN CONTACTS

WITH THE STATES CONCERNED IN ORDER TO PROMOTE AGREEMENT AND ASSIST EFFORTS TO ACHIEVE A PEACEFUL AND ACCEPTED SETTLEMENT IN ACCORDANCE WITH THE PROVISIONS AND PRINCIPLES IN THIS RESOLUTION COLON

4. REQUESTS THE SECRETARY GENERAL TO REPORT TO THE SECURITY COUNCIL ON THE PROGRESS OF THE EFFORTS OF THE SPECIAL REPRESENTATIVE AS SOON AS POSSIBLE.

ENDS.

SOSFA

TOR. 0929Z/17

D.C.

TELEGRAM

7041/60/67

Cypher code en clair

From :—

To :—

Bahrain
Despatched

Foreign Office
Received

No.

of

53 (S)

8 November 1967.

UNCLASSIFIED

Addressed to Foreign Office telegram number 53 (Savings) of 8 November, repeated for information Savings to Dubai (202), Doha (102), Abu Dhabi (154), Bahrain Agency (191) and Muscat (83)

Middle East Talking Points

Your telegram number 41, Saving to Abidjan.

Although in the nature of things here we cannot make much use of this material it has been interesting to receive it. We should like to continue receiving them until the withdrawal from Aden is completed. After that we do not think continuation will be justified as far as we are concerned.

CRAWFORD.

Distribution
Normal
Savings

R-X
Xm 18/11

TELEGRAM

Cypher code en clair

From:— Foreign Office

To:— Bahrain

Despatched

Received

No. Guidance 288 of 7 November, 1967.

CONFIDENTIAL
PRIORITY

Arab/Israel: Balfour Declaration.

Guidance number 285 (not to all).

New York Times has reported speech by Lord President of the Council Mr. Crossman, on 5 November under the headlines "Change is indicated in British Policy in Mid East" and "Brown and Wilson are said to have told Eban of shift on direct negotiations".

2. There is no truth in these suggestions. British policy in the Middle East remains unchanged as Foreign Secretary stated it in the General Assembly on 26 September (verbatim 373) and in the House of Commons on 2 November (verbatim 422).

3. The crucial passage of Mr. Crossman's speech, part of which was quoted to indicate a change of policy, was "I am no believer in easy solutions or quick peacemaking, but I am convinced that there is now real chance of peace if only the great powers, working through the United Nations, can be content not to intervene and impose their own peace, but to create the conditions where Arab and Jew freely negotiate a settlement which they will keep because it is their own settlement and not one imposed from outside".

4. If pressed on this, you should emphasise that the crucial phrase is "working through the United Nations to create the conditions where Etc". This formulation, which would cover negotiation under U.N. auspices, avoids endorsement of the Israel demand for direct negotiations now. News department are taking line that it is entirely consistent with our policy as set out in the speeches referred to in para 2.

(Bahrain pass Saving Abu Dhabi Doha Dubai and Muscat).

Muscat.

CONFIDENTIAL

Hmrc

D. 1311

CYPHER/CAT AND BY BAG

IMMEDIATE FOREIGN OFFICE AND COMMONWEALTH OFFICE TO CERTAIN MISSIONS



TELNO GUIDANCE 288

7 NOVEMBER 1967 (IP)

CONFIDENTIAL.

ARAB/ISRAEL: BALFOUR DECLARATION.

GUIDANCE NO 285.(NOT TO ALL).

NEW YORK TIMES HAS REPORTED SPEECH BY LORD PRESIDENT OF THE COUNCIL MR. CROSSMAN, ON 5 NOVEMBER UNDER THE HEADLINES '' CHANGE IS INDICATED IN BRITISH POLICY IN MID EAST'' AND '' BROWN AND WILSON ARE SAID TO HAVE TOLD EBAN OF SHIFT ON DIRECT NEGOTIATIONS''.

2. THERE IS NO TRUTH IN THESE SUGGESTIONS. BRITISH POLICY IN THE MIDDLE EAST REMAINS UNCHANGED AS FOREIGN SECRETARY STATED IT IN THE GENERAL ASSEMBLY ON 26 SEPTEMBER (VERBATIM 373), AND IN THE HOUSE OF COMMONS ON 2 NOVEMBER (VERBATIM 422)

3. THE CRUCIAL PASSAGE OF MR. CROSSMAN'S SPEECH, PART OF WHICH WAS QUOTED TO INDICATE A CHANGE OF POLICY, WAS: '' I AM NO BELIEVER IN EASY SOLUTIONS OR QUICK PEACEMAKING, BUT I AM CONVINCED THAT THERE IS NOW REAL CHANCE OF PEACE IF ONLY THE GREAT POWERS, WORKING THROUGH THE UNITED NATIONS, CAN BE CONTENT NOT TO INTERVENE AND IMPOSE THEIR OWN PEACE, BUT TO CREATE THE CONDITIONS WHERE ARAB AND JEW FREELY NEGOTIATE A SETTLEMENT WHICH THEY WILL KEEP BECAUSE IT IS THEIR OWN SETTLEMENT AND NOT ONE IMPOSED FROM OUTSIDE''.

4. IF PRESSED ON THIS, YOU SHOULD EMPHASIZE THAT THE CRUCIAL PHRASE IS '' WORKING THROUGH THE UNITED NATIONS TO CREATE THE CONDITIONS WHERE, ETC.'' THIS FORMULATION, WHICH WOULD COVER NEGOTIATION UNDER U.N. AUSPICES, AVOIDS ENDORSEMENT OF THE ISRAEL DEMAND FOR DIRECT NEGOTIATIONS NOW. NEWS DEPARTMENT ARE TAKING THE LINE THAT IT IS ENTIRELY CONSISTENT WITH OUR POLICY AS SET OUT IN THE SPEECHES REFERRED TO IN PARAGRAPH 2.

/BY TELEGRAPH

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Foreign Office and Commonwealth Office telegram No. Guidance 288

-2-

BY TELEGRAPH:

Moscow
Washington
Cairo

U.K. Mission New York
Amman

B.I.S. New York
Tel Aviv

[Immediate]

Ankara
Belgrade
Beirut
Kuwait
Khartoum
Benghazi
Canberra
Rawalpindi

Paris
Warsaw
Jedda
Tehran
Rabat
Tunis
Wellington

Rome
Bahrain
Jerusalem
Algiers
Tripoli
Ottawa
New Delhi

[Priority]

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BY BAG

SAVING TELEGRAM

DP 1314

FOREIGN OFFICE TO ABIDJAN

Telno 48 Saving

8 November 1967 (JIPGD)

14 NOV 67

1092

UNCLASSIFIED

Addressed to Abidjan telegram No. 48 Saving of 8 November.
Repeated for information Saving to Other Posts.

MIDDLE EAST TALKING POINTS

9 November 1967

The only non-Communist Heads of State who accepted invitations to attend the October Revolution 50th anniversary celebrations in Moscow were President Kekkonen of Finland (invited on 23 October) and President Sallal of the Yemen. Kekkonen attended, but Sallal was overthrown on 5 November while he was in Baghdad. His visit to Moscow was cancelled. Cairo Radio reported on 3 October that Sallal would be visiting Moscow in November.

Egyptian officials estimate that the damage to the Suez oil refineries amounts to £178.8 million, without taking account of the cost to the economy or the disruption in oil refining, according to the Manchester "Guardian" on 27 October. The same paper reported on 25 October that the Suez refineries supplied 5 million tons of Egypt's annual consumption of 6.5 million tons. The remaining 1.5 million tons are refined at the Alexandria plant, the only one still operating in Egypt, but running below capacity owing to the closure of the Suez Canal.

The Beirut paper Beirag on 28 October expressed the opinion that the Soviet Fleet has taken over policing operations from the United States Sixth Fleet in the (Mediterranean) area. Another Beirut paper, Hayat, said on the same day it believed that the aim of the present Soviet naval visit to Egyptian ports was to deter Egypt from attacking Israel.

"After four months it is obvious that President Nasser has overplayed the Suez Canal's closure as a reprisal against the Western maritime Powers in the blind belief that it would involve them in a crisis similar to that of 11 years ago. Instead, it has simply caused a certain measure of inconvenience, the effects of which will lessen the longer Nasser chooses to delay re-opening the Canal". The Times of Zambia, 26 October.

All India Radio reported on 26 October that East European countries are understood to have agreed to bear part of the increased freight on Indian goods following the closure of the Suez Canal. The radio said that according to official New Delhi sources "the closure has resulted in the increase of 30 per cent of the freight rate to these countries, making Indian goods non-competitive". The broadcast added that to remove such impediments in the

Foreign Office telegram No. 48 Saving to Abidjan

-2-

in the way of a free-flow of trade, India already has Ministerial level committees in Yugoslavia, Czechoslovakia, the UAR, and a study group in Poland.

"The Arab League is grateful to Tunisia and to President Bourguiba, whose attitudes have greatly served the common Arab cause". Sayed Nofal, the Arab League's Assistant Secretary General, on arrival in Tunis, 27 October.

The Libyan Government has issued orders for the payment of 5,277,777 Libyan pounds to the UAR and 2,022,000 Libyan pounds to Jordan, as first instalments of the £30 million Libya is to pay these countries, in accordance with the Khartoum summit conference resolution. Regional News Service, reporting from Tripoli, 26 October.

Kuwait, Saudi Arabia and Libya are to pay Egypt £95 million annually "until the consequences of the Israeli aggression are eliminated". The method of payment, reported by the Cairo paper Al Ahram on 17 October, will be: Kuwait, £3,250,000 every month; Saudi Arabia £8,750,000 every three months, and Libya £5,200,000 sterling every three months.

Describing the reaction abroad to the attempt by Egyptian officers to seize the supreme command of the armed forces, the Editor of Al Ahram, Mohammed Hasanayn Heykal, wrote on 27 October: "Our friends abroad, headed by the Soviet Union, held their hands to their hearts in pity. They moved, however, with noted hesitation".

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1092

CONFIDENTIAL

BRITISH EMBASSY

KUWAIT

(1071)

29 October, 1967.

Nasser's Position in the Arab World

Please refer to James Cable's letter 1078/54/67 of 5 October on Nasser's reduced prestige in the Lebanon.

2. In Kuwait, as in Lebanon, Nasser's prestige has suffered a severe blow, the main effect of which has been that we have heard a good deal less of him and his supporters over the summer. His position, as seen from Kuwait, has certainly not been re-established and probably, even for his supporters, it can never be again what it was before 5 June. Even so he remains for most Kuwaitis by far the most important leader of the Arab world. Whatever mistakes he has made, and these are frankly admitted, though usually with the rider that it is his colleagues, or the army, or the Americans, or the Russians who must take the lion's share of the blame, he is still the best Arab leader in sight.

3. For these others who even before 5 June saw Nasser as a menace to the non-revolutionary Arab world, the trimming of Nasser's wings has been the cause of considerable satisfaction. For these people, little that Cairo or Nasser say now carries conviction; but even for them Nasser remains important, as, for example, when he earned praise for the moderate stand he adopted at the Khartoum conference. And he is still feared for the trouble he might cause.

4. There has been little sign of any actual turning against Nasser except perhaps in the army, where the experiences of the Kuwait Expeditionary Force appear to have made many of the officers anti-Egyptian, and in the Palestinian community. The left wing press has remained largely loyal. For example, 'al 'Asria' has explained that the whole purpose of the June war, launched with Western backing, had been to bring down Nasser and the progressive Arab regimes. Signs of criticism have appeared in the right wing press, particularly 'al Rai al Amm' which has often in the past gone as far as the press law will allow, and beyond, in criticism of Nasser. A member of its editorial staff has told us that a cartoon prepared at the time of Amer's suicide, but promptly censored, depicted a dying Rommel pointing to Hitler and saying "why don't you commit suicide too?"

5. If one can sum up, the feeling in Kuwait is that Nasser's prestige has suffered a blow, but Kuwaitis are prepared to give him a second chance, since despite the mistakes he has made, he remains a great deal better than anyone who might take his place. They would certainly run for cover if he turned his

/propaganda

D.J. Speares, Esq.,
North and East African Department,
Foreign Office.

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Page 2

propaganda on to them; but they no doubt feel that their financial aid secures them from that for the time being.

6. I am copying this letter to the Chanceries in Washington, Paris, Moscow, New York, Aden, Algiers, Amman, Bahrain, Beirut, Benghazi, Cairo, Khartoum, Rabat, Tel Aviv, Tripoli and Tunis..

(J.A.N. Graham)

CONFIDENTIAL

1092
Cable sent by 10/11/67
CYPHER/CAT A

FROM FOREIGN OFFICE

TELEGRAM NO. GUIDANCE 288

7 NOVEMBER, 1967

PRIORITY

CONFIDENTIAL.

ARAB/ ISRAEL: BALFOUR DECLARATION.

GUIDANCE NO 285. (NOT TO ALL).

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
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(BAHRAIN PASS SAVING ABU DHABI DOHA DUBAI AND MUSCAT).

B. BAG

SAVING TELEGRAM



FOREIGN OFFICE AND COMMONWEALTH OFFICE TO ABIDJAN AND
CERTAIN OTHER MISSIONS

Telno 43 Saving

27 October 1967

(JIPGD)

UNCLASSIFIED

Addressed to Abidjan telegram No.43 Saving of 27 October
And to Certain Other Missions.

MIDDLE EAST TALKING POINTS

The Israel Government are studying a plan to build a 42-inch oil pipeline from Eilat, on the Gulf of Aqaba, to Ashdod, on the Mediterranean. Both ports are capable of handling supertankers now being built which are too big to go through the Suez Canal loaded. It is estimated that it would be cheaper and quicker to pump oil from Eilat to Ashdod, than to send a series of smaller ships through the Canal. The pipeline would cost up to £15 million to build and have an annual capacity of 50 million tons.

The Chairman of the Suez Canal Authority, Mashour Ahmad Mashour, said on 19 October that should a political decision to be taken to reopen the Suez Canal it would take at least four months to clear it for navigation.

The Beirut newspaper Safa stated (15/16 October) that in spite of selling them arms, Russia had told the Arabs never to count on her material aid should war be renewed in the Middle East. Nida ul Watan, another Beirut paper, said on the same date that Russia's face in the Middle East was ugly, and that her reported readiness to interfere in the Yemen following Egyptian evacuation would increase the ugliness of her image.

Up to the time of the Arab/Israeli war, many thousands of visitors from the United States, Britain and West Germany provided the bulk of Egypt's tourist revenue worth 115 million dollars in 1966; Egypt's third largest source of foreign currency. The forthcoming visitors from Communist countries referred to in the Cairo paper Al-Gomhouria on 22 September - 73 Czechs for a 15-day visit, 450 Russians to spend four days in Alexandria and "agreements" for tourist visits from Poland, Yugoslavia and Hungary - obviously cannot make good the deficit.

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X. 18/11

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U.O. TEL. No.

SAVING TO

upn
Muscat

18 NOV 67

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By Bag

SAVING TELEGRAM

FOREIGN OFFICE/COMMONWEALTH OFFICE TO ABIDJAN AND CERTAIN OTHER MISSIONS

Telno. 41 Saving 25 October, 1967.

UNCLASSIFIED

Addressed to Abidjan telegram No. 41 Saving of 25 October.
Repeated for information Saving to Certain Other Missions.

MIDDLE EAST TALKING POINTS

This series of weekly Saving telegrams was initiated immediately after the Arab/Israel war of last June. One Middle East post has now reported that they no longer serve a useful purpose. We should be grateful if other recipients would send a brief Saving telegram saying whether they find the series useful or not.

2. We intend in any case to reduce the frequency to once fortnightly after the telegram due to be issued on 27 October.

FILES

J.I.P.G.D.

J.I.R.D.

Eastern Dept.

N.E.A.D.

Arabian Dept.

Oil Dept.

44444

*The M.B. post is
on superior Bahrain.
so we can X.
15/11.*

Mureat 1092

SAVING TELEGRAM

28.49.

By Bag

FOREIGN OFFICE TO ABIDJAN

Telegram No. 28 Saving

15 September, 1967 (JIPGD)

UNCLASSIFIED

Addressed to Abidjan telegram No. 28 Saving of 15 September,
Repeated for information Saving to Abu Dhabi and other posts.

Middle East Talking Points - 14 September, 1967.

The Algiers newspaper El Moudjahid on 27 August reported the expulsion from Brazil of a counsellor at the Algerian Embassy who had been accused of having contact with revolutionary elements.

Stokely Carmichael, the extremist American Negro advocate of Black Power, has just arrived in Algiers from Hanoi, having previously attended the Latin American Solidarity Organisation conference in Havana to which Algeria sent observers. Cuban comment on the Middle East crisis has been eulogistic on the Algerian extremist attitude.

On 31 August at the Khartoum Arab Summit Conference President Nasser and King Faisal of Saudi Arabia reached agreement on the withdrawal of U.A.R. forces from the Yemen. Yet on 5 September Moscow broadcast in Arabic that "a Soviet military delegation is on a visit to the Yemeni Arab Republic and has had a meeting with the Yemeni Minister of the Interior". The Imam of Yemen, Mohammed Al Badr, has charged both the Soviet Union and China with seeking military bases in the Yemen, according to the Lebanese paper Al Hayat of 29 August.

Writing a special article on Anglo-Egyptian relations for the London Sunday Times (10 September), Mohammed Hassanein Heykal, Editor of the Cairo paper Al Ahram and often regarded as President Nasser's spokesman, said it was time for a "genuine dialogue" between the two countries. "So many things could be put right if we were to meet and discuss our differences as equals for the first time in our history," he wrote.

"There used to be a fair amount of mistrust towards us among the Arabs, but now we have created great political capital in the Arab countries. This enormous area includes, Iraq, Syria, Saudi Arabia, and so on." - President Tito, at a social and political workers' meeting in Trbovlje, 4 September.

The East German Communist Party paper Neues Deutschland, which is occasionally used to publicise Soviet Communist plans, reported on 16 August the presence in Egypt of a "national freedom movement" of workers whose purpose was to ensure "the territorial integrity of the country" and to "strengthen the revolutionary régime."

/According

- 2 -

According to the article, education and weapon training has already begun at youth camps and sports fields in the Nile Delta and large cities. 5,000 workers in the industrial centre of Shubra el Kheima, north of Cairo, were trained and armed. They were the "first participant groups in the People's Opposition, ready to defend and protect their production places."

Neues Deutschland criticised the Arab Socialist Union, the only political party in the U.A.R. because it had "not been entirely successful in the political mobilization of the masses." The paper claimed that the recent reorganization of the Egyptian Army was "part of the plan to support the People's Opposition."

A box containing 365 Lebanese eggs used to be sold to Iraq for LL.32. Now a similar box of East European eggs is sold to Iraq for LL.26, reported the Lebanese paper Al Hayat on 31 August. At a meeting of Lebanese farmers Lebanon's Economy Minister, Dr. Saeed Hamadeh, said that the Iraqi authorities wanted guarantees for the stability of Lebanese egg prices so that Iraq may resume its imports from Lebanon. The Lebanese farmers (according to Al Hayat) told Dr. Hamadeh that East European eggs were intended for the dumping trade "because the authorities in East Europe do not care so much about profits and losses as marketing their products and getting foreign exchange".

"What does the Syrian régime really want?" asked the Columnist Basem Jisr in the Lebanese paper Al Jarida on 30 August. He commented that Syria was "always refusing". The stand taken by the Baathist régime in Syria on Palestine could be explained only in the light of three theories: "The régimes popular weakness (weakness among the people?) forces it to rush forward to seek questions larger than those of the Syrian people; the régime believes in the continuation of revolution without really applying Socialism or liberating Palestine; or it has in it certain persons who seek to destroy the Nasser myth, which stands in the way of fulfilment of international motives, regardless of their colour." Basem Jisr added that there were those who held Syria responsible for involving the UAR in war with Israel when the UAR was not prepared for it.

"While standing on the bank of the Suez Canal I said to myself: I am standing here close to the Egyptian ruler. Had I been able to talk to him as Israeli Premier to Egyptian President, as person to person, I should have proposed that we find a way for talks. But the Khartoum Conference has issued its irresponsible verdict - that there shall be no peace with Israel." - Israeli Premier Eshkol, during his tour of Northern Sinai, 6 September.

/"It is

Foreign Office telegram No. 28 Saving to Abidjan

- 3 -

"It is sheer madness to allow revolution to become an effort to achieve the impossible, because as time goes on the revolutionaries come to realise that their capabilities are lagging far behind their flights of fancy." - Heykal, Editor of Al Ahram, in his Friday article, 8 September, quoted by Cairo Radio.

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J.I.P.G.D.

SSSSS

Muscat

CONFIDENTIAL

30 SEP 67
1012

By Bag

FOREIGN OFFICE AND COMMONWEALTH OFFICE TO CERTAIN MISSIONS AND
DEPENDENT TERRITORIES

Guidance No. 243 23 September, 1967. (JIPGD)

CONFIDENTIAL

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SOUTH ARABIA AND THE PERSIAN GULF

The collapse of the South Arabian Federal Government and the ousting of the Sultans and other Rulers by Nationalist Forces has led to speculation about the possible repercussions of these events in the British Protected States of the Persian Gulf (Bahrain, Qatar and the Trucial States) and the implications for our policy there. Hostile propaganda is already seeking to draw a parallel between the two areas and to suggest that the South Arabian experience is bound to be repeated in the Gulf. It is in our interests to discourage speculation on these lines, and in general to avoid publicity about the Gulf during the present critical period in South Arabia and the Yemen.

2. The Gulf Rulers were, inevitably, disturbed by the collapse in South Arabia, and one or two were anxious to have renewed assurances of Her Majesty's Government's support. If a belief were to develop among the Rulers that the British Government were prepared to abandon them and do business with possible Nationalist insurgents, our policy would be seriously affected. The Rulers could be expected to take whatever action seemed open to protect their own positions. The principal danger is that having lost, as they would see it, any incentive to co-operate with the British Government they would (for fear of losing control) obstruct the process of modernisation (see Intel No. 10 of 1965) that we are continuing to urge upon them, with fair success to date. This would probably have the opposite effect of encouraging internal opposition to them and of fostering inter-State rivalries, and would make it more rather than less difficult for us ultimately to disengage and to leave behind a stable situation.

3. There has so far been no such loss of confidence in the Gulf, and we have every interest in avoiding it and in encouraging the Rulers to go forward with social, political and economic development. While we cannot afford to be complacent about the outlook in the Gulf, the parallel between South Arabia and the Gulf is largely superficial and misleading. The Gulf States have the following advantages which the Federal Government of South Arabia largely or entirely lacked:

(i) among the Rulers the will and ability to exercise effective authority in their Shaikhdoms, as was demonstrated during the Arab-Israel war when, notably in Bahrain, the ruling /families

CONFIDENTIAL

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F.O. and C.O. telegram Guidance No. 243.

- 2 -

families kept firm control with almost no resort to force;

(ii) virtually no surviving tradition of tribal warfare or "dissidence" within individual States, which despite the NLF and FLOSY labels used has been much of the basis of the troubles in the Western Aden Protectorate.

(iii) no large reservoir of potentially subversive elements on their borders (Yemenis caused much of the trouble in Aden); and, except on a smaller scale in Bahrain, no large urban centre like Aden with a detribalised population which is not susceptible to Shaikhly influence and affords a natural base for subversion;

(iv) Additionally to (iii) no State on the border under UAR domination from which the EIS could mount armed dissidence and control and supply it direct, and in which the presence of UAR forces as (until Sinai at least) a powerful factor in "bandwagon" calculations;

(v) Security Forces which are genuinely their own (though they have some British officers) and not so dependent on British support and administration as were the various South Arabian forces;

(vi) large oil revenues (or the prospects of revenues or a share in neighbours' revenues through the Trucial States Development Fund) which are being increasingly distributed throughout the local populations;

(vii) active development programmes;

(viii) a totally different constitutional situation; the Shaikhdoms are (whatever the anti-colonialists may say) independent sovereign States, and Britain has no mandatory powers within them as we had in theory, if not in practice, under the Advisory Treaties in the Aden Protectorate, still less the colonial powers we have in Aden.

(ix) in the principal Shaikhdoms, comparatively well established and experienced administrations which have functioned successfully in a modern setting for a considerable number of years; as well as a much longer and greater experience of the outside world stemming from their position as maritime States (as compared with the land-locked up-country States of South Arabia);

4. There will certainly be attempts to step up "nationalist" pressure in the Gulf following withdrawal from Aden, and this may be increased by the diversion of Egyptian subversive

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F.O. and C.O. telegram Guidance No. 243.

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resources from Yemen and South Arabia. The Gulf States have, with our help, taken considerable precautions to enable them to cope with this, and their improved security forces appear to have a good grip on the situation. There is no evidence so far to suggest that such local opposition to the Gulf Rulers as exists has become appreciably more effective as a result of events in South Arabia. We have no reason to suppose that the governments of the Shaikhdoms think that we will abandon them if there should be an outbreak of terrorism. They know that we supported the Federal Government in South Arabia up to the hilt - it was the Federalists who ran out on us, not we on them.

5. We can also expect some of the Rulers to take attitudes more independent of the British Government. This is positively welcome as we are encouraging Rulers to reduce their dependence on us, as we encouraged Kuwait to do some years ago. They have, however, been assured on several occasions recently, on the basis of public statements by ministers, that we intend to stand by our commitments in the Gulf while there is a need for them; we have set no time limit to our presence. We do not need for this purpose a large military base in any way comparable to Aden, and it is misleading (and a gift to our enemies) to speak in terms of "transferring" the Aden base to the Gulf. Our Forces in the Gulf (the basic operational units in which are being increased to a total of two battalions and two fighter squadrons divided between Bahrain and Sharjah), will remain at a modest level and will be as unobtrusive as we can make them; their rôle is entirely confined to the Gulf and they will have none of the wider responsibilities of the former Middle East Command in Aden.

Muscat and Oman

6. There is undoubtedly a risk that security in Muscat and Oman will be affected if there is general disorder in the former Eastern Aden Protectorate following a Nationalist take-over. (The situation there is still obscure, and if it is the NLF that gain control they will not necessarily embark on foreign adventures). The probable consequence would be renewed guerrilla activity by the Dhofar Liberation Front, which has been quiescent in recent months. It is impossible to predict how much success it might achieve, but the Sultan's Armed Forces have an overwhelming preponderance of strength and control at present. In general, continuing stability in the Sultanate will depend on the speed with which the Sultan presses forward with development now that he at last has the resources to finance it. (Petroleum Development (Oman), 85% Shell-owned, began production in August and it is expected to reach an annual level of 10 million tons).

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F.O. and C. O. telegram Guidance No. 243.

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7. The British Government have no responsibility for the internal or external affairs of the Sultanate and no formal defence commitment, though we have at various times in the past responded to requests for assistance. Nor do we have "bases" there; the only British units are two small RAF staging posts at Masirah Island and Salalah. This should be made clear in any discussion of Muscat and Oman, and paragraph 6 above should be drawn upon only in answer to questions.

8. Paragraph 2 is for your own information. The remainder, subject to paragraph 7, can be used in discussion at your discretion.

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BY BAG

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
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FOREIGN OFFICE AND COMMONWEALTH OFFICE TO ABIDJAN
AND CERTAIN OTHER MISSIONS

Telno 33 Saving

22 September 1967 (JIPGD)

22 116



UNCLASSIFIED

Addressed to Abidjan telegram No. 33 Saving of 22 September.
And unnumbered Saving to certain other posts.

MIDDLE EAST TALKING POINTS

21 September, 1967.

Since July 1 the world's tanker owners and oil companies have ordered 49 ships of over 200,000 tons each, according to an Oslo shipbroking company, R.S. Platou A/S. Altogether, there are 136 tankers of 150,000 tons or more on order throughout the world, many of them for delivery within the next three years. Unless the Suez Canal is deepened none of these super-tankers will be able to use the waterway when loaded.

Tunis Radio on 15 September expressed surprise at the statement issued at the end of the OAU African Heads of State conference in Kinshasa expressing sympathy and support for the UAR on the Arab-Israeli issue.

"What calls for astonishment is the silence observed by all Arab radios about the substance of the address of the Cairo delegation to the conference, in which it was suggested that one should simply return to the United Nations resolutions as a starting point for the solution of the Palestine problem", commented Tunis Radio. "They behave as if the matter did not concern every Arab, as if our brothers wanted to carry on in the same way as before the events of 5 June - that is, say one thing and do another. These men resort to utterly different ways of reasoning in addressing international circles and the Arab peoples... They address the former frankly and commit themselves to solutions they cannot refute; but when they speak to the Arab peoples, they encourage them in their desires and dreams and hide from them anything that could arouse their anger or disagreement until, years later, there inevitably comes a new failure and a setback more bitter and harrowing than the last."

Calling on the Arab masses "to rally round the progressive regimes," Damascus Radio on 14 September said: "After the uncovering of the plot of Field-Marshal Amer and the junta of senior Right-wing leaders in the UAR, it seems that the revolution now needs a comprehensive purge of its ranks to eliminate elements which belived in the need for revolutionary authority only because they thought it guaranteed them special privileges."

Moscow Radio, broadcasting in Arabic for Algeria on 6 September, referred to "the acute political struggle between supporters and opponents of a progressive policy in the UAR", which was "far
/from

-2-

from having ended with the dismissal of Amer and those surrounding him." It quoted Pravda's two correspondents recently in Cairo as saying that Amer intended to launch a propaganda campaign placing responsibility for the Arabs' setback "on the UAR's friends".

"Col. Nasser's policies also face opposition from various quarters at home. The extreme Leftists, led by Col. Ali Sabri and backed by Egyptian Communists, are already making veiled criticisms of the Government in some newspapers, and have suggested that Egypt is taking too soft a line with America". - Hindustan Times despatch from Khartoum, 7 September.

"The (Khartoum) conference did not proclaim slogans. It was content with setting forth the aim of safeguarding the rights of the Arab..... It admitted that in dealing with our cause we were more emotional than rational". King Hussein of Jordan, in a letter to his Prime Minister, Sa'd Jum'ah, quoted by Amman Radio, 13 September.

An editorial in the 3-9 September issue of Algérie Actualité said that the agreement on the Yemen "would put an end to five years of ideological war for the installation of a progressive régime. The solution which provides for an end to the fighting is desirable, but would it mean the reinforcement and consolidation of the Republic? It is dangerous to reply in the affirmative."

The Syrian Communist Party Secretary-General Khalid Bakdash, wrote in the Party's paper Nidal as-Sha'b in mid-August: "We must admit that many Arab progressive elements, even we Communists on some occasions, fail to pay due attention to the political factor and its international effect. Often statements are made, slogans put forward, and attitudes adopted without consideration of their international impact and the effect they may have on the popular masses throughout the world, including friendly countries. We recall here, for instance, the well-known statements by Shuqayri and others, which are, devoid of any sense of responsibility". (Bakdash's article was broadcast by the clandestine East German-based station "Voice of the Iraqi People" on 6, 7 and 8 September and printed in the Beirut Communist weekly Al Akhbar.)

The Tehran paper Azhang of 27 August reported that one of the "Iranian traitors" who had taken refuge abroad had had talks with the first secretary of the Bulgarian Communist Party. This had astonished Iranian public opinion in view of Bulgarian promises of non-interference in the internal affairs of Iran. Azhang commented: "Are not the Bulgarian authorities aware that there is no longer a Tudeh Party in Iran? Don't they know that several traitors condemned to death in absentia are to be found in Communist countries?... We hope the Bulgarian authorities will not allow a few turncoats to interfere in the friendly relations between our two countries and introduce tension between them."

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(1073/4/18/67)



From: Foreign Office

To: Bahrain

Telegram No: Guidance 251

Date: 3 October, 1967

D. S. W.

CONFIDENTIAL
PRIORITY

Arab/Israel. Guidance No. 218.

There are at the moment significant indications that both King Hussein and President Nasser are taking a fairly realistic attitude about a solution of the Arab/Israel problem on terms which would give the Israelis what we consider to be their essential requirements, and the moderate Arabs generally may agree to acquiesce in a balanced Security Council Resolution on the lines of what has come to be known as the Goldberg/Gromyko draft of last July (see paragraph 2 of Guidance No. 218).

2. We would hope that such a resolution would recognise the principle of withdrawal on the one hand, and on the other of acknowledgement of the right of all states members of the United Nations to live in peace and security, and the renunciation of all claims inconsistent with this principle: that it would provide for a representative of the Secretary-General to assist in putting the resolution into effect and would look to a U.N. presence to help bring about eventual solutions of particular aspects of the problem including the refugees and freedom of transit through international waterways.

3. According to our information the Russians want to make progress in the Security Council and while they will not move faster than the moderate Arabs, they will not insist on Arab unanimity.

4. The Israelis are taking a hard, indeed an increasingly hard, line. They are insisting that the only way of making satisfactory progress is by direct negotiations with the Arabs, and they dislike the idea of a U.N. representative, who would be an intermediary even if not so called, they insist that the whole of Jerusalem must remain united under Israeli control. Though they are prepared to envisage extra-territorial arrangements for the Holy places. They are still uncooperative about the return of the new refugees to the West Bank, and have recently begun to establish agricultural settlements there. Though they maintain that these are for security reasons the move must appear provocative to the Arabs.

5. In our view early passage by the Security Council of a resolution along the lines of the Goldberg-Gromyko draft offers the best chance of progress. If there is any undue delay in getting such a balanced resolution forward, we are likely to be faced with a previous move in the Council on Jerusalem and/or the refugees. Either of these subjects would be likely to create such an emotional atmosphere that constructive moves towards a balanced settlement would be impeded.

6. The U.S. have moved closer to the Israeli position. Although they would still be prepared to try to make progress in the Security Council on the basis of the Goldberg/Gromyko formula, they are now anxious that the provisions of any such formula with regard to the recognition and security of Israel should be spelled out fully. This runs counter to our own view that this will be impossible to achieve until after a U.N. representative has got to work. We shall be working to convince the Americans that we are right on this.

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7. There is a danger that, if the Israelis maintain their present hard attitude, the present relatively favourable opportunity may pass the Arabs relapse, at whatever cost to themselves, into sterile hostility to Israel. While from a local point of view the Israelis could no doubt ignore the Arabs more or less indefinitely, and remain in occupation of the territories they hold at present, they would in the long run be faced with great difficulties of a wider nature, e.g. consistent Soviet hostility, absence of Western support on a number of issues, economic difficulties due to the need to maintain a large armament, and the problems of controlling or absorbing so large an Arab population which, with its higher birthrate, could fairly soon come to outnumber the Jewish elements unless these are enlarged by substantial net immigration.

8. The above is for your own information. As regards para 6, despite the current difference in emphasis between the Americans and ourselves about the urgency of tabling a resolution based on the Goldberg/Gromyko formula, it is important not to give an impression of serious Anglo-American differences even to friendly governments, since this would be likely to make our objectives more difficult to attain.

Bahrain pass Saving to Abu Dhabi, Doha, Dubai and Muscat.

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SAVING TELEGRAM

Bag

FOREIGN OFFICE TO ABIDJAN

Telno 34 Saving

28 September 1967

(J.I.P.G.D.)

D. H. W.

UNCLASSIFIED

Addressed to Abidjan telegram No. 34 Saving of 28 September. Repeated for information Saving to certain other posts.

MIDDLE EAST TALKING POINTS28 September, 1967

Soviet Premier Kosygin, at a Kremlin reception on 23 September for a North Vietnamese Government delegation, said the arms sent to Viet Nam "are in trustworthy hands and are beating the aggressor as he deserves". Since June, Soviet writers have been critical of Arab handling of arms from the Soviet Union.

2. The Beirut Communist weekly Al Akhbar on 10 September followed the Soviet line of encouraging "progressive" régimes and movements in the Arab world. It said the problem was "the need to preserve Egypt's progressive gains, to maintain its radical changes and to carry them further ahead". It spoke of "widespread participation of the masses in guiding and watching political, economic and social work".

3. Al Akhbar has published details (10 September) of the Egyptian Air Force's unpreparedness at the time of the Arab-Israeli war. It quoted L'Humanité's correspondent in Egypt as saying that after Israel's first attack on West Cairo airport, a Soviet expert ran up to the pilots of five undamaged aircraft and shouted at them: "Why don't you do something?" The pilots answered: "We have no orders".

Several months before the war, said Al Akhbar, a Soviet expert reported that anti-aircraft defences at Egyptian military airports were very weak. "But the Soviet expert's report vanished. He left Egypt, declaring that he could not be held responsible". When the Chief of the General Staff of the Soviet Army, Zakharov, visited Egypt "he learned that tank drivers had not been sufficiently trained but were handed modern military vehicles after five hours' training".

Al Akhbar claimed that a large number of Egyptian Army officers "assumed important positions in the nationalised companies and also in the Government. Generals' salaries exceeded those of Ministers. Priority was given to the military instead of to the specialists. The Army became more important than the State and the (Arab) Socialist Union. It was beyond political control... Every day a new scandal was reported in the Press and talked about... The most significant was the uncovering of a large-scale smuggling network in Field-Marshal Amer's office".

4. A plea for the release of Algerian "progressive" political detainees was made in a broadcast by the clandestine East German-based Iraqi Communist Party station "Voice of the Iraqi People" on 16 September. Quoting the current issue of Muqawamah, the journal of the Algerian Socialist Tali'ah Party, the radio mentioned Ben Bella, former President of Algeria, Ben Alla and their colleagues who "have been detained for 26 months"; about 100 "strugglers of the Tali'ah Party who have been in prison for two

/ years",

years", and some Trade Union "strugglers" who were arrested "despite written guarantees by Sharif Bilqasim" (Head of the Executive Secretariat of the FLN). The broadcast said their conditions of detention were "inhuman" and were "aimed at destroying their morale".

5. The need for moderation and good relations with the West were stressed by the Editor of the Cairo paper Al Ahram in his article of 15 September. Mohammed Hasanayn Heykal wrote: "The Arab world must maintain contact with the West because, no matter how bitter it feels towards it, it cannot dump its relations with it into the sea".

He was against Viet Nam-type fighting. "Those who advocate it are people who like to copy things without giving them much thought... I believe Viet Nam-type fighting is not suitable for us because of the vast difference between conditions in the Arab world and those in Viet Nam".

6. The Director of the "Voice of the Arabs" radio, Ahmad Sa'id, has been relieved of his post, Cairo newspapers reported on 19 September. The removal of this excitable commentator, who broadcast violent propaganda indiscriminately against "enemies" of the moment, may represent the moderation mentioned above. Jumhourieh suggested that Sa'id should be brought to trial as being among those responsible for the recent setback. Sa'id's successor, Mohammed Uruq, broadcasts comments "characterised with calmness", according to the independent review "Arab World".

7. Using the Suez Canal on both legs of the trip, an 80,000-ton tanker could haul a ton of Kuwait crude oil to Rotterdam at a cost of 3.84 dollars. A tanker of 200,000 tons (53 are on order) by rounding Africa on its loaded voyage but returning through the Canal in ballast, could reduce the cost by 34 per cent. A tanker of 300,000 tons (six are on order) carrying 1.25 million barrels of oil and rounding Africa both ways, could cut the cost by 39 per cent. - Estimate by senior oil analyst for New York brokerage firm, Paine Webber, Jackson and Curtis, 24 September.

On 26 September Esso announced that it had placed orders with British shipyards for four tankers of 240,000 tons each at a total cost of £26½ million.

8. In his Annual Report to the United Nations General Assembly on 19 September U Thant also said that the issue of withdrawal of Israeli armed forces from neighbouring Arab States "loses sizeable support when taken alone by separating it from other vital issues, and particularly that of national security.

"The unwillingness of the Arab States to accept the existence of the State of Israel, the insistence of some on maintaining a continuing state of belligerency with Israel ... the question of innocent passage through the Strait of Tiran and the Suez Canal, are also fundamental issues which present hotly controversial problems and sharp division, even though there is much agreement on the principles involved".

9. Noting that some Arabs had criticised Communist countries for sacrificing the "national liberation movement" for the principles of peaceful co-existence a Prague Home Service commentary on 24 September went on "... demands for direct involvement of the Soviet Union, as voiced in the Middle East during the war and

/shortly

shortly after it, are scarcely justifiable. Let us remember that even the Vietnamese Communists fighting for years in far worse conditions have never made such demands. On the contrary, only recently they emphasised again that they want to gain national liberation and at the same time to avoid a world war and thus to crown the policy of peaceful coexistence... The solution of the Indian-Pakistani conflict at a conference in Tashkent, thanks to the efforts of Soviet diplomacy, is an example of the political solving of a conflict which was as long-standing as the Arab-Israeli one... Although the Arab-Israeli conflict is much more complex than that between Pakistan and India, both parties will sooner or later have to look at the problem with different eyes than those of hatred of 20 years".

10. Pravda correspondents Belyayev and Primakov wrote in the latest issue of the Soviet weekly Za Rubezhom that the putting forward of "progressive Socialist slogans" in Egypt was "not accompanied by corresponding work to organise the masses". The article (quoted by Tass on 22 September) said that "another hindrance" was "the existence of certain restrictions with regard to some progressive democratic leaders".

The writers noted that "far from all Egyptians who sincerely believe in scientific Socialism are attracted into active political work". In the last six or eight weeks there had been "a downslide of mood in favour of an immediate continuation of armed struggle with Israel".

11. Belyayev also took part in a discussion programme on 24 September in the Moscow Home Service and said "In Khartoum, where my colleagues and I covered the conference of Arab States which took place from 29 August to 1 September, we noticed a very interesting new note in the debates. The Arab countries now understand that their defeat in the six days' of war is far from being an advantage and, understanding that the Middle East problem cannot at present be solved by old methods, they are prepared to agree to a settlement which would justly take their interests into account. And the plan which was discussed there at a closed session envisages the possibility of a document being presented at the 22nd session of the United Nations General Assembly which would fix the present situation in the Middle East, but on condition that the Israeli troops withdraw behind the lines which existed until 5 June, behind the dividing lines".

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PRIORITY FOREIGN OFFICE AND COMMONWEALTH OFFICE TO CERTAIN
MISSIONS AND DEPENDENT TERRITORIES

GUIDANCE NO. 251 3 OCTOBER, 1967 (IP)

CONFIDENTIAL

ARAB/ISRAEL.

GUIDANCE NO 218.

THERE ARE AT THE MOMENT SIGNIFICANT INDICATIONS THAT BOTH KING HUSSEIN AND PRESIDENT NASSER ARE TAKING A FAIRLY REALISTIC ATTITUDE ABOUT A SOLUTION OF THE ARAB/ISRAEL PROBLEM ON TERMS WHICH WOULD GIVE THE ISRAELIS WHAT WE CONSIDER TO BE THEIR ESSENTIAL REQUIREMENTS, AND THE MODERATE ARABS GENERALLY MAY AGREE TO ACQUIESCE IN A BALANCED SECURITY COUNCIL RESOLUTION ON THE LINES OF WHAT HAS COME TO BE KNOWN AS THE GOLDBERG/GROMYKO DRAFT OF LAST JULY (SEE PARAGRAPH 2 OF GUIDANCE NO 218).

2. WE WOULD HOPE THAT SUCH A RESOLUTION WOULD RECOGNISE THE PRINCIPLE OF WITHDRAWAL ON THE ONE HAND, AND ON THE OTHER OF ACKNOWLEDGMENT OF THE RIGHT OF ALL STATES MEMBERS OF THE UNITED NATIONS TO LIVE IN PEACE AND SECURITY, AND THE RENUNCIATION OF ALL CLAIMS INCONSISTENT WITH THIS PRINCIPLE: THAT IT WOULD PROVIDE FOR A REPRESENTATIVE OF THE SECRETARY-GENERAL TO ASSIST IN PUTTING THE RESOLUTION INTO EFFECT AND WOULD LOOK TO A U.N. PRESENCE TO HELP BRING ABOUT EVENTUAL SOLUTIONS OF PARTICULAR ASPECTS OF THE PROBLEM INCLUDING THE REFUGEES AND FREEDOM OF TRANSIT THROUGH INTERNATIONAL WATERWAYS.

3. ACCORDING TO OUR INFORMATION THE RUSSIANS WANT TO MAKE PROGRESS IN THE SECURITY COUNCIL AND WHILE THEY WILL NOT MOVE FASTER THAN THE MODERATE ARABS, THEY WILL NOT INSIST ON ARAB UNANIMITY.

4. THE ISRAELIS ARE TAKING A HARD, INDEED AN INCREASINGLY HARD, LINE. THEY ARE INSISTING THAT THE ONLY WAY OF MAKING SATISFACTORY PROGRESS IS BY DIRECT NEGOTIATIONS WITH THE ARABS, AND THEY DISLIKE THE IDEA OF A U.N. REPRESENTATIVE, WHO WOULD BE AN INTERMEDIARY EVEN IF NOT SO CALLED. THEY INSIST THAT THE WHOLE OF JERUSALEM MUST REMAIN UNITED UNDER ISRAELI CONTROL, THOUGH THEY ARE PREPARED TO ENVISAGE EXTRA-TERRITORIAL ARRANGEMENTS FOR THE HOLY PLACES. THEY ARE STILL UNCOOPERATIVE ABOUT THE RETURN OF THE NEW REFUGEES TO THE WEST BANK, AND HAVE RECENTLY BEGUN TO ESTABLISH AGRICULTURAL SETTLEMENTS THERE. THOUGH THEY MAINTAIN THAT THESE ARE FOR
/SECURITY

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F.O. AND C.O./DTD TELEGRAM GUIDANCE NO. 251

-2-

SECURITY REASONS THE MOVE MUST APPEAR PROVOCATIVE TO THE ARABS.

5. IN OUR VIEW EARLY PASSAGE BY THE SECURITY COUNCIL OF A RESOLUTION ALONG THE LINES OF THE GOLDBERG/GROMYKO DRAFT OFFERS THE BEST CHANCE OF PROGRESS. IF THERE IS ANY UNDUE DELAY IN GETTING SUCH A BALANCED RESOLUTION FORWARD, WE ARE LIKELY TO BE FACED WITH A PREVIOUS MOVE IN THE COUNCIL ON JERUSALEM AND/OR THE REFUGEES. EITHER OF THESE SUBJECTS WOULD BE LIKELY TO CREATE SUCH AN EMOTIONAL ATMOSPHERE THAT CONSTRUCTIVE MOVES TOWARDS A BALANCED SETTLEMENT WOULD BE IMPEDED.

6. THE U.S. HAVE MOVED CLOSER TO THE ISRAELI POSITION. ALTHOUGH THEY WOULD STILL BE PREPARED TO TRY TO MAKE PROGRESS IN THE SECURITY COUNCIL ON THE BASIS OF THE GOLDBERG/GROMYKO FORMULA, THEY ARE NOW ANXIOUS THAT THE PROVISIONS OF ANY SUCH FORMULA WITH REGARD TO THE RECOGNITION AND SECURITY OF ISRAEL SHOULD BE SPELLED OUT FULLY. THIS RUNS COUNTER TO OUR OWN VIEW THAT THIS WILL BE IMPOSSIBLE TO ACHIEVE UNTIL AFTER A U.N. REPRESENTATIVE HAS GOT TO WORK. WE SHALL BE WORKING TO CONVINCE THE AMERICANS THAT WE ARE RIGHT ON THIS.

7. THERE IS A DANGER THAT, IF THE ISRAELIS MAINTAIN THEIR PRESENT HARD ATTITUDE, THE PRESENT RELATIVELY FAVOURABLE OPPORTUNITY MAY PASS AND THE ARABS RELAPSE, AT WHATEVER COST TO THEMSELVES, INTO STERILE HOSTILITY TO ISRAEL. WHILE FROM A LOCAL POINT OF VIEW THE ISRAELIS COULD NO DOUBT IGNORE THE ARABS MORE OR LESS INDEFINITELY, AND REMAIN IN OCCUPATION OF THE TERRITORIES THEY HOLD AT PRESENT, THEY WOULD IN THE LONG RUN BE FACED WITH GREAT DIFFICULTIES OF A WIDER NATURE, E.G., CONSISTENT SOVIET HOSTILITY, ABSENCE OF WESTERN SUPPORT ON A NUMBER OF ISSUES, ECONOMIC DIFFICULTIES DUE TO THE NEED TO MAINTAIN A LARGE ARMAMENT, AND THE PROBLEMS OF CONTROLLING OR ABSORBING SO LARGE AN ARAB POPULATION WHICH, WITH ITS HIGHER BIRTHRATE, COULD FAIRLY SOON COME TO OUTNUMBER THE JEWISH ELEMENTS UNLESS THESE ARE ENLARGED BY SUBSTANTIAL NET IMMIGRATION.

8. THE ABOVE IS FOR YOUR OWN INFORMATION. AS REGARDS PARAGRAPH 6, DESPITE THE CURRENT DIFFERENCE IN EMPHASIS BETWEEN THE AMERICANS

/AND

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F.O. AND C.O./DTD TELEGRAM GUIDANCE NO. 251

-3-

AND OURSELVES ABOUT THE URGENCY OF TABLING A RESOLUTION BASED ON THE GOLDBERG/GROMYKO FORMULA, IT IS IMPORTANT NOT TO GIVE AN IMPRESSION OF SERIOUS ANGLO-AMERICAN DIFFERENCES EVEN TO FRIENDLY GOVERNMENTS, SINCE THIS WOULD BE LIKELY TO MAKE OUR OBJECTIVES MORE DIFFICULT TO ATTAIN.

SOSFA/CROSEC SENT 2015Z 3 OCTOBER, 1967

BY TELEGRAPH:

| | | |
|------------------|----------------------|-----------------|
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SAVING TELEGRAM

FOREIGN OFFICE/COMMONWEALTH OFFICE TO ABIDJAN AND CERTAIN
OTHER POSTS

Telegram No. 36 Saving

6 October, 1967 (JIPGD)

UNCLASSIFIED

D.A.W.

HMCY 15/10.

Addressed to Abidjan telegram No. 36 Saving of 6 October,
And Saving to certain other posts.

Middle East Talking Points.

5 October, 1967.

Algeria's policy of resuming the war against Israel was reaffirmed in an Algiers Radio commentary in Arabic on 26 September. The broadcast called upon Palestinian Arabs to march on the path of "armed popular resistance, whatever the price". It claimed that the Palestinian people "are on their way to create a new Algeria" (implying that their resistance might in time be comparable with that practised by the Algerians in their war against France). Algeria, said the commentator, "will not stint means of support and aid in all fields" for "the fraternal Palestinian Arab people". Similarly, Baghdad's "Holy March" programme said on 28 September: "Strugglers in our occupied territory: The peoples of the Arab nation and particularly the Palestinian people, firmly believe that the armed struggle is the revolutionary course to recover the stolen homeland and that fida'i activities are a practical translation of this course of action".

2. Chadli al Klibi, Tunisian Minister of Cultural Affairs and Information, included the following in his speech to delegates at the Arab Information Ministers' Conference in Bizerta on 27 September. "I should like to dwell on some particularly important questions. In the first place I shall mention the language of our information. We must divest it of rhetoric and must shed those inflamed oratorical formulae that have led our peoples astray to the point that they can no longer conceive of reality and its problems, except through a veil of passion covering a truth which has become ungraspable. We have gone so far in verbal excess that words have become powerless to serve their natural functions. Our abuse of language is such that no more than relative attention is paid to our statements. Neither our writers nor even a number of our leaders are free of this alienation.... In particular we must be firmly convinced that for the Arabs the best propaganda they can make abroad is what they tell their own peoples, what they do at home to increase their resources and put an end to poverty and to ignorance and to all the aspects of underdevelopment and of decadence."

3. "It is about time the resources spent on military forces by the developed world were at least partly directed towards raising living standards in the developing areas", the UAR Minister of Economy and Foreign Trade, Hassan Abbas Zaki, told the International Monetary Fund meeting in Rio de Janeiro on 27 September.

- 2 -

The 1966/67 Egyptian Budget presented to the National Assembly last May allocated 171.4 million Egyptian pounds to the armed forces. This was an increase of 13 million pounds (about 8 per cent) over the 1965/66 estimate. U.A.R. military expenditure has risen substantially since the Arab-Israeli war in June. Hundreds of destroyed tanks, aircraft and large quantities of arms have been replaced - by the Soviet Union.

4. Referring to Pakistan's continuing worry about Soviet arms deliveries to India, President Ayub of Pakistan said in Moscow on 28 September: "We should conserve our resources and utilise them for the welfare of the common man rather than fritter them away on the acquisition of arms We on our part would welcome an all-round reduction in arms and elimination of disputes likely to endanger peace".

5. "The courageous speech delivered (to the UN General Assembly) by British Foreign Secretary George Brown should not go without a quick word of appreciation", said the Jordanian paper Al-Difa, quoted by Amman Radio on 27 September. "He has set a good example to the Foreign Ministers of all other countries, regardless of their relations with the Arab countries or with Israel". The Lebanese Press gave prominence to Mr. Brown's speech, with favourable headlines on his insistence on a United Nations solution, and his deploring the extension of Israeli frontiers and Israel's continuing occupation of Arab land.

6. A U.A.R. envoy sent to tour Latin America to "establish contacts" had to be replaced because he had attended the Havana Tricontinental Conference which reminded Latin American leaders of "the danger threatening them from Havana". Reporting this in his Friday article on 22 September, the Editor of Al Ahram, Mohammed Hasanayn Heykal, said: "We were faced with a set of contradictions: it was natural for us to attend the Havana Conference as we had contacts with revolutionary forces On the other hand, we need the votes of the Latin American States (in the U.N.) regardless of future consequences".

7. Speaking on the Arab/Israeli problem in the U.N. on 5 October the Yugoslav Foreign Minister, Mr. Nikezic said "The right of all states to exist is for us a principle beyond dispute. It fully applies to the State of Israel, whose existence and equality of rights with other States we have never questioned. It is obvious that recognition of the right to exist and respect for the independence and territorial integrity of all States constitute an integral part of any solution. It is in this spirit that my Government proposed guarantees to be given by the Great Powers, or by the Security Council, in order to ensure the respect of those rights in practice." "Yugoslavia is also for the respect and application of the principle of freedom of navigation through international waterways". (Mr. Nikezic went on to stress the need for a general settlement recognising the interests of the Palestine refugees and the need for withdrawal.)

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CAIRO TO FOREIGN OFFICE.

Telno. 957

29 September. 1967

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Addressed to Foreign Office telegram No. 957 of 29 September.

Repeated for information U/N Saving UKMIS New York, HC Aden (Personal) Algiers, Amman, Bahrain (Residence) Beirut, Benghazi, Jedda, Khartoum, Kuwait, Rabat, Tel Aviv Tripoli, Tunis, LIC Aden and JIC Cyprus.

Arab/Israel at the United Nations.

Reactions to Secretary of State's speech on Mid-East (Ahram, which reflects official line), sub-headlined on 27 September your concentration on Israel withdrawal, early opening of canal on U.N. presence. Sub-lead refers to "important speech by Brown" and Israel attacks on it. Reuter report of Arab delegation's applause is also mentioned. Gomhouriya and Akhbar headlined your demand for speedy opening of canal and use of United Nations to solve crisis; only Gomhouriya picked up call for recognition of Israel's right to exist but also mentioned your concern about Israel settlements in occupied territory.

2. No (repeat no) editorial comment; and no (repeat no) report today of Israel criticism and Gomhouriya mention of your warning to Israel over settlements. I hear widely however that in official circles speech was well received.

Foreign Office pass U/N Saving UKMIS New York, HC. Aden (Personal) Algiers, Amman, Bahrain (Residence) Beirut, Benghazi, Jedda, Khartoum, Kuwait, Rabat, Tel Aviv Tripoli, Tunis, LIC Aden JIC Cyprus.

Mr. Tesh.

Sent 1330Z/29 September.
Recd 1842Z/29 September.

[Repeated as requested]

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(6/19)

(4 August, 1967)

JOINT RESEARCH DEPARTMENT MEMORANDUM

CHRONOLOGY OF THE ARAB-ISRAEL WAR. MAY-JUNE 1967.

I. Events leading up to the war

During January Israel and Syria finally agreed to reactivate the Mixed Armistice Commission in order to discuss the question of cultivation in the demilitarised zones by the Israelis, which had been the flash point of a number of armed clashes. However discussions lapsed without result after only three meetings. While the Commission was in session, Syrian sabotage activities and artillery harassment of Israel cultivators increased in intensity.

On 7 April the Israel Air Force finally mounted an air strike against the artillery positions from which Syria had been bombarding Israel settlements in the Gadot-Ein Gev-Haon area. The strike was also retaliatory action against Syrian harassment of Israel cultivation in the demilitarised zones. Thereafter Israel re-inforced her troops on the Syrian frontier. The scale of re-inforcement appeared to be in excess of that required to achieve Israel's stated aim of taking the initiative whenever Syria gave the opportunity and of enforcing, by use of arms if necessary, Israel's right to cultivate the demilitarised zones.

It was reported that following the action of 7 April the Syrians were maintaining a state of maximum alert on the Israel border and that Syrian forces on the border had been re-inforced. However Israel spokesmen reported no significant build up of Syrian border forces on 13 April.

On 9 May the Israel Foreign Minister warned Syria that further acts of terrorism ran the risk of provoking further retaliation, while the Israel Prime Minister accused Syria of acting as a centre for sabotage action against Israel, both in the provision of training facilities and in the financing of operations.

/Saturday 13 May

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Saturday 13 May

Syria accused Israel of plotting to destroy the Syrian revolutionary régime in collusion with the imperialist powers.

The Israel Prime Minister stated that Israel would foil all plans for the diversion of the Jordan head waters and would ensure that the Red Sea remained open to Israel shipping. He also said that Syria was the focal point of the terrorist campaign against Israel, but that the latter would choose the time, the place and the means of countering the aggression.

The UAR press suggested that Israel was contemplating a fresh attack on Syria.

Sunday 14 May

The UAR Chief of Staff visited Syria to discuss joint defence against Israel.

The Syrian delegate at UN accused Israel of making clear threats of war against Syria and denounced U Thant's statement on Arab terrorism.

Monday 15 May

The UAR armed forces were placed in a state of alert and various roads out of Cairo were closed to civilian traffic. The UAR claimed that this action had been taken because Israel was concentrating troops for an attack on Syria.

Tuesday 16 May

UAR troop movements into Sinai were confirmed.

The UAR called upon General Rikhye, commanding UNEF forces on the UAR-Israel frontier, to withdraw UNEF forces in Sinai to ensure their safety. The UAR later called upon General Rikhye to withdraw UNEF troops from Sharm al Shaikh within 48 hours. General Rikhye refused to move UNEF without instructions from U Thant but undertook to refer the request to him. Nevertheless, UAR troops subsequently occupied Yugoslav manned UNEF control posts in Sinai, thus placing the UAR troops between UNEF and Israel.

Cairo Radio called for battle preparations and accused the USA and the UK of supporting Israel.

Wednesday 17 May

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Wednesday 17 May

UAR troops occupied UNEF observation posts in the Al Sabha area. At mid-day the UAR called for the withdrawal of all Yugoslav troops from the border including the Sharm al Shaikh contingent within 24 hours. An hour later UAR troops were reported in the area of Al Qusaima and by 1400 hours Israel troops, about a battalion strength, had moved to the frontier in the area of Al Amr.

The armed forces of Jordan were placed in a state of alert, and Iraqi support for Syria was announced.

Thursday 18 May

Israel announced restricted counter-measures of a defensive nature in response to the UAR military build up in Sinai. She estimated the UAR concentration at 60-70,000 troops, including 600 tanks, artillery and air forces.

UAR made a formal request for the withdrawal of UNEF. Despite pressure from the UK, USA and Israel that there should be no action without reference to the General Assembly, the Secretary-General agreed to the withdrawal without further preliminaries.

Mobilisation in Iraq, Jordan and Kuwait in support of the UAR and Syria was announced.

Friday 19 May

Cairo Radio announced that the USSR had pledged that "the USSR will not stand idly by if Israel attacks Syria".

Algeria and Republican Yemen pledged support for UAR and Syria.

Withdrawal of UNEF from the border completed.

Saturday 20 May

Israel announced that a limited call up of reserves had been completed.

Military talks between Syria and Iraq to coordinate military cooperation commenced.

A concentration of Iraqi armed forces on the Jordanian frontier was announced.

Syrian airports were formally opened to all UAR aircraft.

/Sunday 21 May

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Sunday 21 May

UAR troops occupied Sharm al Shaikh.

UAR announced the mobilisation of reserves, while troop movements into Sinai continued and the movement of UAR naval forces south through the Suez Canal took place.

The Jordanian Chief of Staff visited Cairo to discuss the coordination of Arab effort with the Unified Arab Command.

Lebanon proclaimed a state of defence on her frontier with Israel.

Monday 22 May

The UN Secretary General left for Cairo to discuss methods of easing the Middle East situation.

UAR announced that the passage of Israel shipping through the Straits of Tiran, which she claimed as territorial waters, had been banned. She also announced a ban on the passage of strategic materials to Israel through the Straits even if carried in non-Israeli shipping.

Lebanon announced that a part of her reserves were being called up.

The Sudan announced her support for the UAR.

Israel announced that a limited call-up of reservists had been ordered. In a speech in the Knesset, the Prime Minister called for a restoration of the status quo on both sides of the Israel-UAR frontier. He said that Israel had no intention of attacking the Arab states and had no desire to interfere in their internal affairs, security, territory or lawful rights. He demanded that similar principles be observed towards Israel.

Tuesday 23 May

Cairo announced that the Straits of Tiran had been mined.

This later proved to be untrue.

UAR demanded that Iran cease exporting oil to Israel.

All Gaza reservists were called up.

Morocco announced her support for the UAR and Syria, while Republican Yemen announced a general mobilisation of her armed /forces.

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forces. King Faisal, in a London press conference, affirmed Saudi Arabia's readiness to enter any war against Israel, and announced that Saudi armed forces had been placed in a state of alert.

The Israel Prime Minister declared that the closure of the Straits of Tiran constituted a violation of international law, an interference with the sovereign rights of other nations, and an act of aggression against Israel. He also called upon the Great Powers to maintain freedom of shipping through the straits.

The USA urged the UAR to lift the "illegal" blockade of the Gulf of Aqaba, which she considered to be an international waterway. At the same time elements of the US Sixth Fleet were ordered to the eastern Mediterranean.

The USSR issued a warning that she would join the Arab states in "resolute resistance" to any aggressor and accused Israel of causing the crisis.

Denmark and Canada called for an urgent meeting of the Security Council to consider the crisis.

Wednesday 24 May

Jordan announced that permission had been granted for the entry of Saudi and Iraqi forces into Jordan. In addition it was reported that Jordanian general mobilisation had been completed.

Lebanon called up reservists.

The British Prime Minister in a speech at Margate, reaffirmed HMG's view that the Straits of Tiran and the Gulf of Aqaba were international waterways, and declared that HMG would assert the right of freedom of innocent passage on behalf of British shipping, though he did not specify how. He also pledged British support for international action to uphold the right of free passage.

It was announced that British naval forces transiting the Mediterranean and the Middle East had been held over in the area.

The USA warned the UAR that she considered the closure of the Straits of Tiran an act of aggression. The USA and the UK agreed that the Straits must be reopened. The use of force was not discounted, although the emphasis was on diplomatic action.

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The French Government proposed four power talks on the Middle East question. They noted that although in international law there should be freedom of navigation for ships of commerce in the Straits of Tiran, the situation was complicated by the fact that the UAR had not guaranteed to assure this freedom when UNEF was established.

In the Security Council emergency session the USA announced her willingness to work with the USSR, the UK and France in a common effort to restore and maintain peace in the Middle East, either within the framework of the UN or outside it. Shortly afterwards the USSR demanded the withdrawal of US and British naval forces from the Mediterranean.

Thursday 25 May

Cairo Radio announced that there was definite proof of American collusion with Israel in all the latter's movements, threats and preparations on the Syrian frontier and charged that the crisis was the result of collusion between Israel, USA and UK.

The UN Secretary General left Cairo at the end of his talks with the UAR Government.

The Israel Foreign Minister visited Washington seeking assurances that the USA would ensure that the Gulf of Aqaba remained open. It seemed likely that although Israel considered that the closing of the Gulf was a casus belli, she was waiting to see what resulted from international diplomacy.

Friday 26 May

Troop movements from northern Iraq into Syria were reported.

The Israel Government continued to resist the mounting pressure to broaden the base of the Government. At the same time the Israel Government warned that they were not prepared to wait indefinitely for the blockade of the Gulf of Aqaba to be lifted and for troop concentrations on the borders to be dispersed.

President Nasser stated that if war broke out the main task would be the destruction of Israel.

/Saturday 27 May

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Saturday 27 May

It was reported that the UAR had placed the economy on a war footing and was withdrawing troops from the Yemen.

Kuwait declared that she would take steps against the interests of any power which committed hostile acts against the Arabs, and would occupy oil installations and oil fields in order to prevent sabotage, even cutting off the flow of oil, if necessary, until the matter was settled. No precise indication was given of what would constitute "hostile acts".

In reporting on his mission to Cairo, U Thant said that President Nasser had assured him that the UAR would not initiate offensive action against Israel. U Thant also proposed the re-activation of EIMAC and ISMAC as helpful moves which would gain a breathing space.

Sunday 28 May

President Nasser declared, during a press conference, that the UAR did not accept any form of peaceful coexistence with Israel, but that the UAR would not make the first attack. He said that the UAR would not budge on her stand on shipping through the Straits of Tiran.

The Iraqi Cabinet announced a decision to adopt all measures required to repel aggression including the banning of the export of oil to any state which might take part in aggression and to call for a conference of Arab oil producing countries to adopt the following measures:-

- (i) to ban the sale and shipment of oil to any country which takes part in or supports aggression against any Arab country, against Arab sovereign rights, or in any Arab territorial waters, especially the Gulf of Aqaba.
- (ii) to inform foreign oil companies of this and to warn them that should they not comply with this decision, steps would be taken to terminate the relevant concession.

An Iraqi-Syrian military coordination agreement was signed.

The Israel Government was urged by party leaders to transfer the Ministry of Defence to Ben Gurion or General Dayan.

/Monday 29 May

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Monday 29 May

The UAR and Israel exchanged fire in the Nahal Oz area.

President Nasser told the UAR National Assembly that the USSR had promised to block any American or Western attempt to intervene in the crisis in Israel's favour.

President Nasser was granted powers to rule by decree while the crisis continued. He warned that the USA and the UK must be treated as enemies because of the pro-Israel bias.

The USA called upon the Security Council to call upon the UAR to lift the blockade.

Diplomatic negotiations were under way among Western maritime nations to create an international mechanism to open the Gulf of Aqaba and keep it open to all shipping without discrimination. It was however expected that this would take some time. There was no indication of how the opening might be achieved.

It was confirmed that the USSR had turned down the French call for four power consultations, although she was obviously anxious to avoid a shooting war.

Tuesday 30 May

Jordan signed a mutual defence pact with the UAR which provided, among other things, that:-

- (i) any attack on either party would be construed as an attack on both and both parties will use all means in their power to assist one another.
- (ii) in the event of military operations, the UAR Chief of Staff would assume command of the armed forces of both countries.

Cairo Radio called upon Libya to ensure that Wheelus Airfield was not used to assist Israel. It said that the base had been so used in the past.

The USSR was granted permission to move ten warships through the Bosphorus into the Mediterranean.

Wednesday 31 May

The arrival of Iraqi and Kuwaiti troops in the UAR was announced.

Republican Yemen offered troops to the UAR.

/The USA

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The USA proposed a resolution in the Security Council which aimed at achieving a much needed breathing space.

Thursday 1 June

An unspecified number of Iraqi planes were reported to have left Baghdad to take up positions at an advanced front

Libyan troops were reported to have arrived at the UAR frontier where they were awaiting orders.

PLO offices in Jerusalem were reopened.

The British Prime Minister left London for Ottawa and Washington for talks on the crisis. It was stressed in London that no decision had yet been taken on the possible use of force to break the blockade of the Gulf of Aqaba. Attention was focussed rather on the British initiative to obtain support from leading maritime nations for a declaration upholding the right of free passage for commercial shipping through the Gulf.

American support was announced for the British initiative for international pressure on the UAR to lift the blockade.

It was reported that France had rejected the possibility of the use of force to lift the blockade.

It was confirmed that the UAR had issued instructions that commercial shipping should be inspected at the entrance to the Gulf of Aqaba. Any attempt to resist inspection would be regarded as a hostile act which might lead to the confiscation of the ship and cargo. The use of force in order to enforce inspection was permitted.

General Dayan was appointed Israel Minister of Defence and Menahim Beigin Israel Minister without Portfolio after two days of consultations.

Friday 2 June

Algeria announced measures to implement a general mobilisation.

Baghdad Radio announced the withdrawal of further units from the north for redeployment on the Israel front.

In Rabat it was announced that the UAR had turned down a Moroccan call for an Arab summit meeting, although the Lebanon, Saudi Arabia and Tunisia had approved a meeting.

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There was a clash between Syrian and Israel forces north of the Sea of Galilee during the night.

In Ottawa, the British Prime Minister said that he and the Canadian Prime Minister were convinced that a solution to the Middle East crisis lay at the UN and that "only if we fail might other action have to be considered."

The UK and the USA were reported to be preparing a joint draft declaration for approval by as many maritime nations as possible. The declaration would pledge support for the premise that the Gulf of Aqaba was an international waterway in which all nations had an equal right to free passage.

France announced that in her view both Israel and the Arab states had an equal right to exist and said that she would withdraw her support from whichever state first broke the peace. She again called for four power consultations to guarantee a new series of international pacts which would provide the basis of a lasting settlement of the Arab-Israel problem.

The USA announced the failure of private attempts to persuade the UAR to lift the blockade.

"Al Ahram" reported that studies were in progress to consider the proposition that any attempt to use force to enter the Gulf of Aqaba was military aggression and would lead to the closure of the Suez Canal.

The UAR Foreign Minister declared that any collective action by maritime powers would be regarded as aggression against the sovereignty of the UAR and warned that the UAR would take all steps necessary to safeguard that sovereignty.

The Iraqi Foreign Minister suggested that since it was politically impossible for President Nasser to lift the blockade, an arrangement might be made whereby no Israel ships would attempt to force passage of the Straits, while the UAR would waive her right to inspection on the understanding that no strategic cargo including oil, would be carried by non-Israel shipping. He criticised HMG's actions with regard to the proposed declaration by maritime powers as indicative of a pro-Israel bias.

/Considerable

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Considerable concern was expressed by H.M. Representatives in the Arab World about the diminishing ability of HMG to influence Arab governments. This was considered to be a direct result of HMG's stand on the blockade of the Straits of Tiran which the Arab states considered as direct support for Israel.

In Cairo diplomatic circles the feeling was spreading that the UAR had a case and that though the crisis would drag on, war was unlikely. However, as far as could be gathered, this feeling was not shared by the UAR government. For the second week running Haikal's Friday article in "Al Ahram" developed the thesis that war was inevitable, since there was bound to be an Israeli reaction to the UAR moves. However Haikal considered that the Arab armed forces could deal successfully with any Israel attack.

Saturday 3 June

Iraqi units took up position on the West Bank of the Jordan.

It was reported in Cairo that President Nasser had said that he planned no further moves and that the crisis was over as far as the UAR was concerned.

Israel reported large scale withdrawals of UAR troops from the Yemen.

The Israel Prime Minister declared that a settlement of the dispute must be based on:-

- (i) territorial integrity and independence of all states in the area.
- (ii) resistance to revanchism and attempts to change the status quo by force.
- (iii) abstention from acts of hostility including sabotage, infiltration, and the imposition of maritime blockades.
- (iv) non-interference in the internal affairs of independent states.

The Israel Defence Minister declared that if it came to war Israel did not want foreign aid. He was however confident in the ability of Israel to win. He also said that it was necessary to give the diplomats a chance to do their best.

The Security Council met after private talks had failed to

/produce

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produce an acceptable resolution. The Israeli delegate stated that nothing short of unimpeded passage through the Gulf of Aqaba would satisfy his government. The Syrian delegate warned that the Arab states would react strongly to any Israel aggression.

The UK and the USA agreed to intensify efforts to get maximum support from the maritime nations for a declaration aimed at forcing the UAR to lift the blockade. However there appeared to be little enthusiasm for such a declaration.

Sunday 4 June

Clashes between Israel and Jordan were reported in the Jerusalem area.

Iraq acceded to the UAR-Jordanian defence pact. It was reported that Iraqi troops had taken up position in Sinai and that UAR troops and equipment had been flown to Jordan.

The UAR denied that there had been troop withdrawals from the Yemen.

The Sudan announced that the first Sudanese units would leave for the front shortly.

King Husain warned the USA and the UK that they stood to lose their friends in the Arab world if they continued to support Israel during the crisis.

During his opening speech at a conference of Arab oil producing countries, President Arif warned foreign oil companies that if they supplied oil to Israel they would be regarded as enemies by the Arabs.

The Israel Government expressed concern at the slowness of the Great Powers to take action to lift the blockade of the Straits of Tiran.

American support for the proposed declaration of maritime states was waning.

The Security Council continued discussion the crisis but no positive action was taken.

/II. The War.

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II. The War

Monday 5 June

The Israel Air Force launched attacks on airfields in the UAR, Jordan, Syria and Iraq at about nine a.m. The main concentration was on the UAR. In order to avoid being picked up on radar, the Israel attack flew in low in a wide arc over the Mediterranean to cross the UAR coastline west of Alexandria. The air attack largely achieved its purpose of destroying or immobilising the UAR Air Force, which, despite the battle fervour of the past weeks, was unaccountably drawn up in neat lines as for an inspection, thus rendering the Israel task much simpler to achieve. The Israelis claimed 280 aircraft destroyed on the ground in the UAR and at least 72 destroyed on the ground elsewhere.

At about the same time Israel ground forces attacked in the region of Khan Yunis at the western end of the Gaza strip. After breaching the UAR defenses, this force split, one part west to al Arish, one part moving north into the Gaza Strip proper. The Gaza strip was cut off by nightfall.

The Israelis claimed that their action was taken in response to a UAR movement of armour and aircraft against Israel with the intention of cutting off southern Negev from the rest of Israel. It was later clear that in fact the Israelis had attacked first but there has been neither confirmation nor denial of the allegation of movement by UAR forces which can be regarded as reliable.

Fighting between Israel and Jordan broke out in the Jerusalem area. Both Israel and Jordan accused the other of initiating hostilities. The Israelis reported that they had passed a message to the Jordanians through General Odd Bull that they had no wish to engage the Jordanians and would not do so unless attacked first. The Jordanians captured the UNTSO Headquarters, but were later ejected by the Israelis. General Odd Bull later reported that a cease fire in Jerusalem area was called for at 3.00 p.m. but was not respected.

Lebanon reported air battles in the Biqa'a and Litani areas.

/The
Lebanese

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The Lebanese Government were granted special powers and were empowered to take the steps necessary to admit other Arab forces into Lebanon. Banks were closed for three days with effect from 6 June and airports were closed with effect from midnight. A state of emergency was declared and Lebanon announced her readiness to fight.

Kuwait declared a state of defensive war against Israel. Martial law was later proclaimed in the state.

Iraq proclaimed a state of war with Israel.

Syria broadcast reports of Syrian action in support of the UAR. Fighting on the Syrian-Israeli front was also reported by Israel and ISMAC. However the Syrian action does not appear to have been more than of nuisance value.

The Sudan declared war on Israel. The Sudanese Prime Minister told an emergency Cabinet meeting that Sudanese troops would leave for the UAR during the day, that Sudanese air space and ports would be closed to British and American planes and shipping and that the Sudan would break off diplomatic relations with any country supporting Israel.

In Libya there were demonstrations in support of the UAR during which American and British Embassies and offices were damaged. Libya later declared that she considered herself at war with Israel.

In Tunisia there were street demonstrations in support of the UAR which developed into violent rioting during which the British and American Embassies were attacked and the Jewish quarter damaged.

Algeria announced support for the UAR and Algerian troops were reported to be standing by to be flown to the UAR. 48 Algerian MIGs were reported to be on the way to the UAR.

Morocco ordered a brigade of 2,000 men to proceed to the front.

Republican Yemen declared war on Israel and a state of emergency was proclaimed.

Saudi Arabia announced full support for the UAR. Saudi troops were reported as having entered Jordan.

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/In Bahrain

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In Bahrain it was reported that there was a possibility of anti-British reaction if HMG appeared to be supporting Israel but that the area would remain calm provided that HMG condemned Israel aggression or remained neutral.

The Conference of Arab Oil Producing Countries unanimously decided that "Arab oil shall be denied to and shall not be allowed to reach directly or indirectly any state committing aggression or participating in aggression on the sovereignty of any Arab state, or its territories or its territorial waters, particularly the Gulf of Aqaba." Aggression was defined as direct armed attack in support of Israel, supplying military aid in any way to Israel, or attempting to ensure the passage of shipping through the Gulf of Aqaba by the use of force. The Conference also agreed that the assets of any foreign company or foreign national whose parent nation committed aggression against the Arab states would be subject to the laws of war.

UNEF forces in the Gaza Strip came under fire. 3 Indian soldiers were killed and others wounded.

The Security Council met to discuss the situation. The Secretary General reported that the situation was confused and it was not possible to establish who attacked first. Both Israel and the UAR accused each other of starting hostilities in the Council. India proposed a resolution calling for a cease fire and withdrawal to positions held before fighting commences. The USSR supported this proposal, but the USA favoured a simple call for a cease fire. If there was to be any withdrawal, the USA considered it should be to the status quo ante 18 May. The USSR also wished the resolution to condemn Israel aggression.

The USA appealed to both sides to support the UN in arranging a cease fire. The American position was later stated to be "neutral in thought, word and deed."

The USSR condemned Israel aggression and demanded that Israel immediately cease all military action unconditionally and withdraw behind the armistice lines. She also reiterated "resolute support" for the Arab states.

/HMG stated

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HMG stated that they aimed at bringing about an urgent and general cease fire. They were not concerned to take sides but to ensure a peaceful solution to the problems of the area. Instructions had been sent to all HM Forces in the area to avoid any involvement in the conflict.

France said nothing, but suspended all arms shipments to the area.

Tuesday 6 June

Israel forces were reported to have reached Al Arish, Abu Agailah and Al Kuntillah, and to have captured Bir Lahsan and Gaza. Al Kussaima was reported under seige.

On the Jordanian front, Latrun and Jenin were captured during the day. Israel air attacks on Amman commenced shortly after midnight. In the Jersualem area Nabi Samwil and Ramallah were captured and the Old City was surrounded. Fighting on the Jordanian front was severe. It later transpired that King Husain had been misled by false UAR reports of successes in the field and believed that the UAR Air Force was being held in reserve. He therefore moved his forces as requested by President Nasser from defensive positions in order to mount an attack on the Hebron area, thus giving the Israel Air Force their chance, and the Jordanian forces were thoroughly beaten.

On the Syrian front, Syrian artillery commenced a major bombardment of Israel settlements. Some retaliatory action against the Syrian artillery positions was taken but the main Israel concentration was still against the UAR forces in Sinai.

Sudan, Syria and Iraq broke off diplomatic relations with the USA and the UK. Algeria, the UAR, and Republican Yemen, all of which had previously broken off relations with the UK or had no relations with the UK, broke off diplomatic relations with the USA. The reason given was that Anglo-American collusion in the Israel assault had been conclusively proved.

Reports that there had been Anglo-American collusion were first broadcast by Radio Cairo early in the morning. The UAR High

/Command

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Command later issued a statement saying that there was definite proof that the USA and the UK were providing air cover for the Israelis on both the Jordanian and UAR fronts using carrier-based aircraft. Jordan had also accused the USA and the UK of assisting Israel, quoting radar spotting as evidence. The accusations were vigorously rebutted by both the US and UK Governments.

Oil. Iraq suspended pumping oil and oil workers announced a boycott of British and American shipping. Lebanon banned loading at Tripoli and Sidon. Kuwait and Algeria banned exports to the UK and the USA.

The Iraqi action was later reported to be partly in order to make a gesture to public opinion and partly to forestall possible Syrian sabotage. The same reasons were put forward by the Kuwaiti Government, but in view of the lack of prior consultation with HMG, a strong protest was made to Kuwait. In addition both Kuwait and Iraq were warned that unless the ban was speedily lifted HMG would have to consider ways and means of avoiding being subjected to blackmail of this kind in the future.

The UAR announced that the Suez Canal had been closed in order to avoid it being obstructed by repeated Israel attacks on shipping transitting the Canal. It later became clear that the Canal was in fact blocked, in all probability as a result of deliberate sinkings by the UAR.

There were peaceful demonstrations in Bahrain. In Jordan police were called out to deal with rioters outside the British and American Embassies. In Syria the British and American Embassies in Damascus were attacked but little damage was done before police protection was provided. In the UAR the British Consulate in Port Said was attacked by mobs and the Residence wrecked, and the British Consulate General in Alexandria was sacked. In Lebanon there were further attacks on the two embassies. In Tunisia armoured cars and armed police were called out to quell rioting crowds in Tunis and to prevent further anti-British, anti-American and anti-Jewish violence. In Libya an extra platoon of British troops were flown to Benghazi to reinforce troops who had been called out to deal with

/violent

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violent demonstrations in the country.

During the day King Husain advised the British Ambassador that he was prepared to accept a cease fire. However Israel found it difficult to implement this suggestion in view of the fierce fighting on the Jordanian frontier. The Israelis thought that the King had lost control to the UAR Army Commander and that until the latter was removed it would be difficult to implement a cease fire.

British arms supplies to the Middle East were temporarily halted. In Paris it was announced that the ban on arms supplies to the Middle East did not apply to spares for equipment already supplied to Israel. The USSR were reported to be unwilling to suspend arms supplies to the area.

At the Security Council the USSR suddenly dropped her insistence that a cease fire call be linked with a demand that there should be a withdrawal to positions held prior to the outbreak of fighting. The Russian volte-face was apparently due to the enormous Israel successes. Late at night therefore the Security Council unanimously approved the following resolution:-

"The Security Council,

Noting the oral reports of the Secretary General on this situation,

Having heard the statements made in the Council,

Concerned at the outbreak of fighting and with the menacing situation in the Near East,

1. Calls upon the Governments concerned as a first step to take forthwith all measures for an immediate cease fire and for the cessation of all military activity in the area;

2. Requests the Secretary General to keep the Council promptly and currently informed on the situation".

Both Jordan and Israel accepted the cease fire call, but fighting continued on the Jordanian front and both sides accused the other of non-compliance.

Wednesday 7 June

Israel forces encircled Kussaima, and reached Bir Rumana and the Mitla Pass. Sharm al Shaikh was occupied by Israel.

/The UAR forces

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The UAR forces in the Gaza strip formally surrendered.

The UAR High Command announced the withdrawal of forces to the second line of defences and reported fierce fighting there.

On the Jordanian front the Old City of Jerusalem was captured after continued fierce fighting. Hebron, Jericho, Nablus and Qalqiliya taken by the Israelis, who also reached the banks of the River Jordan. By evening the whole of the West Bank was in Israel hands.

Kuwait, Syria, the UAR and Algeria rejected the cease fire appeal.

General Dayan declared that Israel would never leave Jerusalem now that she had regained control of the whole city. At a military briefing in Jordan, Attachés were told that Jordan had no evidence of British and American aircraft operating over Jordan, but that it was understood that they were operating on other fronts.

On the Syrian front fighting continued. There were reports of movement of Israel armour to the Syrian border.

Lebanon, after long discussions, decided to ask for the recall of the British and American Ambassadors, and announced the recall of the Lebanese Ambassadors from these two countries. There was no decision to break off diplomatic relations. There was a fire at the Shell installation on the outskirts of Beirut, and an explosion at the TAPLINE terminal at Sidon which wrecked a storage tank.

Saudi Arabia announced that the export of Saudi oil to countries assisting Israel had been banned, but the countries were not named. ARAMCO ceased production and export ostensibly because of strike action and damage to installations. There were demonstrations in Damman and Dhahran and some damage to the US Consulate-General in Damman and to the ARAMCO camp at Dhahran.

In Bahrain oil export ceased and the (now empty) pipeline from Saudi Arabia was formally closed.

In Libya a complete and total ban on oil exports was announced.

In Qatar QPC and SCQ were requested to cease exports to the UK and the USA and to cease loading UK and US flag vessels.

In Algeria British and American oil interests were placed under

/government

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government control. The despatch of further troops to the front was announced.

In Kuwait a contribution of KD 25 million to the UAC was announced. Kuwait Radio, which is predominantly staffed by UAR nationals, continued to follow the Cairo line.

The Federation of South Arabia announced full support for the UAR.

The Security Council reconvened at the request of the USSR and agreed unanimously on a new cease fire resolution:-

"The Security Council,

Noting that in spite of its appeal to the Governments concerned to take forthwith as a first step all measures for an immediate cease fire and for a cessation of all military activities in the Near East, military activities are continuing,

Concerned that the continuation of military activities may create an even more menacing situation in the area,

1. Demands that the Governments concerned should as a first step cease fire and discontinue all military activities at 2000 hours GMT on 7 June, 1967;
2. Requests the Secretary General to keep the Council promptly and currently informed on the situation".

Israel announced that she welcomed, supported and accepted the cease fire call, but with the proviso that the Arab states also accepted it. Jordanian acceptance of the cease fire was notified to UN authorities late at night and announced early on 8 June. UAR rejected the cease fire call and said that her forces would continue fighting as long as Israel continued to exist.

The USSR warned Israel that she would consider breaking off diplomatic relations unless Israel immediately accepted and implemented the cease fire.

The USA and UK announced that they would welcome the presence of UN observers on their ships in the Middle East and the Mediterranean to investigate the charges of collusion.

Thursday 8 June

In Sinai stubborn fighting continued. Israel held all main

/access

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access routes to the Suez Canal and UAR forces in the peninsula were cut off from the UAR. Israel forces consolidated on the high ground east of the Canal.

On the Jordanian front fighting had ceased. The captured areas of Jordan were placed under the military governorship of Brigadier Hertzog. Complete freedom of worship was announced to religious leaders.

On the Syrian front fighting continued. Israel Air Force action against Qunaitra commenced, as did the softening up of Syrian artillery positions on the heights commanding Israel settlements.

The USS "Liberty" was attacked by Israel aircraft. The Israel authorities later apologised, and offered compensation.

During the afternoon the UAR informed the UN that she would accept the latest cease fire appeal. Kuwait, Syria and Algeria rejected it.

The Federation of Arab Chambers of Commerce, Industry and Agriculture recommended a boycott of all British and American goods and organisations.

In Bahrain peaceful demonstrations continued. BAPCO resumed exporting oil to all destinations except the UK and the USA.

In Syria the British Consulate was attacked and completely wrecked.

Friday 9 June

The Security Council convened early in the morning at Syria's request. Syria accused Israel of advancing against Damascus. It became clear from fragmentary reports coming in that fighting continued in other areas on the Israeli-Syrian front. There was a swing of feeling against Israel, which was checked when it was disclosed that the Israel Defence Minister had invited General Odd Bull to Tel Aviv to discuss arrangements for an immediate cease fire.

Syria and Israel informed the Security Council that they had accepted the cease fire appeal but each accused the other of continuing hostilities. In the ensuing fighting, Israel gained control of the heights from which Syrian artillery had been bombarding Israel and were reported nearing Qunaitra.

Tunisia announced her acceptance of the cease fire.

/Abu Dhabi

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Abu Dhabi imposed a ban on oil export to the UK and the USA for political reasons. The decision was taken after consultation with HMG.

Jordan broadcast appeals to the inhabitants of the West Bank to remain where they were.

President Nasser announced his resignation and appointed Zakharía Mohieddin as his successor, but following demonstrations both in the UAR and throughout the Arab world he later agreed to discuss the matter with the National Assembly.

The Israel Foreign Minister indicated that Israel intended to keep some of the captured territory and called for direct talks between Israel and the Arab states to negotiate a lasting settlement.

Saturday 10 June

Israel and Syria officially notified the UN of their acceptance of a cease fire. General Odd Bull reported that both sides had agreed to his conditions that observers should be stationed on both sides of the existing line and that the cease fire would take effect from 1630 hours GMT. He proposed that the UN Truce Supervision should re-establish its HQ at Qunaitra by 1715 hours GMT and that observers would be deployed by 11 June.

President Nasser agreed to withdraw his resignation.

The UAR announced that the Suez Canal was obstructed by shipping sunk by Israel attacks.

The USSR, Bulgaria, Hungary, Czechoslovakia, Poland, East Germany and Yugoslavia warned Israel that they would aid the Arab states if Israel did not immediately accept the cease fire call and withdraw to her own territory.

Sunday 11 June

The reorganisation of the UAR armed forces was commenced. General Fawzi was appointed Commander in Chief. Resignations from a number of senior officers were accepted. President Nasser was granted special powers to carry out the military and political reconstruction of the UAR.

Anti-American rioting was reported from Alexandria and Beirut.

/It was

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It was estimated that the number of refugees from the West Bank who had moved to the East Bank numbered 80,000.

Kuwait reported strikes.

Syria called for an urgent meeting of the Security Council on the ground that Israel advances into Syria were continuing.

After a Cabinet meeting in Algeria, President Boumedienne declared that the Arabs had lost a battle but not the war. He said that the war must continue.

There was general shock throughout the Arab world at the failure of the USSR to intervene actively.

Israel set up a ministerial committee to deal with occupied territory.

In a television interview, the Israel Defence Minister declared that there should be direct negotiation between Israel and the Arab states. He said that if the Arabs were not prepared to negotiate direct, Israel should retain all occupied territory, and that Israel should in any case retain Jerusalem, western Jordan, access to Eilat and transit rights through the Suez Canal. He said that he would like to see some form of Arab autonomy on the West Bank but not absorption of the Arab areas by Israel. It does not appear that this attitude was the official Israel policy, which had not yet crystallised, although it seemed obvious that it was the intention to retain Jerusalem and perhaps Sharm al Shaikh, and to retain the rest of the occupied territory as a bargaining counter.

In the Security Council the USSR continued her unsuccessful attempts to have Israel condemned for aggression.

The view generally held by H.M. Representatives in the Middle East was that HMG should avoid taking a prominent part in any settlement and should not give the impression of taking sides.

Monday 12 June

In the Security Council, a fresh cease fire resolution was adopted.

President Boumedienne left for Moscow. Prior to his departure, he denounced Soviet "neutralism".

/Jordan

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Jordan appointed a ministerial committee to deal with refugees, who continued to pour across the Jordan.

Saudi Arabia recommenced oil production and export, but imposed a ban on export to the UK and USA.

The Sudan placed the Shell-BP installations at Port Sudan under Government control.

Iraq recommenced pumping for internal use in Syria only. The Iraqi Government called upon the owners of IPC to make representations to the US, British and French Governments calling upon them to force Israel to withdraw behind the borders existing before fighting broke out. Until such withdrawal was achieved, Iraq intended to maintain the ban on exports.

In Libya, strikes paralysed oil installations.

Israel demolished the wall separating the two parts of Jerusalem.

Hungary and Poland broke off diplomatic relations with Israel.

UAR and Tunisia re-established diplomatic relations.

UNRWA appealed for aid in dealing with the new refugee problem.

Tuesday 13 June

The USSR requested a special session of the UN General Assembly. The Security Council met to discuss the USSR's demand that Israel withdraw immediately from the occupied territories. The USA rejected the Soviet proposal calling for vigorous condemnation of Israel's aggressive activities. The Council adjourned without further action.

Jordan and Tunisia asked the UN to put an end to the expulsion of Jordanians from their lands. Israel stated that no compulsion was being used but that those who wished to leave Israel occupied territory were free to do so. HMG expressed concern at this attitude, which could be interpreted as pressure upon Jordanians to leave the West Bank.

The British Foreign Secretary suggested the possibility of a four power guarantee of Israel's frontiers and proposed an effective limitation on arms supplies to the area and the re-

re-
establishment

re-establishment of a UN "presence". He suggested that the Secretary General might appoint a personal representative, although he recognised that a solution could not be imposed from outside the area.

The Central Office for the Boycott of Israel announced that it was considering a boycott of all British and American goods, including a withdrawal of Arab funds from the UK.

Wednesday 14 June

The UAR restored water supplies to the east bank of the Suez Canal which had been cut off to prevent water reaching the Israeli forces on the East bank. Israel sources said that in fact the worst sufferers from the UAR action were UAR troops.

Israel forces continued to search for and assist UAR stragglers to reach the Canal.

The UAR announced that the Canal would not be reopened while Israel occupied the east bank.

Jordan asked for UN help in dealing with refugees who had fled the West Bank. It was estimated that there were now 150,000 refugees. An agreement between Israel and UNRWA was signed concerning facilities for the latter. The Security Council called upon Israel to facilitate the return of Arabs who had fled during the fighting.

Israel offered to exchange prisoners of war. In Tel Aviv Israel officials rejected as entirely unacceptable a British proposal for a neutral mediator.

Radio Damascus broadcast an appeal to all citizens to prepare for the next battle.

Israel declared that over 100 MIGs, a number of tanks and artillery and a quantity of spare parts had been supplied to the UAR since the end of hostilities.

ARAMCO resumed full production, but the ban on exports to the UK and the USA continued.

BAPCO resumed operations but a similar ban was applied.

In the Security Council, a Russian resolution condemning Israel aggression and demanding Israel's immediate and

/unconditional

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unconditional withdrawal from occupied territory was rejected.

Thursday 15 June

Libya requested the liquidation of British bases in Libya.

Iraq announced a ban on all British, American and West German goods.

Syria closed all British, American and West German schools, institutes, libraries and cultural centres.

It was announced that a meeting of Arab Foreign Ministers would be held in Kuwait on 17 June.

Arab strategy was to concentrate on forcing the USA and the UK to persuade Israel to withdraw behind her borders.

Mr. Kosygin announced that he would attend the special session of the UN General Assembly.

It was reported that Israel were prepared to offer compensation to Arab refugees as part of an overall peace settlement, provided the Arab states first accepted Israel's right to exist.

In Jordan cabinet changes were announced. Generally anti-Nasser Ministers were replaced by pro-Nasser nominees.

Algeria announced that there would be a special tax levied for the war effort.

The Mayor of Israel, Jerusalem reported that the Israeli Cabinet would be considering legislation to incorporate the Old City into Israel at a meeting to be held on 18 June.

Friday 16 June

HMG offered the Jordanian Government, who accepted the offer, £500,000 for urgent rehabilitation and reconstruction programmes.

The Canadian Government announced that they were contributing food supplies to the value of 2½ million dollars to the Middle East.

The Israel Foreign Minister outlined Israel's current policy as follows:-

- (a) the prevention of any infringements of the cease fire.
- (b) action against any attempts to return to the status quo ante.

/(c)

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- (c) an initiative for negotiations between Israel and individual Arab states with the aim of achieving a peaceful existence and peaceful coexistence.

He also accused the USSR of being responsible for the outbreak of fighting.

Saturday 17 June

The Libyan Government urged BP and Gulf Oil to urge the British and American Governments to follow a policy more favourable towards the Arab states.

The Conference of Arab Foreign Ministers was held in Kuwait. The only practical result was a decision to continue the ban on oil exports to the UK and the USA.

Israel appointed a committee to work out proposals for a peace settlement with the Arab States.

The emergency of the UN General Assembly was formally opened.

Sunday 18 June

Iraq announced that pumping oil to Lebanon for internal consumption would be resumed.

King Husain called for an Arab Summit Conference.

The Sudan withdrew mineral and oil concessions from a British and American firm.

Israel reported a breach of the cease fire by Syria and denied that she was forcibly expelling Arabs from the West Bank area.

Ben Gurion, speaking as a "private person", put forward the following points as a basis for negotiations:-

- (a) Israel should be allowed free access to and use of the Suez Canal and the Gulf of Aqaba.
- (b) Jerusalem should be reunited and should remain in Israel hands.
- (c) The West Bank should be given some form of autonomy as an Arab entity, though still under Israel control.
- (d) The Sinai peninsula should not be evacuated by Israel until a peace agreement had been successfully concluded.

There is no evidence that Ben Gurion had submitted, or later did submit these proposals to the Israel Government, but later moves by

/the Israel

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the Israel Government indicated that their position was becoming based on these points.

It was reported that the Israel Government had decided not to proceed with their proposals for the annexation of Jerusalem.

Monday 19 June

Kosygin called upon the UN General Assembly to condemn Israel for her aggressive actions and to demand that Israel withdraw her forces from Arab territory immediately and unconditionally. The call was made in a speech to the General Assembly. A USSR draft resolution also appealed to the Security Council to "undertake immediate and effective measures in order to eliminate all consequences of the aggression committed by Israel".

President Johnson had earlier appealed for an immediate halt to the Arms race in the Middle East.

President Nasser took over as Premier and as Secretary General of the ASU and announced a Cabinet reshuffle.

Libyan oil workers called off their strike but export was still banned.

Qatar lifted the ban on American and British flag vessels.

Tuesday 20 June

Israel reported that during the war 452 Arab aircraft had been destroyed, of which 52 were destroyed in air combat and 2 by anti-aircraft fire.

In a speech at the UN General Assembly, the British Foreign Secretary suggested that there should be a special representative appointed to deal with the Middle East situation, that refugees should be allowed to return to their homes, that the reopening of the Suez Canal was an urgent matter, that territorial aggrandisement as a result of war was contrary to the UN Charter and that the matters requiring urgent settlement were the refugee problem, free and innocent passage through international waterways for ships of all nations and an agreement to limit arms sales to the Middle East. He also warned Israel not to annex the Old City of Jerusalem and referred to the 1949 resolution on international control.

/Wednesday 21 June

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Wednesday 21 June

France condemned Israel for opening hostilities and stated that she regarded none of Israel's territorial gains as final. However she also disapproved of Arab threats to destroy Israel, considering that both parties have the right to exist.

Jordan warned West Bank inhabitants that cooperation with Israeli authorities would be regarded as treason.

The Israel Prime Minister announced his readiness to meet all or any of the Arab leaders to discuss a permanent peace.

It was reported that the feeling among Palestinians was veering towards the possibility of a modus vivendi with Israel along the lines of Ben Gurion's proposals.

Saturday 24 June

Jordan indicated that measures she had undertaken for the relief of refugees from the West Bank were of a temporary nature only and urged that all should return to the West Bank.

Sunday 25 June

The Central Office of the Boycott of Israel proposed that there should be an overall ban on trade between Arab states and the UK, USA and West Germany, including a ban on trade or financial deals with these countries, a ban on the import of their products to Arab markets, a ban on Arab exports to them and government control of oil installations to prevent indirect export of oil to them.

Iraq resumed oil exports to France and Turkey.

Tuesday 27 June

In a television interview King Husain admitted that he had no definite evidence of involvement by the UK and the USA in the war.

The Israel Prime Minister stated that Israel would not return occupied territory while the Arab states continued their belligerent policy.

The Knesset approved bills providing for the organisation of government and justice in occupied territory, for the organisation of local administration and for safeguarding the holy places.

Wednesday 28 June

Israel published an ordinance extending the area of Israel Jerusalem to include the Old City, Calandria Airport, Mount Scopus, /the Mount

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the Mount of Olives. This amounted to annexation by Israel.

A non-aligned draft resolution was tabled at the General Assembly which did not condemn Israel but called for immediate withdrawal from occupied territory under UN supervision.

Thursday 29 June

The Saudi Minister of Oil and Mineral Wealth, in a statement on the Saudi financial loss as a result of the suspension of oil exports, declared that the continuation of an extreme ban on exports would harm the Arab states more than any European state.

The Israel annexation of Jerusalem was denounced by Arab states.

It had become clear in private talks that the US and Soviet attitudes were similar, except on the question of Israel's unconditional withdrawal, where the USSR was taking a very tough stand.

Friday 30 June

A Latin-American draft resolution was tabled in the General Assembly which linked Israeli withdrawal with measures to ensure a lasting peace in the area.

Saturday 1 July

Breaches of the cease fire were reported on the Canal.

Sunday 2 July

Further breaches of the cease fire were reported on the Canal.

Israel announced that she would permit the return of Arabs who had fled the West Bank. The method of return and other details would be published later.

Monday 3 July

The Damascus Chamber of Commerce called for a boycott of all products, organisations, services and shipping of the UK, the USA and West Germany, and for a refusal by Arabs to trade in the currencies of these countries.

Tuesday 4 July

At the UN General Assembly voting took place on the Russian, the American, the non-aligned and the Latin American draft /resolutions.

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resolutions. None of them achieved the necessary majority.

Middle East Section,
Joint FO/CO Research Department

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LR 6/19

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By Bag

SAVING TELEGRAM

FOREIGN OFFICE/COMMONWEALTH OFFICE TO ABIDJAN AND CERTAIN OTHER MISSIONS

Telno 26 Saving

8 September, 1967

(J.I.P.G.D.)

UNCLASSIFIED

DP 12/4
16 SEP 67
1092

Addressed to Abidjan telegram No.26 Saving of 8 September,
And Saving Unnumbered to other Foreign Office and Commonwealth
Posts.

MIDDLE EAST TALKING POINTS

7 September, 1967.

"It is a grave mistake to look upon everything the Soviet Union says as something handed down from on high and beyond dispute, and on anything the others say as heresay. Any attempt of this kind will damage not only ourselves but the Soviet Union as well, because it would turn our friendship into servility - something which neither we nor any friend would accept". - From an article by Muhammed Hasanayn Heykal, Editor-in-Chief of Al-Ahram, quoted by Cairo Radio, 25 August.

According to Borek Homola, writing on the Middle East in the Prague newspaper Rude Pravo on 8 August, the view that the Arab-Israeli war continues, and has not been completely lost because there will be a "second stage", is an antidote to defeatism and a factor maintaining unity. He paid particular attention to the Syrian position and quoted Syrian moderates as pointing out that this belief cannot be maintained for ever. Syrian unity should be based on more lasting elements than threat from the outside and war.

"When the question of realism arises it is worth mentioning that ever more voices come out for the recognition of the State of Israel". - From a Khartoum dispatch in the Polish newspaper Trybuna Ludu, 31 August.

In an interview with the Jordanian News Agency on 5 September, King Hussein was asked about the dispatch of fedayeen to the territory currently occupied by Israel to strengthen passive resistance there. He said: "Concerning former fedayeen operations, it has now become clear that their positive results were very limited. They were also one of the most important weapons used by the enemy to impose the battle on us at a time chosen and dictated by him alone. Fedayeen operations had been carried out before the aggression in contravention of the orders of the Unified Arab Command and of the Arab plan to build up Arab strength".

"There is no dictionary which defines Socialism. I have found that for some Socialism consists of impoverishing the rich. My kind of Socialism consists of enriching the poor". - King Hassan of Morocco, in a speech during a tour of Agadir Province, 12 August.

La guerre israélo-arabe a coûté plus de 1 milliard de dollars aux pays arabes, en plus des dépenses militaires, estime un rapport officiel publié par l'agence Tass. Dans ce total, l'Égypte figure à elle seule pour 700 millions de dollars.

Le Monde, 3-4 September, quoting a despatch from Belgrade.

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88888

ROUTINE

1092
23 SEP 67
MURC

Advance File 1073/4/11/67

From

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APK 7/8/5

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BEIRUT BELGRADE WASHINGTON MOSCOW UKMIS NEW YORK HC ADEN
PARIS AND UKDEL NATO.

MY TEL NO 989.

FOREIGN MINISTER'S PRESS CONFERENCE.

AT A TELEVIS~~E~~ PRESS CONFERENCE ON TUSDAY 5 SEPTEMBER, ISRAEL
MINISTER FOR FOREIGN AFFAIRS AGAIN REJECTED PRESIDENT TITO'S
PROPOSALS FOR SOLVING THE ARAB/ISRAEL PROBLEM. HE REPEATED
ISRAEL'S CALL FOR DIRECTLY NEGOTIATED PEACE SETTLEMENTS OFFICIAL
TRANSCRIPT OF CONFERENCE FOLLOWS BY BAG.

2. FOLLOWING ARE MAIN POINTS OF INTEREST.

(A) RESOLUTIONS OF KHARTOUM ARAB SUMMIT HAD STRENGTHENED ISRAEL'S NEED AND RIGHT MAINTAIN THE PRESENT SITUATION UNTIL A NEW ARRANGEMENT IS MADE WITH ARAB NEIGHBOURS.

(B) TO DESCRIBE THE ARAB ATTITUDE IN KHARTOUM AS MODERATE WAS UNJUSTIFIED. THE ADOPTION OF RESOLUTIONS PROVIDING FOR "NO RECOGNITION, NO NEGOTIATIONS AND NO PEACE" WAS IN VIOLATION OF THREE FUNDAMENTAL PRINCIPLES OF THE UN CHARTER.

(C) THE UN SHOULD TAKE A "MODEST AND REALISTIC VIEW" OF ITS ROLE IN THE PRESENT DISPUTE AT ITS FORTHCOMING GENERAL ASSEMBLY. MR. ELEANOR ~~ROOSEVELT~~ ^{QUESTIONS} THE UN'S RIGHT TO MAKE RECOMMENDATIONS AFFECTING ISRAEL'S SECURITY SINCE IT HAD DONE NOTHING TO PREVENT THE OUTBREAK OF HOSTILITIES IN JUNE.

(D) ISRAEL HOPED TO MAKE SOME INTERIM PROPOSALS ABOUT THE REFUGEE PROBLEM AT THE ANNUAL DEBATE ON UNRAW. HOWEVER NO COMPLETE SOLUTION COULD BE ACHIEVED WITHOUT REGIONAL AND INTERNATIONAL CO-OPERATION

(E) HE BELIEVED THAT THE RE-OPENING OF THE SUEZ CANAL WOULD BE FACILITATED NOW THAT THE ARAB STATES HAD DROPPED THEIR OIL EMBARGO, BUT NOTED THAT EGYPT AND ISRAEL WERE BOUND BY A MUTUAL AGREEMENT REGARDING THE USE OF THE CANAL. OFFICIAL SOURCES ARE REPORTED TO HAVE SUBSEQUENTLY ADDED THE GLOSS THAT IF EGYPT WERE TO REMOVE THE BLOCK SHIPS AND RE-OPEN THE CANAL TO INTERNATIONAL SHIPPING ISRAEL WOULD NOT OBJECT. IF HOWEVER, ISRAELI SHIPS WERE REFUSED PERMISSION TO USE THE CANAL, ISRAEL WOULD ENSURE THAT EGYPTIAN SHIPS WERE LIKEWISE BARRED.

FO PSE PASS UKDEL NATO AS MY TEL NO 4

HADOW.

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ADDSO FO TEL NO 989 OF 4 SEPT RFI AMMAN, BENGHAZI, BAHRAIN,
JEDDA, KHARTOUM, KUWAIT, TRIPOLI, RABAT, TUNIS, CAIRO, ALGIERS,
BEIRUT, BELGRADE, WASHINGTON, MOSCOW, UKMIS NEW YORK, HC ADEN,
PARIS AND UKDEL NATO PARIS TEL NO 3.

YOUR TEL NO 316 TO BELGRADE. PRESIDENT TITOS PROPOSALS .
AT THE CABINET MEETING ON SUNDAY, 3 SEPTEMBER THE ISRAEL
FOREIGN MINISTER IS REPORTED TO HAVE REJECTED PRESIDENT
TITOS PROPOSALS FOR SOLVING THE ARAB/ISRAEL PROBLEM. MR EBAN
IS SAID TO HAVE CHARACTERISED PRESIDENT TITOS EFFORTS AS
BEING AIMED NOT TO SAVE THE PEACE BUT TO SAVE THE ARAB
GOVERNMENTS FROM MAKING PEACE WITH ISRAEL. PRESIDENT TITOS
INITIATIVES WERE BEING PURSUED OVER ISRAELS HEAD AND ANY
PEACE PLAN WHICH WAS NOT CONDITIONAL ON THE CONSENT OF BOTH
SIDES VIOLATED THE PRINCIPLES OF SOVEREIGNTY AND INDEPENDENCE
OF STATES WHICH YUGOSLAVIA ONCE CHAMPIONED.

2. ISRAEL HAD RECEIVED NO DIRECT INFORMATION ABOUT THE TITO PLAN
BUT KNEW OF IT FROM VARIOUS SOURCES SINCE IT HAD BEEN PUBLISHED
IN BELGRADE, CAIRO, NEW DELHI AND ELSEWHERE. ISRAELS OUTRIGHT
~~OPPOSITION~~ OPPOSITION TO THIS PLAN WOULD BE BROUGHT TO THE ATTENTION
OF ALL GOVERNMENTS WITH WHICH ISRAEL HAD DIPLOMATIC RELATIONS



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Advance File 10734/2/67

202 8/6/9

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From TEL AVIV

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TO RR ASOLDQ 01904

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ADDED TO TEL NO 900 OF 4 SEPT RFI AMMAN, BENGHAZI, BAHRAIN,
JENNA, KHARTOUM, KUWAIT, TRIPOLI, RABAT, TUNIS, CAIRO ALGIERS,
BEIRUT, MC ADEN, WASHINGTON AND URMIS NEW YORK.

KHARTOUM TEL NO 503 OF 2 SEPT.

ARAB SUMMIT CONFERENCE.

AFTER THE CABINET MEETING ON SUNDAY, 3 SEPT, PRIME MINSITER LEVI
ESHKOL ISSUED THE FOLLOWING STATEMENT COMMENTING THE ARAB SUMMIT
CONFERENCE.

"AFTER THE WAR AND THE BEGINNING OF THE CEASE-FIRE, THE ISRAEL
GOVERNMENT ANNOUNCED ITS WISH TO COME TO PEACEFUL TERMS WITH
THE ARAB STATES AND ITS READINESS TO OPEN NEGOTIATIONS WITH
ITS NEIGHBOURS WITHOUT DELAY. THIS ANNOUNCEMENT OF THE ISRAEL
GOVERNMENT HAD NO RESPONSE FROM THE ARAB RULERS. NOW THAT THE
ARAB HEADS OF STATE HAVE CONVENED AT KHARTOUM, THEY HAVE ANNOUNCED
THAT THAT THEY ARE RESOLVED NOT TO COME TO PEACEFUL TERMS WITH
ISRAEL. THEY HAVE ALSO DECIDED NOT TO RECOGNISE THE FACT OF
OUR EXISTENCE OR TO OPEN NEGOTIATIONS WITH US. THIS IRRRESPONSIBLE
IRRESPONSIBLE

DECISION IGNORES THE TRUE INTERESTS OF THE PEOPLE OF THE MIDDLE EAST AND RUNS COUNTER TO THE PRINCIPLES OF THE U.N. CHARTER."

"THE GOVERNMENT OF ISRAEL POINTS TO THIS GRAVE FACT WHICH DELAYS THE PROSPECT OF PEACE IN THE AREA AND NOTES THE POLITICAL AND SECURITY IMPLICATIONS INVOLVED".

"THIS STAND OF THE ARAB HEADS OF STATE REINFORCES THE ISRAEL GOVT DECISION NOT TO PERMIT THE RETURN OF SUCH CONDITIONS THAT ENABLE OUR ENEMIES TO UNDERMINE OUR SECURITY AND TO PLOT AGAINST OUR SOVEREIGNTY AND EXISTENCE".

"ISRAEL WILL NOT REFRAIN FROM EFFORTS TO COME TO PEACEFUL TERMS WITH ITS NEIGHBOURS. WE WILL BE STRIKE REGARDING THE EXECUTION OF PROCEDURES AGREED UPON IN THE CEASE-FIRE RESOLUTIONS".

IN THE FACE OF THE AGGRESSIVE INTENTIONS OF THE ARAB RULERS WHO REFUSE TO NEGOTIATE PEACE WITH US, WE WILL HOLD FIRM TO OUR POSITIONS WHICH ARE OF VITAL IMPORTANCE TO THE SECURITY AND UNDISTURBED DEVELOPMENT OF ISRAEL

HADOM

TOR. 97332/85 D.C.

Advance a file

1071 / 15 / 67

Co by the recorder

16 SEP 67
1092

CYPHER CAT A

FROM FOREIGN OFFICE

TELEGRAM NO 1113

DATED 2 SEPTEMBER

PRIORITY

Ref 7/4/5

Ref - Co, and Co Level books 16 with inclusion

JIS

1 other (W)

1 other (C)

DP 17/7

CONFIDENTIAL.

FOLLOWING RECEIVED FROM KHARTOUM

ADDRESSED TO F O TELNO 495 OF 2 SEPT REPTD FOR INFORMATION TO
ARAB POSTS HICOMA ADEN TEL AVIV AND SAVING TO WASHINGTON AND
UKMIS NEW YORK.

SCD
2 other (W) - BU for MCC.
3 other

lul
ceq.

MYTEL NO 493: SUMMIT CONFERENCE.

THE HEADS OF STATE ARE DISPERSING.

NASSER WAS ONE OF THE FIRST TO LEAVE IN THE EVENING OF 1/9.

AS SEEN FROM HERE THE OUTCOME OF THE CONFERENCE IS AS
SATISFACTORY AS WE CAN REASONABLY EXPECT. FROM THE ARAB POINT OF
VIEW THEY HAVE ACHIEVED A UNITED FRONT. THE EXCEPTIONS ARE THE
IRRESPONSIBLE SYRIANS WHO HAVE ISOLATED THEMSELVES BY THEIR
BOYCOTT AND POSSIBLY THE ALGERIANS WHO MAY YET USE THEIR
COMPARATIVELY LOW-LEVEL REPRESENTATION AS AN EXCUSE FOR
DISASSOCIATING THEMSELVES FROM THE CONFERENCE RESOLUTIONS.

FROM OUR POINT OF VIEW THE DECISION TO REGARD OIL EXPORTS AS A
SINEW OF WAR AND NOT A WEAPON OF SPITE REMOVES A SERIOUS THREAT
THE OIL PRODUCING STATES ARE HAVING TO PAY A HEAVY PRICE FOR
THIS DECISION (SAUDI ARABIA 50 MILLION KUWAIT 55 MILLION LIBYA
30 MILLION PER YEAR IN THREE MONTHLY TRANCHES PAYABLE IN ADVANCE).
THESE SUBVENTIONS WILL HELP EGYPT AND JORDAN TO WARD OFF FOR SOME
LITTLE TIME LONGER THE ECONOMIC CONSEQUENCES OF DEFEAT. THIS LEVY
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PREDICTABLY THE HEADS OF STATE REAFFIRM THEIR UNSHAKABLE HOSTILITY
TO ISRAEL AND THEIR DETERMINATION NOT TO GIVE UP ANY OF THEIR
LANDS OR TO ENTER INTO ANY SORT OF DIRECT SETTLEMENT. PARADOXICALLY
THE EMPHASIS ON ACTION AT THE INTERNATIONAL LEVEL IS AN
OPENING POSITION FOR SOME FORM OF MEDIATION PROBABLY IN THE UNITED
NATIONS. THE DECLARATION ABOUT BASES WILL PROBABLY EMBARRASS US
IN THE GULF.

2. THE FOLLOWING ARE SOME OTHER REFLECTIONS:

(1) NASSER WAS UNQUESTIONABLY THE DOMINATING FIGURE. IF HE HAD
DECIDED TO LINE UP WITH THE SYRIANS AND HIS OWN EXTREMISTS THE
PRESSURE ON THE MODERATES WOULD HAVE BEEN VERY HARD
TO RESIST. AS IT IS HE HAS IMPARTED RESPECTABILITY TO RESOLUTIONS
WHICH WOULD OTHERWISE HAVE BEEN REGARDED AS A SELL OUT AND WILL
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THE FORMER BECAUSE THEY APPEAR TO HAVE MISSED OUT IN THE OIL
PRODUCERS HANDOUT AND THE LATTER BECAUSE THE BULK OF THEIR RESUMED
OIL EXPORTS HAVE TO PASS THROUGH THE SYRIAN PIPE LINE.

(2) DURING THE CONFERENCE THE YEMENI AGREEMENT BETWEEN NASSER
AND FEISAL WHICH IS NOT MENTIONED DIRECTLY IN THE COMMUNIQUE CREATED
THE GREATEST INTEREST. IT REMAINS TO BE SEEN WHETHER IT WILL
STICK IN THE FACE OF FIERCE HOSTILITY FROM SALLAL AND HIS
SUPPORTERS WHICH MANIFESTED ITSELF BY QUITE SERIOUS RIOTING BY
YEMENIS OUTSIDE THE EGYPTIAN EMBASSY HERE YESTERDAY.

(3) THE SUDANESE CAN CONGRATULATE THEMSELVES ON A HIGH STANDARD OF ADMINISTRATIVE ARRANGEMENTS FOR THE CONFERENCE ALTHOUGH THE PRESS ARRANGEMENTS WERE PRETTY CHAOTIC. APART FROM THE YEMENI INCIDENT AND A FAIRLY NOISY DEMONSTRATION BY A CROWD OF EXTREMISTS (SHOUTING AS ALWAYS DOWN DOWN USA) THERE WAS NO UNPLEASANTNESS. AZHARI AND MAHGOUB HAVE GAINED GREAT CREDIT FOR THEIR PERSONAL EFFORTS IN GETTING THE CONFERENCE CONVENED AND FOR THEIR HANDLING OF THE PROCEEDINGS.

(4) ARDENT SUDANESE NATIONALISTS WITH LITTLE MORE TO LOSE ARE EXPRESSING DISAPPOINTMENT THAT THE SUMMIT DECIDED NOT TO TAKE REVENGE AGAINST THE US, BRITAIN AND WEST GERMANY BY EMBARGOING OIL REMOVING RESERVES AND BREAKING OFF RELATIONS BUT WITH NASSER COMMITTED TO THE RESOLUTIONS THEIR COMPLAINTS HAVE NO HEAD OF STEAM BEHIND THEM

FO PASS PRIORITY ARAB POSTS U/N HICOMA ADEN 37 TEL AVIV 16
AND SAVING WASHINGTON 18 UKHIS NEW YORK 12.

CYPHER CATA

FROM FOREIGN OFFICE

TELEGRAM NO 1115

DATED 3 Z SEPTEMBER

ROUTINE

RESTRICTED. why?

FOLLOWING RECEIVED FROM CAIRO. *make*

ADDRESSED TO F.O. TELEGRAM NO 871 OF 2 SEPTEMBER REPEATED FOR

INFORMATION TO KHARTOUM AND OTHER ARAB POSTS AND SAVING TO

WASHINGTON PARIS MOSCOW AND BELGRADE.

ARAB SUMMIT

CAIRO PRESS CONFINES ITSELF TO FACTUAL REPORT OF FINAL DAYS PROCEEDING COMMUNIQUE AND PUBLIC STATEMENTS BUT GOMHOURIA CARRIES FOLLOWING COMMENT: QUOTE THE CORRESPONDENT OF EL GOMHOURIA LEARNT THAT IN THE MORNING SESSION OF THE ARAB SUMMIT CONFERENCE YESTERDAY IMPORTANT DISCUSSIONS TOOK PLACE ABOUT THE ARAB POLITICAL ACTION IN THE UN¹ TO REMOVE THE EFFECTS OF THE AGGRESSION. UNQUOTE. QUOTE THE PRESIDENTS AND KINGS ALL PUT FORWARD THEIR POINTS OF VIEW IN CONNEXION WITH THE PROPOSALS TO FACE UP TO THE PRESENT CRISIS. THEIR OPINION WAS CLEARLY THAT IT IS NECESSARY FOR A REALISTIC VIEW TO BE TAKEN, THAT IS THAT THE CRISIS SHOULD BE DISCUSSED WITH DUE REGARD TO THE RIGHT OF THE PALESTINIAN PEOPLE TO RETURN TO THEIR LAND. DURING THE DISCUSSIONS BOTH THE YUGOSLAV POINT OF VIEW ON THE CRISIS WAS REVIEWED, AND ALSO THE POINT OF VIEW OF THE GREAT POWERS. IT CAN BE SAID THAT SEVERAL OF THE ARAB DELEGATIONS INCLUDING THAT OF THE MAGHREB, TUNISIA AND SAUDI ARABIA SHOWED A COMPLETE UNDERSTANDING OF THE YUGOSLAV VIEWPOINT AND SOME OTHER STATES SUPPORTED THAT THIS VIEWPOINT SHOULD BE THE BASIS FOR THE CONTACTS WHICH SHOULD BE MADE DURING THE NEXT SESSION OF THE UNS. THE OPINION OF SOME OF THE DELEGATIONS DIFFERED SOMEWHAT IN DETAIL FROM THIS ATTITUDE BUT THE MAJORITY GAVE THEIR SUPPORT TO A SERIOUS ATTEMPT BY THE ARABS TO FIND A REASONABLE POLITICAL SOLUTION ACCEPTABLE TO THE ARAB PEOPLE IN ORDER THAT THE ARAB STATES CAN RECOVER THEIR STRENGTH IN VARIOUS FIELDS UNQUOTE.

Cable sent to the Secretary

Advance 2 file

1071 / 14 / 67

1092

*If this does not appear
to have gone to PAI,
please send wire (S).*

lul

34

*OK
JIS
(initials)
(initials)
SRO
initials*

*Perhaps because
we have no
"mission" in
Cairo.*

Advance a file

1071 / 15 / 67

1092

Co by ^{new} the recorder

CYPHER CAT A

FROM FOREIGN OFFICE

TELEGRAM NO 1113

DATED 2 SEPTEMBER

PRIORITY

ASX 73 4/5

Reg - to send to Genl but it is not in the

JIS

1 other (W)

1 other (W)

CONFIDENTIAL.

FOLLOWING RECEIVED FROM KHARTOUM

ADDRESSED TO F O TELNO 495 OF 2 SEPT REPTD FOR INFORMATION TO
ARAB POSTS HICOMA ADEN TEL AVIV AND SAVING TO WASHINGTON AND
UKMIS NEW YORK.

SCD

2 other (W) - BU for MCC.

3 other

1 other
69.

MYTEL NO 493: SUMMIT CONFERENCE.

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FO PASS PRIORITY ARAB POSTS U/N HICOMA ADEN 37 TEL AVIV 16
AND SAVING WASHINGTON 18 UKMIS NEW YORK 12.

CYPHER CAT A

FROM FOREIGN OFFICE

TELEGRAM NO 1108

DATED 1 SEPTEMBER

PRIORITY

Cat, our
Governing

Advance 2 file

1028 / 10 / 67

APK 4/5

Regy - KC, and to Govt of UK
JIS

D. 17/9

16 SEP 67
1092

CONFIDENTIAL.

(Sthru W)

(Sthru W)

FOLLOWING RECEIVED FROM KHARTOUM.

30
Machuk
Machuk

lul
car.

ADDRESSED TO FOREIGN OFFICE TELEGRAM NUMBER 489 OF 1 SEPTEMBER

REPEATED FOR INFORMATION CAIRO ADEN JEDDA BEIRUT RABAT

ALGIERS TRIPOLI BENGHAZI AMMAN BAHRAIN KUWAIT TEL AVIV

AND SAVING WASHINGTON UKMIS NEW YORK.

MYTEL 486: YEMEN AGMNT.

THE SUDANESE P M MAHQOUB ISSUED THE OFFICIAL TEXT OF THE UAR/SAUDI

~~AGMNT ON THE YEMEN TODAY. THE SHOPTEVUOTUB~~

AGMNT ON THE YEMEN TODAY: THE TEXT DOES NOT DIFFER MATERIALLY

FROM THAT IN MYTEL UNDER REFCE. SALLAL RESPONDED WITH AN ATTACK

ON THE AGMNT ON THE GROUNDS THAT IT DETRACTED FROM THE SOVER-

EIGNTY TO INTERNATIONAL LAW. HE IS REPORTED IN THE SUDAN NEWS AGENCY

TO HAVE MADE A STATEMENT TO THE SUMMIT CONFCE ON 30 AUG RESERVING

HIS GOVT'S RIGHT TO ACCEPT MILITARY AID FROM ANY QUOTE FRIENDLY

COUNTRY UNQUOTE AFTER THE WITHDRAWAL OF EGYPTIAN FORCES. KING

FEISAL COMMENTED ON THIS THAT THE QN SHD BE LEFT FOR CONSIDER-

ATION BY THE THREE MAN COMMISSION (IRAQ, MOROCCO AND THE SUDAN)

WHICH WILL BE FORMED UNDER THE TERMS OF THE AGMNT. THE REPUBLICAN

FOREIGN MINISTER ABDEL SALAAN HAS ANNOUNCED, HOWEVER, THAT NO

VISAS WILL BE ISSUED FOR THE YEMEN TO THE MEMBERS OF THE COMMISSION.

2. MAHQUB HELD A PRESS CONFCE YDAY TO RELEASE THE TEXT OF THE AGMNT. CONCEDED UNDER PRESSURE FROM WESTERN CORRESPONDENTS THAT THERE WERE SECRET CLAUSES. PRESS SOURCES WHO ARE IN CONTACT WITH THE DELGNS TO THE CONFCE CONSIDER THAT THESE CLAUSES AMOUNT TO:
(A) THE WITHDRAWAL OF EGYPTIAN TROOPS WITHIN THREE MONTHS;
(B) A PLEBISCITE TO BE HELD FROM THREE TO SIX MONTHS AFTER THE WITHDRAWAL OF THE EGYPTIANS
(C) SALLAL TO REMAIN AS THE FIGURE-HEAD OF THE INTERIM ADMINISTRATION.

3. THE SAME SOURCES ARE IN NO DOUBT THAT THE EGYPTAINS ENVISAGE RECUPERATING THEIR POLITICAL LOSSES IN THE YEMEN IN A SHORT TIME BY POLITICAL GAINS IN SOUTH ARABIA. ✓

FOREIGN OFFICE PASS ARAB POSTS AND TEL AVIV U/N

Y BAG

SAVING TELEGRAM

COMMONWEALTH OFFICE AND FOREIGN OFFICE TO ABIDJAN AND CERTAIN
OTHER MISSIONS

Telno 25 Saving

1 September 1967

UNCLASSIFIED

DP 13/1

Addressed to Abidjan telegram No. 25 Saving of 1 September.
Repeated for information Saving to certain other posts.

MIDDLE EAST TALKING POINTS

31 August, 1967

"Kosygin, Chairman of the U.S.S.R. Council of Ministers, in his speech at the Special Emergency Session of the United Nations General Assembly, said that the Soviet Union throughout the 50 years of its history had viewed all nations, big and small, with respect and that all peoples had the right to establish their own independent national State. This is one of the basic principles of Soviet policy, inspired by which, we defined our attitude towards Israel as a State when in 1947 we voted for the United Nations resolution to establish two independent States in Palestine, the former British colony, a Jewish State and an Arab State. Consistent with this attitude, the Soviet Union subsequently instituted diplomatic relations with Israel". -- An article from *Kommunist*, broadcast by Moscow Radio in Arabic, 13 August.

President Bourguiba of Tunisia, in a speech on 23 August, said: "We know what "Quixotism" costs the régimes which describe themselves as revolutionary. However, while they are fighting the windmills of imperialism the people for whom they have the responsibility continue to live in black misery -- even the exercise of the most elementary liberties is forbidden them.

"The struggle against imperialism has become the sole preoccupation of these régimes. Thus over the Palestine affair they have followed a policy which consists of abandoning the substance for the shadow".

Other points he made on Arab policy were:-

"The State of Israel is recognised as such both by American and the Soviet Union, it is a member of the United Nations and its existence is only contested by the Arab States. In these conditions it is useless to insist obstinately on not recognising this reality. To claim to efface Israel from the map of the world is to condemn oneself to almost total isolation. The policy adopted up to now has alienated all sympathy from us ..."

"After the defeat which the Arab States have just experienced they must abandon the hopeless policy which they have pursued for the past 20 years. Whatever it costs, they will be forced to put an end to the state of war in order to recoup the territory conquered by Israel and to avoid even greater dangers. They must henceforth seek to bring their peoples up to the level of the strong and highly-
/developed

-2-

developed nations so that they will be capable one day of preventing all injustice and discouraging all aggression".

An Ekonomska Politika article, reported by the Yugoslav agency Tanyug on 19 August noted that during President Tito's visit to three Arab countries harmonisation of Yugoslav-Egyptian and Yugoslav-Arab attitudes was recorded, and even a definite plan of joint action, through the United Nations ... It seemed that both Moscow and Washington are now in a position to adjust their attitudes with greater flexibility in their search for a solution of the Middle East crisis ... It might be possible to reach a solution "on a wider platform which includes not an explicit attitude for recognition of Israel, but perhaps a more realistic attitude to the fact of its existence".

Soviet exploration uncovered nearly 1,000 million tons of oil reserves in Northern Syria, "a tempting morsel which the oil companies could not hope to obtain from the extant Syrian Government", according to a report in the British Communist Party paper Morning Star, 18 August.

The Strathconon, the first cargo liner of the Peninsular and Orient Line to make the homeward journey from Japan via the Panama Canal since the closure of the Suez Canal, had arrived in London one day ahead of the original scheduled transit time of 32 days from Japan via Suez.

"If we have not yet realised that we are facing the most perilous situation in our modern history, it is high time that we did". -- Mohammed Heykal, Editor-in-Chief of the Cairo newspaper Al-Ahram, quoted by Cairo Radio, 18 August.

In the Cairo weekly Rose al Youssef of 14 August the editor, Ahmed Hamroush, emphasised that the present battle in Egypt cannot be fought without leadership of the "Party" (meaning the Arab Socialist Union, the State-controlled and only political organisation in the UAR).

Use of the word "Party" is significant, in that President Nasser and other UAR leaders have constantly avoided calling the ASU a party. They have always insisted that it is an "alliance" among the popular forces of the people -- workers, farmers, the military, the intellectuals and national capital.

Hamroush said that a "political vacuum" now exists in the UAR, mainly between the "leadership and the masses" and asked that this vacuum be filled. "It is not logical or possible to establish and protect the Socialist structure against imperialist aggression without a revolutionary party ... The Party is the only way".

/"We say

"We say that the support which the Soviet Union accorded or promised to accord us in a savage battle like the battle we have waged has actually been like a dishonoured cheque". -- Jiddah Radio in Arabic, 21 August.

Chinese propaganda on the Middle East crisis appears to be mainly concerned with using it as a weapon to attack Soviet revisionism, and alleging Moscow's "collusion" with Washington, and also to expound Peking's revolutionary policies. For example, the Red Flag journal made these comments, broadcast by Peking Radio on 23 August:-

"It can be seen from the Middle East events that the military and economic 'aid' provided by the Soviet revisionist clique for the Arab and other African, Asian and Latin American countries is not meant to give genuine support to the anti-imperialist struggles of these countries. This so-called 'aid' only serves the Soviet revisionist clique's neo-colonist policies and its counter-revolutionary general line of Soviet-United States collaboration for world domination. It uses its 'aid' not only to exploit and plunder other countries; it tries, by means of its 'aid', to have a say in matters concerning these countries, to represent them, interfere in their internal affairs and control them...

"This (Middle East) war proves that it will not do to rely on modern weapons. It will not do to rely on aircraft, tanks or long-range artillery. Chairman Mao says: 'Weapons are an important factor in war, but not the decisive factor. It is the people, not things, that are decisive'".

The Indian Minister of State for Petroleum and Chemicals stated on 13 July that the Russian Trade Representation in India had asked the Indian Oil Corporation to bear an increase of 4.20 dollars (Rs. 51.50) per ton in freight charges on kerosene imports from the Soviet Union after the closure of the Suez Canal. On 1 August the Indian Government announced that the ceiling price of kerosene had been raised to 67 paise per litre.

Commenting on this, the Bombay paper "The Current" said on 5 August: "It is interesting to find that the Communists in this country have not uttered a word against kerosene becoming costlier as a result of the increase in Russian freight charges, though whenever the Government has taxed kerosene they have made a big noise about the poor man's daily need becoming costlier".

FO/CO/WH DISTRIBUTION
J.I.P.G.D.

0 B

Advanu File 1071/12/67
Cats not to be written

CYPHER/CAT A

FROM FOREIGN OFFICE

TELEGRAM NO. 1097

30 AUGUST, 1967

PRIORITY

CONFIDENTIAL

FOLLOWING RECEIVED FROM KHARTOUM.

ADDS TO F O TL NO 484 OF 30 AUG REF TO ALL ARAB POSIS HC ADEN
PERSONAL TEL AVIV WTON AND UKMIS NEW YORK (ALL PRIORITY).

M I P T.

THE SUDANESE ARE DELIGHTED THAT THEIR PATIENT EFFORTS TO
CONVENE A SUMMIT HAVE AT LAST BEEN REWARDED. THEY ARE NOT MUCH
CONCERNED AT THE ABSENCE OF KING HASSAN AND BOURGEIBA (THE LATTER'S
RECENT SPEECH SEE TUNIS TELNO 249 HAS BEEN SUPRESSED HERE),
BUT THEY ARE DISAPPOINTED AND IRRITATED AT THE ABSENCE OF
BOUMEDDIENE AND ATASSI.

APR 1/9
JLSD 2/9
10
1stec (W)
1stec (U)
800
2ndec (M)
3rdec

Wl
1.9

2. AS I SEE IT, ALGERIAN AND SYRIAN SULKING MAY EXPOSE NASSER'S
REVOLUTIONARY FLANK AND MAY CONSEQUENTLY DISSUADE HIM FROM
GOING AHEAD WITH ANY FORM OF QUOTE POLITICAL SOLUTION
UNQUOTE SUGGESTED TO HIM BY TITO AND THE RUSSIANS, UNLESS
IS AND JORDAN'S ECONOMIC PLIGHT LEAVES HIM NO OPTION
BUT TO SEEK SOME FORM OF ACCOMMODATION WITH ISRAEL.

3. IF THIS PREDICTION IS CORRECT THE MAIN TOPICS LIKELY TO BE
DISCUSSED AND RECORDED ARE THE IRAQI PROPOSAL FOR AN OIL EMBARGO, THE
YEMEN ISSUE AND PROPOSALS FOR GREATER ARAB ECONOMIC AND MILITARY
UNITY: THE PROBLEM OF ~~THE ARAB BOYCOTT OF ISRAEL~~
DISLODGING THE ISRAELIS MAY WELL BE
OBSCURED IN THE FLOOD OF RHETORIC, BUT IT IS BOUND TO BE
DISCUSSED. ENLISTMENT OF UN ACTION, DISCREETLY SOUGHT, SEEMS THE
MOST LOGICAL NEXT STEP.

4. NASSER IS THE HERO OF THE HOUR IN KHARTOUM: THE PRO-NASSERITE
P D P PARTY AND THEIR EXTREMIST ALLIES ARE HAVING A FIELD DAY
AND AZHARI AND MAHGOUB ARE BASKING IN REFLECTED GLORY. THE
OPPOSITION INCLUDING THE SOUTHERNERS HAVE UTTERED SOME CAREFUL
CRITICISM OF UNSEEMLY HERO WORSHIP OF A FOREIGN RULER, BUT
THEY WILL BE FORCED TO REMAIN MORE OR LESS MUTE IN THE
FACE OF THE GENERAL ENTHUSIASM FOR NASSER AS LEADER ^{OF} THE ARAB
CAUSE.

CYPHER CAT A

FROM FOREIGN OFFICE

TELEGRAM NO 1088

DATED 28 AUGUST

PRIORITY

Advance & file

1073 / 487/67

(Comments to Col Ray)

APK 23/8

Reply - re from the level below if not included in

JIS

10

18th (M)

18th (G)

SLC

2nd (M)

2nd

CONFIDENTIAL

FOLLOWING RECEIVED FROM KHARTOUM.

ADDSD TO F.O. TELNO 479 OF 28 AUGUST RPTD TO ARAB POSTS H C ADEN

(PERSONAL) TEL AVIV AND SAVING TO WTON AND UKMIS NEW YORK.

hul
308

FOREIGN MINISTERS CONFERENCE.

THE FOREIGN MINISTERS COMPLETED THEIR BUSINESS ON 27 AUG. THEY APPEAR TO HAVE DONE VERY LITTLE MORE THAN PASS ON THE RECOMMENDATIONS OF THEIR EARLIER CONFERENCE AND OF THE BAGHDAD CONFERENCE TO THE SUMMIT. THERE HAS BEEN SOME DISCUSSION OF THE IRAQI PROPOSAL FOR A THREE MONTH STOPPAGE OF OIL EXPORTS AND IT IS WIDELY REPORTED IN THE LOCAL PRESS THAT THE SAUDI ARABIAN, LIBYAN AND KUWAITI DELEGATES EXPRESSED RESERVATIONS. THE ALGERIAN DELEGATE SULKED AND ARE SAID TO HAVE ABSENTED THEMSELVES DURING THE DEBATE ON OIL. THE CONFERENCE FINALLY ACCEPTED UNANIMOUSLY THE FOLLOWING HEADINGS FOR DISCUSSION BY THE SUMMIT WHICH HAD BEEN DRAWN UP BY A COMMITTEE COMPRISING THE SUDANESE LIBYAN AND JORDANIAN DELEGATES, AND WHICH IS OBVIOUSLY INTENDED TO EMBRACE ALL MATTERS DISCUSSED AT KHARTOUM AND BAGHDAD WITHOUT COMMITTING ANY STATE OR GROUP OF STATES TO A PARTICULAR LINE OF ACTION.

QUOTE

(1) POLITICAL, MILITARY AND ECONOMIC MEASURE TO COUNTER THE
IMPACT OF THE AGGRESSION

82) LIQUIDATION OF MILITARY BASES IN ARAB TERRITORY

(3) THE ROLE OF THE ^RARAB ECONOMY IN THE LIGHT OF THE BAGHDAD
CONFERENCE RECOMMENDATION

~~(4) ARAB POLPX~~

~~580N~~

~~12434~~

~~1710N~~

(4) ARAB POLITICAL ACTIVITIES IN THE INTERNATIONAL SPHERE.

UNQUOTE.

2. THE SUMMIT IS BILLED TO START AT 7 PM ON 29 AUGUST. KING HUSSEIN,
THE FIRST ARRIVAL, IS EXPECTED AT 6 PM ON 28 AUGUST. NASSER SALLAL
AND ARIF ARE EXPECTED TO COME TOGETHER FROM CAIRO SOMETIME DURING
29 AUGUST. KING IDRIS AND BOUGEIBA WILL NOT ATTEND QUOTE FOR HEALTH
REASONS UNQUOTE BUT WILL BE REPRESENTED. THERE IS NO LOCAL CONFIR-
MATION OF THE B B C REPORT THAT BOUMEDIENE AND ATAI^{Sr} HAVE DECIDED
NOT TO COME.

3. SEE M I F T FOR LATEST MOVES CONCERNING THE YEMEN.

. F.O. PASS ARAB POSTS U/N

B

CYPHER/CAT A

FROM JEDDA

TELEGRAM NO. 164

28 AUGUST, 1967

ROUTINE

CONFL.

ADDRSD TO F O TELNO. 567 OF 28 AUG RFI AMMAN, KUWAIT

BAHRAIN AND H.C. ADEN (PERSONAL) AND SAVING TO TEL

AVIV, WTON AND UKMIS NEW YORK.

Advance file 1073/4/7/67

3297 Cols sent to Col. Hays

Reg - 12 sent cables to Gulf states in morning

515

10

(8th Dec 67)

1 Nov 67

515

2nd Dec 67

2nd Dec

6th

307

YR TELNO: 1252: AUDIENCE WITH KING FAISAL.

YR TEL ARRIVED AFTER I HAD BEEN RECD BY KING FAISAL ON 27

AUGUST. I DID HOWEVER TAKE THE OPPORTUNITY OF ASKING HIM

ABOUT YEMEN (YR PARA 1) AND, SPEAKING PERSONALLY,

ALSO MADE THE POINTS CONTAINED IN YR PARA 24 ABOUT OUR CONCERN

OVER ISRAEL'S ATTITUDE. FAISAL RECOGNISES THAT WE ARE

DOING OUR BEST TO HELP (SEE MYTEL NO 566 NOT REPEATED TO

ADEN) BUT, KING FAISAL, THE BEST IS RARELY GOOD ENOUGH

FOR HIM.

2. I ASKED THE KING WHETHER ANY PROGRESS HAD BEEN MADE TOWARDS SETTLEMENT OF THE YEMEN PROBLEM. FAISAL SAID,

THAT VARIOUS PEOPLE HAD COME TO HIM WITH SUGGESTIONS FOR A SETTLEMENT, THE LATEST BEING THE

SUDANESE PRIME MINISTER'S

PROPOSAL. HE HIMSELF COULD NOT HOWEVER CONTEMPLATE ANY SETTLEMENT WHICH DID NOT SATISFY THE TWO VITAL PRECONDITIONS HE HAD MADE CLEAR TO ALL CONCERNED:

I) WITHDRAWAL OF ALL UAR FORCES FROM YEMEN AND

II) THE CESSATION OF ALL SAUDI AID TO THE ROYALISTS. HE

WAS ADAMANT ON THESE TWO POINTS. HE REMAINED HIGHLY SUS-

PICIOUS OF NASSER AND FELT THAT THE LATTER WAS TRYING

TO SPIN THINGS OUT UNTIL WE HAD WITHDRAWN FROM SOUTH ARABIA

IN JANUARY. BUT NASSER CO. NOT HIDE BEHIND THE EXCUSE THAT

HE HAD NO TIME TO GET OUT BEFORE JANUARY - +IF NASSER CAN

GET 299,999 SOLDIERS OUT OF SINAI IN 24 HOURS THERE

IS NO REASON WHY HE CANNOT GET 25,999 TROOPS OUT OF YEMEN IN

A WEEK+.

3. THIS WAS AS FAR AS FAISAL WAS PREPARED TO GO WITH ME, BUT

IT SEEMS CLEAR THAT THE WITHDRAWAL OF MOST IF NOT ALL OF

THE UAR FORCES FROM THE YEMEN BEFORE JAN IS WHAT HE WILL TRY TO HOLD OUT FOR.

FO PL PASS AMMAN AND ADEN AS MY TEL NOS 45 AND 70 AND

SAYING TO TEL AVIV 7, WTON 43 AND UKMIS NEW YORK 19.

Advance file 1073/4/6/67

CYPHER CAT A
FROM JEDDA
TELNO 163
DATED 28 AUGUST
ROUTINE

APR 29: Copy sent to Col King

Aug - R send via to Gulf State in next day

10

JIS

1 letter (W)

1 letter (L)

SW

2 letters (1)

3 letters

W
207

CONFL

ADDSD TO FO TELNO 566 OF 28 AUG RFI TO AMMAN KUWAIT BAHRAIN
AND SAVING TO TEL AVIV, UKNIS NEW YORK, WTON, BEIRUT,
TRIPOLI, TEHRAN, BENGHAZI, TUNIS AND RABAU.

YR TELNO. 1249: JORDAN.

KING FAISAL RECEIVED ME ON 27 AUG AND I SPOKE IN ACCORDANCE
WITH YR INSTRUCTIONS.

2. THE KING LISTENED ~~carefully~~

CA

~~He~~ LISTENED CAREFULLY AND REACTED WELL TO YR MESSAGE.
HE WAS PARTICULARLY GLAD TO HAVE THE ASSURANCE CONTAINED
IN THE FIRST SENTENCE OF PARA 1 OF YOUR TEL.

3. HOWEVER, HE INTERRUPTED ME ON TWO OR THREE OCCASIONS TO MAKE THE FOLLOWING MAIN POINTS:-

1) 'COMMUNISM': JORDAN AND SAUDI ARABIA ARE THE SOLE BARRIERS REMAINING IN THE MIDDLE EAST AGAINST COMMUNISM AND IT IS ESSENTIAL THAT BOTH COUNTRIES SHD RECEIVE EVERY SUPPORT FROM BRITAIN AND THE U.S. JORDAN NEEDS THIS HELP MOST. THE BRITISH HAVE TO PERSUADE THE AMERICANS TO DO MORE THAN THEY ARE DOING SINCE THE LATTER ARE RICHER AND MORE POWERFUL. KING HUSSEIN BADLY NEEDS ARMS BUT THE AMERICANS ARE DRAGGING THEIR FEET. THERE IS A DEFINITE RISK THAT HUSSEIN MIGHT BE TEMPTED TO GO TO THE RUSSIANS FOR ARMS IF THE WEST ARE UNWILLING TO SUPPLY HIS NEEDS. HUSSEIN HAD HINTED AS MUCH TO FAISAL DURING THE FORMER-S RECENT VISIT TO SAUDI ARABIA'

11) 'ISRAEL': FAISAL RECOGNISES THAT WE ARE DOING OUR BEST WITH THE ISRAELIS, BUT WE AND ESPECIALLY THE AMERICANS

MUST DO MORE. IT IS ESSENTIAL FOR JORDAN S SURVIVAL

THAT THE ISRAELIS SHD GIVE UP JERUSALEM AND THE WEST BANK.

IF THESE ARE NOT RESTORED TO JORDAN, HUSSEIN AND HIS REGIME - AND INDEED JORDAN AS A COUNTRY - WELL MIGHT COLLAPSE.

111) FAISAL FULLY AGREES WITH US (YR PARA 3) THAT HUSSEIN SHD NOT ~~WALK~~ ^{WALK} THE DANGERS OF ATTEMPTING NEGOTIATIONS WITH THE ISRAELIS + IN PRESENT CIRCUMSTANCES.

HUSSEIN MUST FIRST STRENGTHEN AND STABILISE HIS POSITION AND PUT HIS COUNTRY BACK ON ITS FEET. THIS HE CAN ONLY DO BY GETTING BACK THE TERRITORIES THAT THE ISRAELIS HAVE TAKEN FROM HIM. ONCE THIS HAS BEEN ACHIEVED A +TRUCE+ CD BE

ESTABLISHED

BETWEEN ISRAEL AND JORDAN. IN REPLY TO MY QN

+WHAT THEN?+ FAISAL WAS VAGUE BUT APPEARED TO HAVE IN MIND THAT AT THIS ^{POINT} IT WOULD BE EASIER FOR HUSSEIN TO ESTABLISH SOME ^NKIND OF 'MODUS VIVENDI' WITH ISRAEL, WHICH MIGHT LEAD TO AN EVENTUAL TACIT SETTLEMENT. COMMENTING ON THE LAST SENTENCE OF YOUR PARA. 3 FAISAL SAID THAT HUSSEIN HAD INDEED TOLD HIS PEOPLE AND HIS FRIENDS OF THE REAL NATURE OF JORDAN

S PROBLEMS AND THIS APPEARED TO HAVE STRENGTHENED HIS POSITION.

IV) NASSER HAD ONLY ENCOURAGED HUSSEIN TO NEGOTIATE WITH ISRAEL BECAUSE HE WANTED TO PLACE HUSSEIN IN AN IMPOSSIBLE POSITION AND THEREBY SECURE HIS DOWNFALL.

(V) THE ARAB SUMMIT MEETING WOULD SEE A SEVERE TUG OF WAR BETWEEN THE EXTREMISTS AND THE MODERATES. IT WAS A PITY THEREFORE THAT BOURQUIBA HAD FELT IT NECESSARY TO MAKE HIS RECENT STATEMENT. THIS WAS NOT HELPFUL AT THE PRESENT JUNCTURE AND COULD ONLY ACCENTUATE THE DIVISIONS OF THE ARAB WORLD THEREBY MAKING THE TASK OF THE MODERATES MORE DIFFICULT.

FO PL PASS AMMAN AS MY TELNO 64 AND SAVING TO TEL AVIV 6, UKHIS NEW YORK 18, WTON 42, BEIRUT 31, TRIPOLI 7, TEHRAN 4, BENGHAZI 3, TUNIS 5 AND RABAT 5.

Advance e file . 10214/1/67

good stuff

ITY

ACK

29/8

Regg - 1st Lt. Col. May who
Gen. web bank

ISA 368

From

TUNIS 10

18th (C)

18th (C)

00325

500

2nd (H)

2nd

hul
29.8

NR 673

P 251455Z

FM ASOLH NR 95

TO PP ASOLDQ

00325

GR 1049

249
ADDSD TO FOREIGN OFFICE TEL NO OF 25 AUGUST RPTD FOR INFO
TO MOSCOW, TEL AVIV, UKMIS NEW YORK, WASHINGTON, TRIPLOI,
BENGHAZI, KUWAIT, BAHRAIN, KHARTOUM, JEDDA, RABAT, AMMAN
BRITISH INTERESTS SECTIONS COLON CAIRO, ALGIERS.
THE FOLLOWING ARE EXTRACTS FROM PRESIDENT'S BOURGUIBA'S ADDRESS
TO THE RECENTLY ELECTED BUREAU OF THE UNION GENERAL DES ETUDIANTS
TUNISIANS.

A. MISTAKE ON THE PART OF A LEADER CAN BE FATAL FOR HIS PEOPLE
DESPITE THE GOOD INTENTIONS WHICH HE HAS. WE HAVE HAD RECENT
PROOF OF THIS. BECAUSE THE AGGRESSORS WERE EXPECTED FROM THE
EAST AND THEY ARRIVED FROM THE WEST, BECAUSE A MISTAKE WAS
MADE ON THE BALANCE OF FORCES, BECAUSE THE MOMENT WAS INOPPORTUNE
TO THROW DOWN A CHALLENGE TO THE ENEMY, WE NOW SEE ARAB COUNTRIES
SUBJECTED TO THE WORST POSSIBLE HUMILIATION OF DEFEAT AND OCCUPATION
ISRAEL WAS CONTENT WITH HER FRONTIERS AND DEMANDED NEITHER THE
WHOLE OF THE CITY OF JERUSALEM NOR THE WEST BANK OF THE JORDAN,
NOR THE OTHER TERRITORIES WHICH SHE OCCUPIES TODAY TO THE EAST
AND TO THE NORTH. DELIBERATELY AND WITHOUT CONSIDERING THE

RISKS, MEASURES WERE TAKEN TO PREVENT HER ACCESS TO THE GULF OF AQABA IN DEF^{ENCE} OF INTERNATIONAL AGREEMENTS AND THE ACTUAL STATE OF AFFAIRS. ONE KNEW WITH CERTAINTY THAT THE ENEMY WOULD NOT FAIL TO REACT AND THE ARAB PRESS ITSELF LET THIS BE UNDERSTOOD. ONE EVEN FORESAW THIS REACTION AND INDEED ONE EVEN HOPED FOR IT. SINCE THEN THE ISRAELI ARMY HAS REACHED THE BANKS OF THE SUEZ CANAL AND THE ARABS AFTER HAVING BEEN SUBJECTED TO A REIGN OF STEEL FIRE AND NAPALM ONCE AGAIN FIND THEMSELVES REFUGEES.

B. SINCE THE COLD WAR HAS DEVE^{LOPED} THE WORLD INTO TWO OPPOSING CAMPS STUDENTS HAVE BECOME THE OBJECT OF GREAT ATTENTION. EACH CAMP WANTS THEM ON THEIR SIDE. THUS CERTAIN PROPAGANDISTS EXPLOIT THE JUVENILE ENTHUSIASMS OF STUDENTS IN AN ATTEMPT TO INTOXICATE THEM TO THE POINT WHERE THEY HAVE LOST ALL POSSIBILITY OF PERSONAL JUDGMENT. THUS "SATELLISED" THEY BECOME THE EMPTY ECHO OF THE PROPAGANDA THAT THEY HAVE NOT TAKEN THE TROUBLE TO ANALYSE. THEY WANT TO HAVE PROGRESSIVE IDEAS ON EVERY QUESTION. IN THEIR EYES THE POSITION TAKEN BY THE SOVIET UNION HAS A LABEL OF PROGRESSIVENESS. IN THIS WAY ALIGNING THEMSELVES INDISCRIMINATELY WITH ATTITUDES THAT THEY HAVE NOT EVOLVED THEMSELVES. THEY CONSIDER THAT SALLAL OF THE YEMEN IS A PROGRESSIVE BUT THAT BOURGUIBA WHOSE ACTIVITIES ARE CONCENTRATED ON THE EMANCIPATION OF WOMEN, THE INSTRUCTION OF THE YOUNG AND THE IMPROVEMENT OF THE CONDITIONS OF THE POOR, IS NOT PROGRESSIVE. ~~✓~~

C. WE KNOW WHAT "DON QUICHOTISM" COSTS THE REGIMES WHICH DESCRIBE THEMSELVES AS REVOLUTIONARY. HOWEVER WHILE THEY ARE FIGHTING THE WINDMILLS OF IMPERIALISM THE PEOPLE FOR WHOM THEY HAVE THE RESPONSIBILITY CONTINUE TO LIVE IN BLACK MISERY, EVEN THE EXERCISE OF THE MOST ELEMENTARY LIBERTIES IS FORBIDDEN THEM. THE STRUGGLE AGAINST IMPERIALISM HAS BECOME THE SOLE PRE- OCCUPATION OF THESE REGIMES. THUS OVER THE PALESTINE AFFAIR, THEY HAVE FOLLOWED A POLICY WHICH CONSISTS OF ABANDONING THE SUBSTANCE FOR THE SHADOW. THE STATE OF ISRAEL IS RECOGNISED AS SUCH BOTH BY AMERICA AND THE SOVIET UNION, IT IS A MEMBER OF THE UNITED NATIONS AND ITS EXISTENCE IS ONLY CONTESTED BY THE ARAB STATES. IN THESE CONDITIONS IT IS USELESS TO INSIST OBSTINATELY ON NOT RECOGNISING THIS REALITY. TO CLAIM TO EFFACE ISRAEL FROM THE MAP OF THE WORLD IS TO CONDEMN ONESELF TO ALMOST

TOTAL ISOLATION. THE POLICY ADOPTED UP TO NOW HAS ALIENATED ALL SYMPATHY FROM US, AND NO NATION HAS WANTED TO SEE AGGRESSOR IN ISRAEL. ON THE CONTRARY IT IS ADMITTED THAT IT WAS EGYPT WHICH CREATED THE CAUSEUS BELLI (UNDERLINED) DOTS SINCE 1947 THAT IS SINCE THE TIME WHEN ISRAEL WAS RECOGNISED BY THE UNITED NATIONS WE SHOULD HAVE TAKEN ACCOUNT OF THIS FACT IN CHOOSING A STRATEGY WHICH WOULD HAVE ASSURED US VICTORY OVER ISRAELI COLONIALISM. AFTER THE DEFEAT WHICH THE ARAB STATES HAVE JUST EXPERIENCED THEY MUST ABANDON THE HOPELESS POLICY WHICH THEY HAVE PURSUED FOR THE PAST TWENTY YEARS. WHATEVER IT COSTS THEM WILL BE FORCED TO PUT AN END TO THE STATE OF WAR IN ORDER TO RECOUP THE TERRITORY CONQUERED BY ISRAEL AND TO AVOID EVEN GREATER DANGERS. THEY MUST HENCEFORTH SEEK TO BRING THEIR PEOPLES UP TO THE LEVEL OF THE STRONG AND HIGHLY- DEVELOPED NATIONS SO THAT THEY WILL BE CAPABLE ONE DAY OF PREVENTING ALL INJUSTICE AND DISCOURAGING ALL AGGRESSION.

D. THE PROBLEM OF VIETNAM IS NOT AS SIMPLE AS IT SEEMS. IT IS A SERIOUS PROBLEM WHICH CONCERNS THE WORLD BALANCE OF POWER. AT THE END OF THE SECOND WORLD WAR THE WORLD WAS DIVIDED INTO TWO CAMPS COLON THE COMMUNIST COUNTRIES AND THE OTHERS DOTS IT IS THEREFORE AS A RESULT OF THE PARALLEL "LIBERATIONS" MADE BY THE RUSSIANS AND THE AMERICANS THAT A LINE OF DEMARKATION WAS ESTABLISHED CORRESPONDING TO THE ADVANCES OF THE DIFFERENT ARMIES. GERMANY, AUSTRIA, KOREA AND LATER VIETNAM HAVE BECOME SUCCESSIVE THREATS OF CONFRONTATION DOTS SINCE THEN CHINA HAS ENTERED THE FRAY AND IN ENCOURAGING HANOI TO BE INTRANSIGENT SHE ONLY HAS IN MIND TO CONFOUND HER SOVIET BROTHER ENEMY AND TO PROVE TO THE SOVIET UNION THAT THE GUERRILLA ARMY CAN DEFEAT THE AMERICAN ARMY. IF THIS WERE TO HAPPEN AMERICA WOULD HAVE BEEN PROVED NOT TO HAVE BEEN INVINCIBLE DESPITE HER ATOMIC BOMB. CHINA WOULD THEN HOPE FOR ALMOST ANYTHING AND NOTHING WOULD BE ABLE TO STOP THE UNLEASHING OF HER MASSES ON VIETNAM, ASIA AND RUSSIA ITSELF. FURTHERMORE SHE WOULD TAKE OVER THE LEADERSHIP OF THE COMMUNIST WORLD. IT IS IN THE LIGHT OF THIS FACTS THAT ONE HAS TO UNDERSTAND THE DEMAND REPEATEDLY MADE BY LEADERS IN HANOI FOR "THE AGGRESSOR" TO WITHDRAW BEFORE ANY NEGOTIATIONS ARE STARTED DOTS CHINA IS TODAY AT THE MERCY OF THE MADNESS OF THE RED GUARDS

WHO DO NOT EVEN RESPECT THE IMMUNITY OF DIPLOMATIC MISSIONS. (Tunis in June 67 ?!)
ONE HAS REASON TO FEAR THE WORST FROM THESE WILD HORDES, RUSSIA
IS FAR FROM WANTING A CHINESE VICTORY BECURSE SHE KNOWS TO WHAT
PERILS SHE HERSELF WOULD BE EXPOSED. THE WHOLE OF THE ASIATIC PART
OF HER TERRITORY WOULD BE SERIOUSLY THREATENED. TODAY THE SOVIET
UNION FEARS THE POEPLER REPUBLIC OF CHINA MORE THAN SHE FEARS THE
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA. PERHAPS IT IS POSSIBLE THAT ONE DAY
SHE WILL NEED THIS HELP AS AT THE TIME OF THE HITLERITE AGGRESSION
THINGS ARE FAR FROM BEING SIMPLE AND WHAT ONE CALLS "IMPERIALIST"
IS OFTEN NO MORE THAN A QUESTION OF POINT OF VIEW DOTS THE PRESENT
CONFLICT HAS A SCOPE AND MEANING OUTSIDE VIETNAM DOTS FACTS OF GEOGRAPHY
♦, THE SPECIFIC HISTORY OF CHINA, TND THE STALINIST DEOLOGY TO
WHICH SHE IS ATTACHED ALL THIS INDICATES THAT VITNAM WILL EXPERIENCE
THE SAME FATE AS THE COUNTRIES OF CENTRAL EUROPE DURING THE TIME
OF STALIN. IF COMMUNISM DECLARES ITSELF TO BE A CHAMPION OF DEMOCRACY
AND INDEPENDENCE IT IS ONLY IN OTHER COUNTRIES AND NOT IN THOSE WHICH
HAVE BEEN SUBJECTED TO THE YOKE OF STALIN OR WHICH ARE THREATENED
WITH THAT OF MAO. ♀

E. TUNISIA ^{ENJOYS} ~~ENJOYS~~ THE RESPECT OF EVERY ONE OF THE SOVIET UNION
AS OF THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA AND OF FRANCE WITH WHOM SHE WAS
SO LONG IN CONFLICT. WE DO NOT SUFFER FROM THE COMPLEX OF THE
DECOLONISED COUNTRIES WHICH HAVE NOT BEEN ABLE TO OUTGROW THEIR
OLD RANCOURS.

FOREIGN OFFICE PASS UKMIS NEW YORK Ø1125 WASHINGTON Ø1325 AND
RABAT Ø2225. HOOPER.

1823/3/67

April 23/78
 Repts - Typing
 (1) 100 (2) 25/8
 515
 1800 (4)
 800

23.8

ADDRESSED TO TEL AVIV TELEGRAM NUMBER 1836 OF 22 AUGUST REPEATED
FOR INFORMATION TO UKMIS NEW YORK. UKMIS GENEVA, WASHINGTON,
TRIPOLI, BENGHAZI, KUWAIT, BAHRAIN, KHARTOUM, JEDDA, RABAT, TUNIS,
JERUSALEM, AMMAN, BRITISH INTERESTS SECTIONS: CAIRO, ALGIERS.
YOUR TELEGRAM 959: RETURN OF REFUGEES.

PLEASE REPRESENT URGENTLY TO MR. EBAN THAT IT WOULD BE UNREASON-
ABLE OF THE ISRAELI GOVERNMENT TO INSIST ON THE 31 AUGUST DEADLINE
ESPECIALLY IN VIEW OF THE PRACTICAL DIFFICULTIES DESCRIBED
IN PARAGRAPH 2 OF AMMAN TELEGRAM 1012. IN SO DOING, YOU MAY
INFORM HIM OF H.M. AMBASSADOR'S RECENT REPRESENTATIONS IN AMMAN
(NY TELEGRAM NO 1808 TO TEL AVIV AND AMMAN TELEGRAM NO 1025.)

2. IT CANNOT BE IN ISRAEL'S OWN INTERESTS TO OBLIGE THE NEW REFUGEES TO REMAIN AS A CENTRE OF DISAFFECTION ON THE OTHER SIDE OF THE JORDAN. THE CONSEQUENT AGGRAVATION OF THE REFUGEE PROBLEM CAN ONLY MAKE EVEN MORE REMOTE ANY EVENTUAL ARAB/ISRAEL SETTLEMENT. AN UNYIELDING ATTITUDE ON THIS PROBLEM IN WHICH THERE ARE SUCH STRONG HUMANITARIAN CONSIDERATIONS CAN ONLY DAMAGE THE ISRAELI GOVERNMENT IN THE EYES OF THE WORLD, AND CERTAINLY OF U.K. PUBLIC OPINION.

3. PLEASE REPORT BY TELEGRAM WHEN YOU HAVE TAKEN ACTION AS WE INTEND NEWS DEPARTMENT TO MAKE PUBLIC THE FACT THAT WE HAVE MADE REPRESENTATIONS, BALANCING THIS WITH A SIMILAR REFERENCE TO OUR REPRESENTATIONS TO THE JORDANIAN GOVERNMENT TO AVOID PROVOCATIVE PROPAGANDA ABOUT THIS QUESTION.

1823 / 10 / 67

1823 - 1823 / 10 / 67
1823 - 1823 / 10 / 67

300334Z

FM ASOLHY NR 651

TO RR ASOLDQ

09329

PRODROME BAHRAIN FM F.O.

GR 190

10
J.S
(1823 W)
(1823 L)

500
2000 (1)
2000

1823

FOLLOWING RECEIVED FROM TEL AVIV ADDRESSED TO FO TELNO 978 REF MY
TELNO 977 OF 29/8. REFUGEES.

TODAYS MA ARIV (EVENING NEWSPAPER) REPORTS THAT FOREIGN MINISTRY
SOURCES LET IT BE KNOWN THIS MORNING THAT REFUGEES WHO HAVE ALREADY
RECEIVED PERMITS TO RETURN TO THE WEST BANK BUT WHO DO NOT MANAGE
TO DO SO BY 31 AUGUST WILL BE ADMITTED AFTER THAT DATE.

2. IT IS ESTIMATED THAT THERE WILL BE ABOUT 10,000 UNUSED PERMITS
ON 31 AUGUST.

3. MA ARIV STATES THAT THIS DECISION WAS TAKEN IN SUCH A WAY AS TO
AVERT INTERNATIONAL PRESSURE ON ISRAEL WITHOUT GOING BACK ON HER
DECISION NOT TO EXTEND THE DATE FOR RETURN OF THE REFUGEES BEYOND
31 AUGUST.

4. IT IS ALSO REPORTED THAT THE GOVT IS CONSIDERING A DECISION
ABOUT THE RIGHT TO RETURN TO THE WEST BANK WITHIN THE FRAMEWORK
OF THE FAMILY REUNION SCHEME.

5. ARTICLE CONCLUDES BY SAYING THAT AN (OFFICIAL) ANNOUNCEMENT ON
THE GOVTS STEP WILL APPARENTLY BE PUBLISHED TOMORROW (WED 30 AUG)
IN JERUSALEM. SOSFA

CYPHER/CAT A

FROM FOREIGN OFFICE

TELEGRAM NO. AGENCY 150

25 AUGUST, 1967

ROUTINE

CONFIDENTIAL.

ADDRESSED TO TEL AVIV TELEGRAM NO. 1854 OF 25 AUGUST REPEATED FOR
INFORMATION TO UKMIS NEW YORK UKMIS GENEVA WASHINGTON TRIPOLI
BENGHAZI KUWAIT BAHRAIN (AGENCY) KHARTOUM JEDDA RABAT TUNIS
JERUSALEM AMMAN CAIRO (BRITISH INTERESTS SECTION) AND ALGIERS.

YOUR TELEGRAM NO. 965.

I ACCEPT THE RECOMMENDATION IN YOUR PARAGRAPH 4 THAT WE SHOULD
POSTPONE PUBLICITY FOR YOUR REPRESENTATIONS TO THE ISRAELIS.

2. IF THERE HAS BEEN NO MOVE BY THE ISRAELIS BEFORE THEN YOU SHOULD
MAKE ANOTHER APPROACH TO MR. EBAN, OR FAILING HIM TO THE PRIME
MINISTER, OR TO WHICHEVER MINISTER IS IN CHARGE OF THE M.F.A. ON
29 AUGUST. NEWS DEPARTMENT WOULD ANNOUNCE THIS AT THEIR 12 O'CLOCK
PRESS CONFERENCE ON 31 AUGUST IF THERE HAD STILL BEEN NO
FAVOURABLE ISRAELI REACTION. THIS TIME-TABLE WOULD ALLOW THE
ISRAELIS 24 HOURS IN WHICH TO REACT WITHOUT BEING UNDER PUBLIC
PRESSURE FROM H.M.G. IF YOU JUDGED IT USEFUL YOU COULD INFORM
THEM OF OUR INTENTION ABOUT PUBLICITY WHEN MAKING YOUR SECOND
DEMARCHE.

~~3. H.M. AMBASSADOR WASHINGTON SHOULD~~

~~WING YLAX~~

3. H.M. AMBASSADOR, WASHINGTON, SHOULD INFORM THE STATE DEPARTMENT
OF THESE INSTRUCTIONS.

Advance - File 1823/6/67
U Thaur has nature
shaken on Thursday!
25/8

APL

Regy - R, and copy to CCFH + to
Cable note

JTS

Locher (u)

1 other (u)

See
make 20 make

3 SEP 67

1092

WJL
26/8

0 B
Advance File 1073/481/67

CYPHER/CAT A
FROM KUWAIT
TELEGRAM NO. 286
24 AUGUST, 1967
PRIORITY

SECRET.

ADRESSED TO FOREIGN OFFICE TEL NO 464 OF 24 AUGUST, R F I TO
BAHRAIN, JEDDA, TRIPOLI, BENGHAZI, KHARTOUM AND SAVING TO WASHINGTON.

ARAB POLICY ON OIL AND FINANCE.

I SAW THE KUWAIT FOREIGN MINISTER (SHEIKH SABAH AL AHMAD) TODAY.
HE LEAVES FOR KHARTOUM TONIGHT.

2. SHEIKH SABAH SAID THE ARABS HAD BEEN STRUCK BLIND : AFTER
THEIR MILITARY DEFEAT THEY DID NOT KNOW WHAT TO DO. THEY COULD
ONLY THINK OF LASHING OUT WITH THEIR OIL AND FINANCIAL WEAPONS.
BUT THE ATMOSPHERE AT ARAB MEETINGS WAS TERRIBLE, AND SOME OF
THEIR LEADERS, NOTABLY THE SYRIAN FOREIGN MINISTER, WERE OFF
THEIR HEADS : THEIR AIM SEEMED TO BE TO CROWN MILITARY DEFEAT
WITH ECONOMIC DISASTER. WHAT WORRIED HIM WAS THAT THEY CONCENTRATED
THEIR PRESSURE ON KUWAIT AS THOUGH SHE HELD THE KEY TO THE
SITUATION AND AS THOUGH NO OTHER ARAB COUNTRIES PRODUCED OIL
OR HELD FINANCIAL RESERVES..

26/8
JIS - ~~be~~ ^{not} ~~to~~ CCG + bo Gmt
bo Gmt
1st (u)
1st (u)
Suo
2nd (u)
3rd
Lul
268.

3. KUWAIT HAD FINALLY TAKEN THE POSITION THAT SHE WOULD OPERATE A TOTAL BAN ON OIL EXPORTS IF ALL THE OTHER ARAB COUNTRIES WITHOUT EXCEPTION AGREED TO DO (AND DID) LIKEWISE. HE WAS QUOTE ONE THOUSAND PER CENT CERTAIN UNQUOTE THAT THIS WOULD NOT HAPPEN. SAUDI ARABIA WOULD NEVER AGREE, NOR HE THOUGHT WOULD LIBYA. HE DOUBTED WHETHER EVEN IRAQ WOULD AGREE : LAST WEEK'S MEETINGS IN BAGHDAD HAD SHOWN THAT THE IRAQ GOVERNMENT WERE SHARPLY DIVIDED ON THIS ISSUE. IF THERE WAS TO BE NO TOTAL BAN, KUWAIT WOULD NOT ACCEPT THE CONTINUATION OF THE SELECTIVE BOYCOTT, WHICH WAS BOTH INEFFECTIVE AND UNJUSTIFIED, FOR IT WAS NOW GENERALLY AGREED THAT THE UNITED STATES AND BRITAIN HAD NOT TAKEN PART IN THE ARAB/ISRAEL FIGHTING.

4. I ASKED WHAT WOULD HAPPEN NEXT. SHEIKH SABAH SUPPOSED THAT THE SO-CALLED RESULTS OF THE BAGHDAD CONFERENCE WOULD BE SUBMITTED TO THE ARAB FOREIGN MINISTERS, WHO WOULD IN TURN SUBMIT THEM TO THE ARAB SUMMIT, WHICH HE THOUGHT WAS FAIRLY CERTAIN TO BE HELD BY THE END OF THIS MONTH. THE SUMMIT WOULD DISAGREE ON OIL. FURTHER THAN THAT HE COULD NOT SEE.

5. KUWAIT HAD ALSO BEEN UNDER PRESSURE ON HER STERLING HOLDINGS, BUT THERE WAS NO NEED TO WORRY ABOUT THAT. SHE HAD EXPLAINED THAT 75 PER CENT (SIC) OF ALL HER RESERVE S WERE ALREADY INVESTED OR DEPOSITED IN OTHER ARAB COUNTRIES.

6. SHEIKH SABAH HOPED THAT THE WESTERN POWERS WOULD DO SOMETHING (HE DIDN'T KNOW WHAT) TO GET THE ARAB/ISRAEL QUESTION SETTLED. THE ARABS THEMSELVES WERE QUITE INCAPABLE OF EFFECTIVE ACTION. IF THERE WERE NO SETTLEMENT EVERYBODY WOULD SUFFER

EXCEPT ^THE SOVIET UNION. HE ASKE^D ME TO SEND HIS MESSAGE,
AND PARTICULARLY PARAGRAPH 3 ABOVE, TO YOU PERSONALLY FOR YOUR
CONFIDENTIAL INFORMATION : HE DID NOT WANT ANY FURTHER MISUNDER-
STANDINGS ^TO ARISE BETWEEN US.

7. SHEIKH SABAH LOOKED TIRED **AND DISILLUSIONED**. HE WAS VERY
FRIENDLY - ALMOST APOLOGETIC. HIS POLICY IS DESIGNED SIMPLY
TO EVADE ARAB PRESSURES : HE KNOWS THAT KUWAIT HAS NEITHER THE
STRENGTH NOR THE COURAGE TO MEET THESE HEAD-ON.

F O PASS TRIPOLI 20, BENGHAZI 5, KHARTOUM 6 AND SAVING TO
^GWASHINGTON 43 SAVING.

4/2 SAVING TO Muscat

SAVING TELEGRAM

By Bag

FOREIGN OFFICE/COMMONWEALTH OFFICE TO ABIDJAN AND CERTAIN OTHER MISSIONS

Telno 24 Saving

25 August, 1967 (J.I.P.G.)

① Dr Porter to me 18/8

UNCLASSIFIED

② P.A. Dr 21/8

Addressed to Abidjan telegram No. 24 Saving of 25 August.
Repeated for information Saving to: Certain other posts.

MIDDLE EAST TALKING POINTS
25 August, 1967

The Middle East crisis has not (repeat not) led to a massive withdrawal of Arab funds from London. A good deal of the money that went out has come back and within the past fortnight some large new deposits have been offered to London banks from the Middle East. According to an article in the London Times of 25 August "a leading Shaikh" has said "we shift our money from London to Zurich and get two per cent and the Swiss shift it back to London and get six". In the past few weeks there has been what one London banker called a "redispositioning of funds".

The London Guardian Miscellany Column said on 18 August that there had been a call for "true socialist markets" in which to deposit, "a call slightly marred by the fact that no such markets exist". Money that goes into Russia has an unpalatable habit of never coming out again.

"It is perhaps worth noting that the Arab Governments' own national interests were not and are not at all engaged in the question of the rights of the Palestine refugees. But this, perhaps, gave the Israelis an advantage, because they were fighting for something more easily understood by their soldiers - simple survival". - From a report from Lebanon published in the Ghanaian Times, 31 July.

Increasingly, oil industry strategists are turning to the possibility of by-passing the Suez Canal. Several companies are firmly committed to major "super-tanker" programmes, building ships that simply will not be able to use Suez. Apart from the half dozen 312,000 tonners already ordered by one company, latest estimates put the total number of further super-tankers on order, or about to be ordered, at an impressive 22. - London Evening Standard City Page, 14 August.

During the war the aggressor, using the most modern means of intercepting and interfering with radio channels, succeeded in mis-informing the commanders of enemy units and even in issuing false orders. This explains, among other things, the abandoning without resistance of the important strategic position of Sharm al Shaikh the incident when Arab Migs fought each other, the unplanned withdrawal of certain units, and similar weaknesses in the Arab defence. - Belgrade Radio, 11 August quoting an article on the Middle East war by Lt. Gen Ivan Miskovic in the Yugoslav paper Narodna Armija (National Army).

The canal managers had actually promised that by this summer it would be able to accommodate tankers with a 39 foot draught. But the canal authority told the Cairo newspaper "Al Ahram" (4 August) that it would now take a full year to dredge the canal back to its old depth.

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Foreign Office/Commonwealth Office telegram No. 24 Saving to
Abidjan and Certain Other Missions

- 2 -

During the past two months the Suez Canal has become shallower by several centimetres (owing to sand deposits). In one year its bottom may rise nearly half a metre, which would automatically mean reduction in traffic. Experts of the Canal Administration, who have already set out to remove the damage, believe that the Canal could be rendered fit for navigation in three months' time - naturally, provided Israel withdraws and no new destruction takes place. But even after the three months, the Canal would be able to handle ships of only 36 foot draught, not 38 foot as before the aggression. It will take a whole year for it to be made fully fit for navigation ... Tanyug Cairo dispatch, 14 August

"While dangling Israel as a lure before Arab eyes, however, the Russians have a much bigger goal, observers here (in Rome) indicate. Moscow's goal, spelled out time and again in official Party documents, is a gateway into the riches of Africa, control of Middle East oil and control of the passageway to India and the East". - Report from Rome, in The Pioneer (Ghana). -----

"We notice that Sudanese radio and television have adopted new policies ... What we object to, and strongly, is that the radio should lose its independent Sudanese character to become something else; that Sudanese television should lose its independent Sudanese character to become something else; that Sudanese television should lose its independent Sudanese characteristic to become a subsidiary of Egyptian television. Things have so developed that one cannot help feeling astonished. Sudanese songs praise a certain UAR hero ... and not Sudanese heroes - in spite of the great feats achieved by Sudanese heroes". - From the independent Khartoum paper Anba El Sudan, 28 July. -----

"We must firmly slam the door on the advocates of banning of oil exports, the suspension of pumping (for a period of three months from 1 September), or nationalisation. It is clear to all Arabs that these calls are in the interest of Communism at the expense of Arab interests. They aim at opening Arab oil markets to Russian oil. They also want the Arabs to boycott the West and become the friends of Communism, so that their land may become a sphere of Red influence.

"If this happens, Communism will turn its ugly, real face to the Arabs. It will make the Arabs live in peace and harmony with Israel in the sphere of Communism and under its principles. If the Arabs then reviewed accounts they would find that they had been used by Communism and that they had destroyed their countries' wealth and boycotted the world for the sake of Communism and the liberation of Palestine. They would finally discover that instead of liberating Palestine they had placed the band of Red slavery round their necks. In that situation return would be difficult, if not impossible." - Jiddah Radio in Arabic, 15 August. -----

"Many people in the UAR are of the opinion that if the main question on the agenda at the Baghdad conference of Arab Finance, Economy and Oil Ministers - the ban on oil supplies to the Western States who inspired and actively supported the Israeli aggression - is settled satisfactorily, it will be an important step towards the

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Foreign Office/Commonwealth Office telegram No. 24 Saving to
Abidjan and Certain Other Missions

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consolidation of the Arab national liberation movement. Nobody overlooks in Cairo the fact that great difficulties will be encountered in Baghdad during the examination of this question for, as a result of the oil embargo, the oil producing Arab States have suffered appreciable material losses". - Moscow Radio in Serbo-Croat, quoting a Soviet dispatch from Cairo, 15 August.

"Halting oil production for three months, as advocated by certain Arab countries, would undoubtedly harm a number of European countries. However, this is a two-edged weapon, particularly because we are telling our enemy in advance that he will not be supplied with oil for only three months. It is as if we were calling upon the enemy to tighten his belt and look for other sources of supply during this period and until matters return to normal. The Arabs should consider the results of any economic weapon they intend to use and must make sure that the weapon does not backfire and have negative results." - Ad-Dustur article, quoted by Amman Radio in Arabic, 15 August.

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FOREIGN OFFICE AND COMMONWEALTH OFFICE TO CERTAIN MISSIONS AND
DEPENDENT TERRITORIES

Guidance No. 218

25 August, 1967.

(IPG)

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The Middle East Situation

This Guidance reviews recent developments in the Middle East situation. Paragraphs 6, 7, 12 and 16 are for your own information. You may draw on the rest in talking to representatives of friendly governments, and on a non-attributable basis, with trustworthy journalists and other reliable contacts.

The British View

2. We have always taken the view that the United Nations has a vital rôle to play in achieving a lasting solution in the Middle East. So far, however, neither the Security Council nor the General Assembly have been able to agree on a substantive resolution on the main problems. In the Emergency Session, both the Latin American and the non-aligned draft resolutions (Guidance No. 173 of 4 July) were defeated on 4 July. After further back-stage efforts to reach a last minute compromise had foundered on the intransigence of the extreme Arabs, the Assembly on 21 July adopted a procedural resolution referring the Middle East problem back to the Security Council. The Assembly debate had, however, shown a substantial measure of agreement about the elements which should form part of any eventual settlement. It was encouraging that the Russians were in the end prepared to stand against the Arabs and vote for the adjournment. Even more, it was encouraging that they and the Americans privately agreed on a draft resolution (the Dobrynin draft) which in essence contained the main elements of the Latin American draft. In particular, it established the necessary balance by affirming as principles:-

- (a) Withdrawal, without delay, by the parties to the conflict from territories occupied by them;
- (b) Acknowledgement, without delay by all in the area that each has the right to independence and to live in peace and security and that all claims and acts inconsistent therewith should be renounced.

It also foresaw efforts, making use of a United Nations presence, to solve the problems in the Middle East and especially those of refugees and freedom of transit through international waterways. The existence of Soviet/American agreement on this basis became widely known.

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3. Our view remains that any settlement will have to take account of the four points made by the Secretary of State in his speech to the General Assembly on 21 June (Verbatim No. 291/67). We think the next step should be taken in the Security Council and we hope this can be done before the General Assembly meets on 19 September. The difficulties of singling out any aspect of the problem lead us to think that a comprehensive resolution covering the appointment of a United Nations representative and a statement of principle on the lines of the Dobrynin draft would be the best approach, although we do not exclude others. For the time being, it seems best to leave it to the United States and USSR to work out details. We would want the opening of the Canal to have priority and would want to make sure that all concerned understood that the ending of belligerency would result in this. But we do not wish to make too much of this point except to friends and allies. Should it turn out that one comprehensive resolution will not work, we would certainly consider other approaches. But for the time being this seems the most hopeful line.

4. We do not intend to advocate any particular solution of any aspect of the problem. However, the future of the Old City of Jerusalem, for which some form of international control seems likely to be the best solution and the position of the refugees both old and new, form the most indigestible core of the problem. For this reason we are particularly opposed to Israeli moves to make the Jerusalem issue un-negotiable, and have pressed the Israelis to extend the dateline of 31 August for the return of refugees and to accept as many of them back as possible.

5. We consider that it is to both our and the Israeli interest that the West Bank territories should be returned to Jordan as we think that a rump Jordan would not long survive, that the probable outcome would be its absorption by Syria which would lead to a more intransigent Arab attitude and adversely affect developments throughout the Arab world.

6. For your own information, the reopening of the Suez Canal is the aspect of the situation which concerns us most immediately. Although we have no wish to advertise the fact or make the running, we wish to mobilise as much international opinion as possible behind the concept that in the common international interest the Canal should be opened as a result of concessions by both sides, if necessary in advance of a general settlement.

7. For your own information also, following the Arab-Israel war the extra cost on oil to the United Kingdom balance of payments will be up to about £20 million per month, of which

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the greater proportion arises from closure of the Canal. Heavy payments have had to be made to foreign tanker owners. The effect on dry cargo is much less, but as most of our chartered shipping is on long-term charter there is very little benefit to United Kingdom shipowners from increased rates and there is loss to United Kingdom users. In addition, the United Kingdom shipowners with ships stuck in the Canal would lose £1 million in revenue if closure were to last for six months, quite apart from cargo losses. The Egyptians have so far taken the line that they are not prepared to open any part of the Canal before the Israelis withdraw from the East Bank. We estimate that there are about ten blockages both to the north and south of the Great Bitter Lake. Estimates of the time it would take to remove the obstacles vary. We calculate it might take up to two months for the purely engineering work, though the obstacles to the south of the Great Bitter Lake might be removed in a much shorter time.

The Israel position

8. At a Press conference on 14 August Mr. Eban, Israel Minister for Foreign Affairs made it clear that Israel would not declare her proposals in advance of negotiations but intended to keep all options open. There could be no question of a return to the situation before 5 June, and the Old City of Jerusalem must be regarded as permanently under the sovereignty of Israel who would guarantee access for all to the Holy Places.

9. So far the indications are that the more moderate elements in the Israel Government represented by the Prime Minister and Mr. Eban, who are still in control, would settle for a return to the Arabs of all conquered territory apart from the Old City of Jerusalem and except for certain rectifications of the Jordan border and satisfactory arrangements for the Syrian heights, Sharm El Sheikh, the Gaza Strip and passage through the Straits of Tiran and the Suez Canal. In return they would require Peace Treaties with the Arabs. However, other elements in the Israel Government, notably General Dayan and Mr. Allon, the Minister of Labour, both of whom aspire to succeed Mr. Eshkol as Prime Minister, have publicly advocated permanent annexation of the West Bank territory of Jordan.

10. So far the Israelis have been taking a tough line in private as well as public and argue that there is no advantage in pressing for early progress or resolutions in the United Nations. They say they intend to stay where they are until the realities of the situation persuade the Arabs of the advantages of negotiating a genuine peace.

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11. However in the long run Israel needs international support and it is not to be excluded that international pressure on them, to be more flexible and reasonable, to which we shall contribute whenever we can, will have some effect.

12. The Israelis would much prefer no United Nations resolution, or at most a resolution asking for the appointment of a Mediator. Anything further they regard as interfering with the process whereby with the passage of time Arab States are made to face the reality (according to the Israel thesis) that they will not secure Israeli withdrawal without direct negotiations with Israel.

The Arab positions

13. No unified Arab position has emerged either from the meeting of Arab Foreign Ministers in Khartoum from 1 to 5 August or from the subsequent meeting of Arab Finance Economic and Petroleum Ministers in Baghdad. Despite great efforts to avoid open quarrels a three-way division has been developing between

- (a) the extremists; Algeria and Syria, possibly with some support from Iraq, who favour continuing the war using guerilla tactics and appealing to the Chinese for help if the Russians turn them down;
- (b) the U.A.R. which, whether for tactical reasons or otherwise, seems content for the time being to let the Syrians and Algerians make the extremist running and to let it be known that the U.A.R. is disposed to be moderate;
- (c) the moderates, of whom Jordan is under the greatest pressure to seek an accommodation, but is, we think rightly, keeping her head down.

14. There is a possibility that if this division persists, and Russian influence on the U.A.R. is exerted in a generally moderating direction, a situation might evolve in which it would be possible for the Arabs, or some of them, to negotiate a limited settlement under United Nations cover. Such chances as there are would also be contingent upon the Israelis showing a greater degree of flexibility.

The position of the Soviet Union

15. The Soviet leaders are continuing their policy of seeking to extend their influence with the Arab Governments and of causing the maximum damage to Western interests. At the

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same time they appear to accept that they must work to prevent a recurrence of hostilities with its attendant danger of a confrontation with the United States. The costs of supporting their Arab friends and their political and economic interest in seeing the Canal re-opened must also weigh with them. They now seem to be seeking an interim settlement based on an Israeli withdrawal in return for a declaration by the Arabs of an end to the state of belligerence. They are having a hard job to sell this proposition to the more extreme Arabs. (For fuller details please see paragraphs 15 to 22 of Intel No. 23 of 16 August).

The American position

16. For your own information, the Americans reject the basic Israeli contention that a final peace settlement negotiated directly with the Arabs is the only solution, and seem determined to get a Resolution agreed with the Russians and through the Security Council in September if they can. The State Department have been nettled by the rigid Israeli attitude. Present indications are that they intend to take a strong line with the Israelis, whom they hope to be able to persuade to move from their present position in the direction of action at the United Nations.

Conclusion

17. To sum up: Israel is in no hurry to make a move and believes that time is on her side; the Arabs are divided; the Soviet Union and the United States are feeling their way towards possible solutions, but are hampered in particular by the limited susceptibility of the Arabs and Israel to external advice and pressure.

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FROM FOREIGN OFFICE TO TEL AVIV

Cypher/CAT A

From Foreign Office

Telegram No. 1057

22 August, 1967

Routine

25 letter to see *AB*

22/8

Addressed to Tel Aviv telegram No. 1836 of 22 August. Repeated for information to UKMIS New York, UKMIS Geneva, Washington, Tripoli, Benghazi, Kuwait, Bahrain, Khartoum, Jedda, Rabat, Tunis, Jerusalem, Amman, British Interests Section; Cairo, Algiers.

Your telegram 959: Return of refugees.

Please represent urgently to Mr. Eban that it would be unreasonable of the Israeli Government to insist on the 31 August deadline especially in view of the practical difficulties described in paragraph 2 of Amman telegram 1012. In so doing, you may inform him of H.M. Ambassador's recent representations in Amman (my telegram No. 1808 to Tel Aviv and Amman telegram No. 1025.)

2. It cannot be in Israel's own interests to oblige the new refugees to remain as a centre of disaffection on the other side of the Jordan. The consequent aggravation of the refugee problem can only make even more remote any eventual Arab/Israel settlement. An unyielding attitude on this problem in which there are such strong humanitarian considerations can only damage the Israeli Government in the eyes of the world, and certain of U.K. public opinion.

3. Please report by telegram when you have taken action as we intend News Department to make public the fact that we have made representations, balancing this with a similar reference to our representations to the Jordanian Government to avoid provocative propaganda about this question.

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Copies to: CCPC
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SAVING TELEGRAM

FOREIGN OFFICE/COMMONWEALTH OFFICE TO ABIDJAN AND CERTAIN
OTHER MISSIONS

Telno 23 Saving

17 August 1967

(J.I.P.G.D.)

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Addressed to Abidjan telegram No. 23 Saving of 17 August
And Saving Unnumbered to certain other Posts.

MIDDLE EAST TALKING POINTS

"Israeli soldiers are said (censes) to have attacked by themselves last June, since no proof of direct American, English, German or other foreign participation has been given by the Arab States". - From Algérie Actualité, Algerian Sunday newspaper, 6 August.

"Arab peoples must grasp this fundamental idea, that it would be very difficult, emotionally and politically, for the countries of the East, (in context meaning U.S.S.R. and Eastern Europe) if ever they come to the point, to fight directly against Israel. We are unlikely to see Arab and Eastern armies fight side by side against Israeli troops. We can hardly imagine pilots or missile technicians from the Eastern countries confronting Israeli's planes or missiles in Palestine or Arab countries; so long as the enemy camp limits the conflict at least in appearance to the Arabs and the Israelis. At the most, there might be Socialist volunteers, but that only if the enemy had appealed for volunteers from the other camp". - Algérie Actualité, 6 August.

"The damage (from the oil embargo) suffered by Britain, the United States and the West in general may be compared with a slight scratch that a light dressing would be sufficient to cure. For the Arab world, the losses suffered are quite likely to lead to a spreading cancer". - The Moroccan Foreign Minister, Dr. Ahmed Laraki, during the Arab Foreign Ministers' conference in Khartoum (reported in Rabat, 3 August).

"We were not as good at building and constructing for our future as we were at dreaming... We built the summit conference and then demolished it. We established the Unified Arab Command and then crippled it. We then spent years when our wounds were bleeding on a long road of peripheral differences, fabricated battles and conflicts". - From King Hussein's accession anniversary broadcast, 10 August.

"The Arab Socialist Union must remain under the Government... When it tries to compete with the Government or bring it to heel, it is only creating duality of authority, or confusion of responsibility... The attempt (by information media) to arouse enthusiasm and exaltation and to consider that as a form of mobilisation has proved worthless. It has been shown to be incapable of supplying stamina in a war whose battles demand stamina". - From an article by Mohammed Hasanayn Heykal, Editor-in-Chief of Al-Ahram, broadcast by Cairo Radio and Voice of the Arabs, 11 August.

/"The United

"The United States Oil and Gas Journal recently reported on an Israeli plan to build a canal from the port of Elath in the Gulf of Aqaba to the Mediterranean coast...which might in the future replace the Suez Canal or at least considerably lessen its importance... There are reports of other plans, too. Thus the United States bulletin, Economic Law, reports that Israel proposes to provide Western companies with concessions for working Sinai oil deposits seized from the U.A.R., and, furthermore, as the magazine points out, it is proposed to offer these concessions on much more favourable terms than those on which the Egyptians were insisting". - Moscow Radio home service, 5 August.

"One of the greatest contradictions arises from the Egyptian public's eagerness to learn what has really happened and what will happen now, and from the obvious reluctance of the country's leadership to discuss publicly these questions at a moment when the enemy is lurking a mere 120 kilometres from the capital. The official spokesman, Mohammed Heykal, Editor-in-Chief of Al-Ahram, has said that the time is not auspicious for stock-taking and for a debate on lessons to be drawn. This can be done only after the consequences of aggression are eliminated. The official premise is that no retreat is possible from the demand for the unconditional withdrawal of the enemy's troops. The moment is equally not considered propitious for any further social changes. For example, sequestration of agricultural land has been annulled in some 300 cases and another 4,000 cases are to be subjected to re-examination. The private sector has been given a go-ahead for independent exports". - Rudé Právo's Cairo correspondent, 20 July.

The United States Government forecast (on 9 August) that an extra 7,400,000 barrels of oil would be shipped to Europe this month to help make good the shortage in Arab oil. The August estimate compares with July's 6,100,000 barrels.

"India's food supplies from America and Canada are costing 17 per cent more in freight and insurance. In a year, closure of the Suez Canal will add £150 million to India's bill". - Daily Telegraph, 11 August.

"Now the pro-American lobby in Cairo is alleging that without the West - and the United States, to be exact - the U.A.R. will be unable to overcome the economic difficulties which cropped up because the Suez Canal was closed and because of the consequences of the Israeli war". - Moscow's Radio Peace and Progress, in English for Africa, 9 August.

"Why did the Soviet Union, after the June disaster, abandon its slow pace and rush forward? The Kremlin realised that it had a good opportunity in the Middle East, and in its greed, it did not hesitate to seize that opportunity. The Arab leaders who went to Moscow to ask for arms have undoubtedly noticed this change in the Soviet attitude. They must also have noticed that Soviet arms, which were formerly offered for sale on attractive and easy terms, are now offered as though they were made of precious platinum". - Jiddah Radio, 9 August.

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KUWAIT TO BAHRAIN RESIDENCY 1073/40/67

SAVING TELEGRAM No. 23.

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ADDRESSED TO FOREIGN OFFICE TEL NO 469 OF 29 JULY, R F I SAVING
TO BAHRAIN, JEDDA, TRIPOLI, BENGHAZI, KHARTOUM, AND WASHINGTON.

MY TELEGRAM NO 464 : OIL AND FINANCE.

I DISCUSSED THE BAGHDAD CONFERENCE BRIEFLY TODAY WITH THE MINISTER
OF FINANCE AND OIL (ATIQI), WHO IS GOING TO KHARTOUM WITH THE
AMIR.

2. ATIQI CONFIRMED THAT KUWAIT HAD PROPOSED THE ESTABLISHMENT
OF A FUND WITH A CAPITAL OF AT LEAST £100 MILLION FOR ARAB
ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT. KUWAIT WAS READY TO SUBSCRIBE A SUBSTANTIAL
PROPORTION OF THE CAPITAL. THE FUND WOULD NOT BE WASTED ON ARMS
PURCHASES : IT WOULD OPERATE ON THE SAME LINES AS THE K F A E D,
THAT IS BY MAKING LOANS AT LOW INTEREST RATES FOR SPECIFIC
DEVELOPMENT PROJECTS THAT COULD BE JUSTIFIED ON ECONOMIC
GROUNDS. ATIQI DID NOT KNOW WHETHER OTHER OIL-PRODUCERS WOULD
ACCEPT THE KUWAIT PROPOSAL : THE SAUDIS DID NOT SEEM ENTHU-
SIASTIC. NOR WAS HE SURE (OR WOULD AT ANY RATE NOT ADMIT)
WHETHER CONTRIBUTIONS WOULD BE EXPECTED FROM STATES (E G ABU
DHABI) OUTSIDE THE ARAB LEAGUE.

Mamuk
not.

3. ON STERLING BALANCES ATIQI SAID THAT KUWAIT WOULD HAVE TO
YIELD TO ARAB PRESSURE IF IT WERE UNANIMOUS. BUT THIS WAS NOT
LIKELY, AND HE COULD ASSURE ME THAT THEY WOULD NOT WILLINGLY
TAKE ANY ACTION WITH THE DELIBERATE AND SOLE AIM OF DAMAGING
THE UNITED KINGDOM. THEY WANTED TO MAINTAIN THEIR FRIENDSHIP
WITH US. IN ANY CASE THEY DID NOT BELIEVE IN MIXING POLITICS
WITH BUSINESS IF THEY COULD AVOID IT.

4. I ASKED WHEN THEY WOULD LIFT THE BAN ON THE EXPORT OF OIL TO THE UNITED KINGDOM AND THE UNITED STATES. ATIQI SAID THAT THEY WOULD LIKE TO DO ~~SO~~ NOW BUT THEY WOULD HAVE TO WAIT FOR OTHERS TO MOVE FIRST. EVEN THEN, WE MUST NOT EXPECT A RAPID DECISION : THEY WOULD NEED TO GIVE CAREFUL ATTENTION TO PUBLIC OPINION IN KUWAIT.

5. ATIQI CONCLUDED WITH THE HOPE THAT H H G WOULD QUOTE REVIEW THEIR POLICY UNQUOTE AND NOT MAKE THINGS MORE DIFFICULT FOR THEMSELVES AND FOR KUWAIT. WE WERE INTERRUPTED AT THIS POINT, BUT THE CONTEXT SEEMED TO INDICATE THAT HE WAS THINKING MAINLY OF OUR BEHAVIOUR AT THE UNITED NATIONS WHEN THE PALESTINE ISSUE NEXT COMES UP.

F O PASS SAVING JEDDA 17, TRIPOLI 13, BENGHAZI 4, KHARTOUM 3 AND WASHINGTON 45.

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25 Lines to see 1881

P.A. 20. 2018.

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SAVING TELEGRAM

FOREIGN OFFICE/COMMONWEALTH OFFICE TO ABIDJAN AND CERTAIN
OTHER MISSIONS

Telno 21 Saving

11 August 1967

(J.I.P.G.D.)

UNCLASSIFIED

Addressed to Abidjan telegram No. 21 Saving of 11 August
And Saving Unnumbered to other Foreign Office and Commonwealth
Posts

MIDDLE EAST TALKING POINTS

10 August, 1967

"It would be sinning against truth not to mention a certain trend of chauvinistic nationalism existing in the Arab world, though it is not shaping official policies. Certain Arab leaders who have no relations with Arab Governments have done no small harm to Arab peoples by their ill-considered speeches." Pravda article by Belyayev and Primakov, reporting from Cairo, 3 August.

2. "The Khartoum conference of Arab Foreign Ministers produced no tangible results, nor did it yield anything but an agreement to hold yet another meeting. This meeting will adopt no positive resolutions either because its task, brothers, will be limited to submitting recommendations to an Arab Summit Conference that is still shrouded in confusion and doubt This is not the time for dilly-dallying, differences and manoeuvres. The first and last aim of the Arab leaders must be to strengthen unity and take the necessary measures for the deliverance of the Arab nation. The battle cannot be won by meetings held only to prepare for further meetings."

Algiers Radio 7 August.

3. "According to sources close to the (Khartoum) conference, the Moroccan delegation took the opportunity of emphasising that the situation in the Arab world can be improved not only by a settlement of the Yemen conflict but also by a solution of all the problems which are disturbing the Arab atmosphere, particularly the Algerian-Moroccan frontier dispute." Le Petit Marocain Rabat, 7 August.

4. "Who is going to pay for these new sacrifices (in Egypt)? The measures which have been taken are going to reduce a number of privileges in the Egyptian Civil Service and in the Army. For the first time, officers will suffer cuts in their allowances, or rather their special gratuities for additional responsibilities, which allow senior Civil Servants and high-ranking Army officers sometimes to double their salaries. Also, at the end of every month, Ministers will receive 100 Egyptian pounds less (or a cut of between 20 and 25 per cent of their salaries)." L'Humanité, the French Communist newspaper, 31 July.

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Foreign Office/Commonwealth Office telegram No. 21 Saving
to Abidjan and Certain Other Missions

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5. It is essential that Egypt should have diplomatic relations with the United States, to balance the U.A.R.'s international policy, wrote Muhammed Hassanein Heykal, Editor of the Cairo newspaper Al Ahram, on 4 August. "The head-on clash with the United States was, and still is, in my opinion, an error which we cannot afford and for which we are not equipped."
6. Moscow's Radio Peace and Progress in English for Africa on 4 August complained of the "passivity" of many African countries in the Middle East crisis, and warned them to beware of "Israel's Trojan horse" and to rebuff "any imperialist attempts in Africa". It said that Israel had established diplomatic relations with 28 African States, was developing trade ties and had sent 500 Israeli experts to Africa by the middle of last year. More than 300 Africans were going to Israel for technical training.
7. Izvestiya, on 1 August, blamed African countries for being deceived by the Israeli diplomatic and economic offensive in Africa, which was aimed at "driving a wedge between the Arab and African countries".
8. Comparing June's output of crude oil with that of May, this month's Petroleum Press Service shows that Libya's production fell by 80 per cent from 54 million barrels to 11 million. Iraq fell by 73 per cent, Kuwait by 41 per cent, Saudi Arabia by 40 per cent, Qatar by 18 per cent, and Abu Dhabi by 10 per cent. In contrast, Iranian production rose by two per cent in June and has since increased further.
9. "We may also presume that those States which advocate the further destruction of Arab economic resources have now seen the truth that was lost in the whirl of emotion and sentiment. This is that the oil-producing Arab States cannot pledge themselves to a long-term war effort if they lose their natural sources of income, which constitute the mainstay of their economies." Jiddah Home Service commentary on the Khartoum conference, 4 August.
10. "Moscow is now shifting the target from one of wiping out Israel to one of building a solid Arab-Moscow axis incorporating all of Arabia". Ghanaian Times, 20 July.
11. "There are certain groups within the Arab nation ... which are calling for the complete unification of the Arab countries' foreign policies on the basis of breaking off all relations with one world camp and establishing relations decisively with the other camp. We do not doubt the sincerity of some of these groups, but we doubt very much that their opinion is based on an objective and deep study of international and Arab realities, and of the facts and consequences of the setback." Amman Radio, quoting an Ad-Dustur editorial, 4 August.

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Foreign Office/Commonwealth Office telegram No. 21 Saving
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12. "Russia has been carrying out a well-prepared long-term plan, aimed primarily at Bolshevizing the Middle East and turning it into a Communist sphere of influence. Russia is therefore carefully seeking to fill the hearts of the people of the area with hatred and indignation against all the Western States. At the same time, Russia is trying to present itself as the saviour, loyal friend and guardian angel of the Arab region.... On the pretext of rearming some of the Arab armies, it has assumed for itself the right to supervise these armies with large numbers of Soviet experts, advisers and attachés. It is also assuming the right to supervise the implementation of Socialism and to ensure its stricter and wider implementation. This is done on the ground that the coming Arab battle against Israel requires more austerity and more Socialist measures." Jiddah Radio on Soviet Middle East policy, 29 July.

13. "On Tuesday, 6 June, twenty-four hours after war broke out, there was not a single Egyptian General in Sinai (except those who found themselves surrounded). They had all returned to Cairo by the quickest route, leaving their troops in full disarray." L'Humanité. the French Communist newspaper, 29 July.

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From: Foreign Office To: Bahrain

Telegram No: 1005

Date: 7 August, 1967

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PRIORITY

Following received from Khartoum.

Addressed Foreign Office telegram No. 445 of 7 August repeated for information to Arab posts HICOMA Aden, Tel Aviv, Washington and UKNIS New York.

Foreign Ministers Conference. The Foreign Ministers have dispersed. They are due to meet again in Khartoum on 26 August to make final preparations for a summit meeting after receiving the report of the economic and oil ministers who will meet in Baghdad on 15 August. The Sudanese forecast a summit in Khartoum on 29 August but it is reported that there is a Lebanese counter proposal that it should take place during the second week of September (also presumably in Khartoum) so that it can consider the line to be taken at the United Nations.

2. All business was transacted in closed session and the press communique (Khartoum telegram 444) was no doubt deliberately uninformative. It has therefore been difficult to form a clear idea of all that went on or to assess the outcome. In Khartoum the whole affair has been rather blurred by the delight of the Sudanese at their success in getting together a full tally of Arab ministers and in deciding to recommend a summit.

3. As I see it the conference was of value to the Arabs as a debating forum at which all could calculate how far they could pursue their separate policies and interests without splitting the Arab world. It will now be up to the Heads of State to decide how safely they can embark on a summit without selling individual passes. There were clearly enormous efforts to avoid open quarrels and the prominence given to the Yemeni question (Khartoum tel. 446) reflects the UAR's wish and the general concern to heal the worst wound. I hazard a guess that the eventual outcome will be that all the countries while striving for a semblance of unity will go their own way in their relation with the West and that this is the best we can hope for until the economic shoe begins to pinch Egypt really hard.

4. All delegates were solid in their expressions of hostility to Israel but no practical suggestions were made about getting rid of the Israelis from Arab territory. Whatever proposals the Jordanians made were unsuccessful and they are said to have agreed not to act unilaterally on seeking an understanding with Israel.

5. The delegates representing the "revolutionary states" by no means had it all their own way. If the conference had stars they were Mahgoub for his oratory and chairmanship and Mongi Slim (sic) for hinting that Arab tactics towards Israel would need to be reconsidered. The Algerians arrived late and were not prominent - the Egyptians got the headlines only with the Yemeni initiative - the Iraqis made the running on economic sanctions - the Saudis were inscrutable - the Kuwaitis and the Sudanese tried to be all things to all men.

/6.

CONFIDENTIAL

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6. There is no evidence that relations with East Germany or South Arabia were discussed. The FLOSY delegation did not turn up.

7. Khartoum was completely calm throughout and reflected the generally low key of the conference. The Egyptian line was clearly to avoid fireworks and to keep some options open.

Distribution

File
Gulf Posts.

CONFIDENTIAL

SAVING TELEGRAM

Telno 20 Saving

UNCLASSIFIED

Middle East Talking Points - August 3 1967.

"About the radio, some people sent letters telling me they were fed up with national songs; the radio was broadcasting them all day ... I told the Information Minister: 'Change the broadcasts'. I said: 'Some countries were at war for five years in the Second World War; did they broadcast national songs for five years?' I asked Dr. Qaysuni, who was in London at that time. He told me: 'No, the radio broadcast as usual'". - President Nasser, July 23.

"Looking back now, we can see clearly that the Arab information policy was one of the main elements of the setback. Within our Arab information policy lie the seeds of the danger which has led to our big setback. We lived 20 years enjoying songs about returning to Palestine, as if this would be fulfilled by song and music writers. For 20 years, Arab radio stations were devoted to destroying the psychology of Arab unity. Charges of treason and subservience to imperialism became the salt of radio and Press work in Arab countries. These campaigns of suspicion have borne their fruit: the Arabs reaped the thorns when the hour of war came". - Kuwait's newspaper Al Rai Al Aam, reported in Beirut, July 4.

"Pedgorny's personal supervision of the dismissal and trial of no fewer than 1,000 officers of various ranks in the Egyptian Army may be taken to confirm the view that the secret of the setback lies in the fact that so many officers fought under a régime and system which did not inspire their confidence and faith". - Jiddah Radio commentary, July 27.

"Today, after the rôles have been reversed (in Jerusalem), but without any restrictions on the movement of Christians and Moslems to these Holy Places by the Israeli authorities, most States are falling over each other to 'safeguard' the Holy Places. What is even more ironical is that Communist Russia, a self-proclaimed atheistic State - a godless State - should be in the forefront of this agitation". - Ghanaian Daily Graphic, July 15.

14-00000

FOREIGN OFFICE AND COMMONWEALTH OFFICE TELEGRAM 20 SAVING
TO ABIDJAN AND CERTAIN MISSIONS

- 2 -

"We want to say honestly to our Arab friends that we do not understand and do not share the attitude of those circles which favour the liquidation of the State of Israel. We do not wish to give advice to anyone, but the lessons of history show that a people cannot achieve its national and social aspirations by rising against the right of another people to exist". - Ceausescu, speaking in the Rumanian Grand National Assembly, July 24.

The former Venezuelan President, Romulo Betancourt, disclosed in a Caracas television talk on July 6 that in the wake of the Arab-Israeli conflict the Soviet Union had made overtures to sell its petroleum to Britain, Switzerland, Belgium and Germany - none of whom had accepted. Betancourt also said that Venezuela, with its valuable petroleum reserves, was the only country guaranteeing the West a considerable source of petroleum in war as well as in peace.

A number of Lebanese papers appear to be agreed that the Soviet Union was not expected to do much in favour of the Arab cause. Al Amal said on July 21 that it rejected "gold-plated Red chains".

According to Algiers Radio, President Boumedienne received Pavlovskiy, the USSR Deputy Defence Minister, on July 26.

"The signs of suspicious Soviet intervention in the affairs of the Arabs, in their vital causes and even in the choice of Arab leaders, may turn into a light, which will penetrate the present thick clouds, to guide the Arabs towards a road which will prevent the setback from being transformed by the Soviet leaders into a deadly national disaster. The Soviet leaders have gone too far and think they have the right to reclassify Arab leaders". - From the Lebanese paper Al-Hayat, quoted by Jiddah Radio, July 24.

"Whatever the situation, the length of time which President Nasser has estimated it will take to remove the effects of aggression will present the régime with difficulties from which it can escape only by a miracle. This is because the Egyptian people cannot tolerate this situation for long. Furthermore, the Egyptian people will see to it that their taxes are no longer spent on spying, Intelligence and high pay for Army officers". - Jiddah Radio commentary, July 27.

FO/CO/WH DISTRIBUTION

J.I.P.G.D.

PPPPP

Cypher/CAT A

(1073/463/67)

From: Foreign Office

To: Bahrain

Telegram No: 987

Date: 1 August, 1967

CONFIDENTIAL
ROUTINE

Dr Parker to see *PP*
PA *DD* b/s

Following received from Tripoli.

Addressed to Foreign Office tel. No. 738 of 31 July repeated for information to Benghazi, Jedda, Kuwait, Bahrain and Khartoum.

My, tel. No. 735: Libyan oil.

When I saw Libyan Foreign Minister on the eve of his departure to Khartoum he told me that he had been very fully briefed on all items of the agenda by the King himself and also charged to carry certain instructions to the Libyan Prime Minister in Baida. Among these was an order to Badri to resume the export of oil to the United Kingdom and the United States as soon as possible.

2. Bishti said that he had a strong and well briefed team for Khartoum and although it would be a very important and difficult meeting he felt confidence of defending Libya's interests.

Distribution

File
Gulf posts.

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| FROM <u>CONSUL GENERAL IN SALALAH</u> | | | PREFIX <u>GR</u> |
| TO <u>POLITICAL RESIDENT BAHRAIN</u> | | | SECURITY CLASSIFICATION <u>RESTRICTED</u> |
| INFO <u>HQ MIDEAST</u> <u>CG MUSCAT</u> | | | ORIGINATOR'S NUMBER <u>RTT 321</u> |
| ON <u>10 JUNE</u> <u>SULTAN SAID</u> | | | |
| (A) AS BETWEEN ISRAEL AND UAR HE WAS NEUTRAL @ PD IF HE HAD SUFFERED IT WAS FROM UAR NOT ISRAEL (B) WITH THE EXCEPTION OF SOME SOPHISTICATED PEOPLE IN MUSCAT AND MUTRAH HIS OMANIS WOULD BE UNCONCERNED (C) HE THOUGHT THE RULER OF BAHRAIN ONLY SENSIBLE TO HAVE RESTRICTED OIL EXPORTS PD OTHERWISE INSTALLATIONS MIGHT HAVE BEEN DAMAGED PD BUT HE EXPECTED NO SUCH PROBLEM HIMSELF PD ONCE OIL EXPORTS BEGAN EVERYTHING FROM THE SULTANATE COULD GO TO U.K. (D) HE HAD HEARD | | | |

Page 1 of 3 pages

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FROM US CONSULATE IN ADEN THAT THEY
EXPECTED TO EVALUATE US CITIZENS
IN SULTANATE PD HE CONSIDERED THIS
UNNECESSARY AND UNDESIRABLE BECAUSE
IT MIGHT CLOSE COUNTRY'S MAIN HOSPITAL
AND DELAY FIRST EXPORT OF OIL PD
TWO PD IN GENERAL EYE CONCUR
WITH SULTAN'S ASSESSMENTS THOUGH EYE
DO NOT RULE OUT ^{POSSIBILITY OF} A FEW MINOR
BOMB OUTRAGES PD THREE ~~IF~~ PD IF
RESTRICTIONS ON EXPORT OF OIL TO UK
CONTINUE FOREIGN OFFICE MAY WISH TO
CONSIDER WITH SHELL WHETHER ANYTHING CAN
BE DONE TO BRING FORWARD FIRST EXPORTS

Page 2 of 3 pages

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BY PDD & PD FOUR PD EYE HAVE
SUGGESTED SULTAN TELLS AMERICANS
HE SEES LITTLE DANGER SECOND SUGGESTS
THEY COMPLETE EVALUATION FROM
MORE DANGEROUS AREAS BEFORE BOTHERING
WITH OMAN AND THIRD TELLS THEM THEY
CAN USE ALL AIRFIELDS WITHOUT DELAY
IF THEY ULTIMATELY DECIDE TO
EVACUATE PD FIVE - BAHRAIN PLEASE
PASS PRIORITY TO FOREIGN OFFICE,
WASHINGTON ~~AND HIGH COMMISSIONER ADEN~~
AND SAVING TO BAHRAIN AGENCY DOHA
ABU DHABI AND DUBAI, PD MIDEAST PASS TO
HIGH COMMISSIONER ADEN.

[illegible]

B. & S. Ltd.—1090

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MESSAGE FORM

R.A.F. SALALAH

NUMBER

FOR COMM CEN/SIGNALS USE

PLEASE CLASSIFY MY RTT 321
OF 101253Z CONFIDENTIAL PD
BAHRAIN PLEASE INFORM FOREIGN
OFFICE AND WASHINGTON AND
AMEND SAVING TELEGRAMS PD MIDEAST
INFORM HIGH COMMISSIONER ADEN.

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| POLITICAL RESIDENT BAHRAIN | | | |
| INFO | | | ORIGINATOR'S NUMBER |
| HQ MIDEAST | | | 2 TTT 321 |

PLEASE CLASSIFY MY RTT 321
OF 101233Z - CONFIDENTIAL PD
BAHRAIN PLEASE INFORM FOREIGN
OFFICE AND WASHINGTON AND
AMEND SAVING TELEGRAMS PD MIDEAST
INFORM HIGH COMMISSIONER ADEN.

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CONFIDENTIAL

Advance file 7041/12/67

From F.O London 1091

NR 216

P/R 251935Z

FM ASOLHY

TO RR ASOLLJ 55625

RR ASOLDQ 97325

GR 230

Is Peter to see ~~1091~~

PA

20 3067

~~55625~~ 97325

at least should be copied.
to posts RFL 28/7

I don't think so, but
they will find it interesting
if they can use it.

IA?

I don't know we
can use this?

Wul
277.

ADDRESSED TO DEPUTY T-1 NO 1889 OF 25 JULY REPEATED FOR INFO

TO RABAT TUNIS TRIPOLI BENGHAZI TEB AVIV ADEN AMMAN JEDDA

KUWAIT BAHRAIN KHARTOUM TEHRAN KABUL RAWALPINDI NEW DELHI MOSCOW

AND SAVING TO CAIRO AND ALGIERS.

FOLLOWING FOR RIO.

IT WAS REPORTED TO US THAT DURING THE PERIOD 19-21 JULY VARIOUS NEWSPAPERS IN PAKISTAN, MOROCCO AND THE SUDAN REPRODUCED A LENGTHY ARTICLE ISSUED BY THE SOVIET QUOTE NOVOSTI NEWS AGENCY UNQUOTE IN THIS ARTICLE IT WAS SAID, AMONG OTHER THINGS, THAT THE SOVIET UNION HAD ALWAYS KNOWN THAT AMERICAN AND BRITISH AIRCRAFT HAD NOT (RPT NOT) HELPED ISRAEL DURING THE RECENT CONFLICT. THAT ONE OF THE REASONS FOR THE ARAB DEFEAT WAS THAT THEIR SOLDIERS WERE QUOTE UNEDUCATED PEASANTS STEEPED IN REACTIONARY ISLAMIC SUPERSTITIONS UNQUOTE.

2 AS REPORTED IN THE TIMES OF 22 JULY QUOTE NOVOSTI UNQUOTE ^{DEB}IED RESPONSIBILITY FOR THE ARTICLE SAYING THAT IT WAS A FORGERY ATTRIBUTED TO QUOTE AS YET UNKNOWN PROVOCATORS UNQUOTE AND WAS DESIGNED QUOTE TO PROVOKE QUARRELS BETWEEN THE SOVIET UNION AND THE ARABS AND TO MISREPRESENT ^{SENT} THE POSITION OF THE SOVIET UNION AT THE TIME OF THE MIDDLE EAST CONFLICT UNQUOTE.

3. HOWEVER, ON 13 JUNE THE SOVIET QUOTE RADIO FOR PEACE AND PROGRESS UNQUOTE SAID THAT QUOTE IF WE EXAMINE THE RANKS OF THE ARAB ARMIES WE SHALL SEE THAT THEY ARE COMPOSED OF PEASANTS, MOST OF THEM WITH A POOR EDUCATION UNQUOTE. PLEASE REFER ABSO TO PARAGRAPH 8 OF OUR TELEGRAM TO ABU DHABI NO ~~1091~~ 63 SAVING OF 7 JULY

SOSFA/CROSEC

132/62/67)

British Residency,

BAHRAIN.

28 July, 1967

... The Political Resident has asked me to pass on to you a copy of the Permanent Under Secretary's letter to him of 10 July (Enclosed). He has at the same time asked me to say that he knows that you were all operating under conditions of considerable strain during the recent crisis and that he is most grateful for all the tremendously hard work that was put in under these conditions.

(M. R. Melhuish)

D.A. Roberts, Esq.,
DUBAI.

CONFIDENTIAL

1892

6/1/67

FOREIGN OFFICE, S.W.1.

10 July, 1967.



Dear Head of Mission,

It is not easy to make comparisons between the burdens laid on missions and the Foreign Office by different crises, but in terms of the number of countries involved, the number of interests affected, the amount of international activity engendered, and general messiness, a full-scale Middle East crisis such as we have had during the past two months would be hard to beat.

Perhaps those who had it worst were Peter Wakefield, Robin Hooper and Hugh Pullar and their staffs. The two former had their Embassy and Consulate-General burned about their ears, the latter managed to keep the DVS working and us informed during three days whilst a war went on around them. Our posts in Tunis, Benghazi, Tripoli, Aleppo, Basra, Alexandria and Port Said suffered mob violence, others the threat of it: we had some very anxious hours on 10 June when Cairo informed us that they were breaking their cypher machines and leaving the building. The Embassy in Tel Aviv, deluged by us with importunate requests for more and more information, answered us between spells in their air raid shelter, during what they thought might be a naval bombardment. There were breaches of relations imposed in an uncivilised fashion by the Syrian and Iraqi Governments. The care and protection of British subjects, and emergency evacuations superimposed more and heavy burdens. Throughout all this, missions had to cope with a quite exceptional weight of telegraphic traffic. It seems little short of miraculous that under all these strains the machine kept turning and there were no breakdowns.

/ Nevertheless

H.M. Representative,
Bahrain.

CONFIDENTIAL

10
CONFIDENTIAL

Nevertheless, with so much going on, it has not always been possible to deal from here with the problems of posts as quickly or as satisfactorily as we would have wished, much less to find time and words for appreciative messages. Now that the General Assembly has temporarily adjourned, may I take an overdue moment to let you know how much Ministers and officials here have admired and appreciated the service given them, under the greatest stress, by our missions in the Middle East? Will you please pass this on to all members of your staff with my thanks and that of all of us, and my hope that things will not continue at quite this pace.

I am writing in similar terms to H.M. Representatives in Algiers, Amman, Bahrain, Beirut, Benghazi, Cairo, Jedda, Jerusalem, Khartoum, Kuwait, Tel Aviv, Tehran, Tripoli, Tunis, Rabat, Ankara, and am sending copies to Dick Beaumont, Trefor Evans and Hugh Pullar

Paul Gore-Booth

(P. H. Gore-Booth)

CONFIDENTIAL

NR1

P 201955Z

TOPP ASOLDQ

P AKWLLJ

GR1000

From F.O. Agency

VERBATIM SERVICE 330/67

THURSDAY 20TH JULY 1967.

MIDDLE EAST AND PERSIAN GULF .

EXTRACTS FROM SPEECH BY THE SECRETARY OF STATE FOR FOREIGN AFFAIRS.

IN FOREIGN AFFAIRS DEBATE IN THE HOUSE OF COMMONS ON 20 JULY.

I WAS GRATEFUL FOR WHAT THE RIGHT HON MEMBER FOR KINROSS AND WEST PERTSHIRE (SIR ALEC DOUGLAS-HOME) SAID AT THE BEGINNING OF HIS SPEECH ABOUT THE LIE WHICH THE LEADERS OF ARAB NATIONS ARE PRETENDING TO BELIEVE . AS HE SAID , IT IS UNTRUE . THEY KNOW IT TO BE UNTRUE , AND IT IS TIME THAT SOME OF THEM HAD THE COURAGE TO STAND UP AND SAY THAT IT IS UNTRUE AND ARRANGE THEIR POLICIES ACCORDINGLY .

IN THE MIDDLE EAST LET US DEAL WITH NATIONS AS GROWN-UP NATIONS , AND IN OUR POLICY WITH THEM ACCORDING TO THE WAY WE SEE IT . DO NOT LET US GO ON IDENTIFYING THOSE WHOM WE LIKE AND THOSE WHOM WE DO NOT LIKE AND USING EMOTIVE TERMS ABOUT THEM . IT DOES NOT GOOD TO US OR TO THEM '' AT THE GENERAL ASSEMBLY THE EMERGENCY SESSION IS NOW DRAWING TO A CLOSE , AND AGAIN IT IS TRUE THAT THE DEBATE SHOWED A NOTABLE GROWING SENSE OF REALISM AMONG THE NATIONS AND THEIR DELEGATES . AS THE DEBATE PROGRESSED FROM WEEK TO WEEK IT SHOWED A WIDE MEASURE OF AGREEMENT IN ANALYSING A NUMBER OF THE MAIN PROBLEMS ON MATTERS LIKE THE NEED FOR A HIGH LEVEL REPRESENTATIVE OF THE ~~SECURITY~~^{SECRETARY}-GENERAL TO BE IN THE MIDDLE EAST. BUT DESPITE ALL

THAT IT SEEMS LIKELY T AND TO SOME EXTENT I REGRET IT - THAT THE ASSEMBLY WILL NOW ADJOURN WITHOUT GIVING ANY FORMAL EXPRESSION OF OPINION OTHER THAN THE NEED - AND THIS IS IMPORTANT IN ITS WAY - NOT TO PREJUDICE THE FUTURE OF JERUSALEM , AND ON THE NEED FOR INTERNATIONAL ACTION TO HELP REFUGEES . THE SECURITY COUNCIL MUST NOW TAKE THE PROBLEM BACK , TAKE UP ITS WORK AGAIN AND GET ON WITH THE TASK OF WORKING OUT ANSWERS TO THE DIFFICULT AND DANGEROUS PROBLEMS , AND HER MAJESTYS GOVT WILL PLAY THEIR FULL PART IN THAT .

AS WE ARE TALKING ABOUT THE MIDDLE EAST IN THIS GENERAL CONTEXT PERHAPS I MIGHT TURN BRIEFLY , AS THE RIGHT HON MEMBER DID , TO THE PERSIAN GULF AND SAY A WORD ABOUT THAT . THIS IS A DELICATE AREA WHERE WE HAVE BOTH MAJOR INTERESTS AND CONTINUING OBLIGATIONS . AS THE RIGHT HON GENTLEMAN POINTED OUT , AND AS THE HOUSE KNOWS , WE SHALL HAVE LEFT ADEN BY THE NEW YEAR . WE HAVE DONE AND ARE DOING OUR BEST TO ENSURE THET SOUTH ARABIA BEGINS ITS INDEPENDENT EXISTENCE IN CONDITIONS OF SECURITY , BUT IN THE PRESENT DISTURBED SITUATION IN THE MIDDLE EAST WE MUST BE PARTICULARLY CONCERNED ABOUT THE STABILITY AND SECURITY OF THE GULF AREA FOR WHICH WE STILL HAVE TREATY RESPONSIBILITIES . IT IS OUR LONG-TERM AIM TO CREATE A SITUATION IN WHICH THESE SMALL STATES CAN STAND ON THEIR OWN FEET . AT PRESENT THEY NEED OUR HELP AND WE PROPOSE TO KEEP SMALL FORCES THERE TO MEET OUR OBLIGATIONS.

I WOULD LIKE TO CORRECT ONE WIDESPREAD MISAPPREHENSION. OUR FORCES ARE NOT IN THE PERSIAN GULF SIMPLY TO PROTECT OUR OIL INTERESTS AS SUCH , BUT TO MAINTAIN STABILITY IN THE AREA . MANY OF THE COUNTRIES IN THE GULF HAVE UNRESOLVED TERRITORIAL CLAIMS ON EACH OTHER.

THE HOUSE WILL REMEMBER THAT IN NINETEEN SIXTY ONE THERE WAS A THREAT TO KUWAIT FROM IRAQ , IF WE WERE TO PULL OUT AT ONCE WE COULD ONLY EXPECT THESE OLD CLAIMS TO COME TO THE SURFACE , AND THE STABILITY OF THE GULF WOULD THEREBY BE PUT AT RISK.

MR JORN SLEE (READING) . MY RIGHT HON FRIEND SAYS THAT OUR FORCES ARE THERE FOR THE PURPOSE OF HELPING TO DELIMTE FRONTIER DISPUTES . BEARING IN MIND THE FACT THAT MOST OF THE COUNTRIES IN THE PERSIAN GULF HAVE NEVER HAD RECOGNISED FRONTIERS , DOES MY RIGHT HON FRIEND MEAN THAT WE CAN CARRY OUT A CADASTRAL SURVEY AND COMPLETE THIS

TALK IN THE SHORT TIME THAT WE ARE LIKELY TO BE THERE?
MR BROWN , NO, BUT KNOWING THE AREA PERSONALLY , AS I DO ,
I AM CERTAIN THAT BY BEING THERE FOR THE TIME BEING - IN THE WAY IN
WHICH WE ARE WE ARE HELPING TO PROVIDE STABILITY IN THE PERIOD OF
CARRY OVER DURING WHICH PEOPLE CAN LEARN TO LIVE WITH EACH OTHER
AND PERHAPS CARRY OUT THEIR OWN CADASTRAL SURVEY. MR. JAMES DAVIDSON
(ABERDEENSHIRE WEST) THE QUESTION OF OUR TREATY OBLIGATIONS IN THE
PERSIAN GULF IS FREQUENTLY RAISED, BUT AS FAR AS I CAN ASCERTAIN THEY
ARE LIMITED TO A TREATY DATING BACK OVER ONE HUNDRED YEARS, BY WHICH
WE ARE OBLIGED TO PREVENT SLAVE TRADING IN THE GULF. BEYOND THAT WE
HAVE NO TREATY OBLIGATIONS IN THE AREA. MR. BROWN MAY I ANSWER FOR
THE GOVERNMENT I AM GRATEFUL TO THE RIGHT HONOURABLE GENTLEMAN FOR
TRYING TO HELP, BUT IT IS NOT ALWAYS USEFUL. THE HONOURABLE MEMBER
IS WRONG IN WHAT HE SAYS. THERE ARE OTHER TREATIES EXCHANGES OF LETTERS
AND VARIOUS MATTERS OF THAT KIND. WE CERTAINLY HAVE OBLIGATIONS THERE.
BUT THE REAL POINT IS NOT THAT, SO MUCH AS THE FACT THAT I BELIEVE THAT
AT THE MOMENT, BY MAINTAINING WHAT WE ARE DOING THERE WE ARE DOING BETTER
THAN WE WOULD BY GETTING OUT, IF WE ARE THINKING IN TERMS OF STABILITY,
SECURITY AND A PEACEFUL TRANSITION TO A DIFFERENT ORDER, WHEN THESE COUNTRIES
CAN STAND ON THEIR OWN FEET. SIR ALEC DOUGLAS HOME BEFORE THE RIGHT HONOUR
ABLE GENTLEMAN SITS DOWN, MAY I ASK WHETHER HE HAS READ ACCOUNTS THAT
EGYPTIAN OFFICIALS IN SAN'A ARE SAYING THAT IF THE ROYALIST GOVERNMENT
DOES NOT CAPITULATE, VILLAGES IN THE YEMEN WILL BE BOMBED WITH GAS IS NOT
THIS AN OCCASION ON WHICH THE RIGHT HONOURABLE GENTLEMAN MUST TAKE AN
INITIATIVE
INITIATIVE IN THE MATTER. MR. BROWN I HAVE READ THE REPORTS, BUT, AS I SAID
TO THE RIGHT HONOURABLE GENTLEMAN IN THE MIDDLE EAST DEBATE THE OTHER
DAY, THIS IS A MATTER IN WHICH THE INITIATIVE OUGHT TO BE TAKEN BY THE
AUTHORITIES OF THE COUNTRY ON WHOSE TERRITORY IT IS HAPPENING. (HONOURABLE
MEMBERS "WHY") HONOURABLE MEMBERS CAN CONTEST THAT WITH ME, BUT I TAKE
THE VIEW THAT THAT IS THE RIGHT WAY IN WHICH TO APPROACH IT. I DO
NOT THINK THAT I WOULD HELP BY MYSELF RAISING IT OR GETTING IT RAISED
ON OUR INITIATIVE. " END VERBATIM SERVICE 330/67 LPS.

11920/20/67



Foreign Office

Tel Aviv

22 27

25 later to see RBT

934

18 July 1967

CONFIDENTIAL
ROUTINE

Addressed to Tel Aviv telegram Number 1545 of 18 July and to Paris, Beirut, Cairo, Kuwait, Jedda, Bahrain (Residency), Amman, Rabat, Tunis, Tripoli, Banghazi, Algiers, Jig Cyprus, Aden (Personal) and Khartoum.

Tel Aviv telegram number 826: Canberra aircraft for Israel (not to all).

There is no repeat no truth in the report being circulated by the French air Attache in Tel Aviv to the effect that the United Kingdom have agreed to sell Canberra Aircraft to Israel.

2. There are at present no repeat no plan to sell Canberras or any other tupe of aircraft to Israel.

BRITISH POLITICAL AGENCY,
ABU DHABI.

4 July, 1967.

(1074/67)

Middle East Crisis

As an appendix to my attempt, in my letter 1074/67 of 3 July, at a long-term view of the results of the recent emergency, the following local comments may be of interest.

2. There is no doubt that as far as Abu Dhabi is concerned Mr. Brown said the right things in his speech to the General Assembly. The Ruler told me that it made a very good impression and pleased his people whose interest in the political manoeuvres following the Arab/Israeli war was now waning. Shaikh Hamdan has said the same to me. Jordanian members of the community to whom I have spoken have also expressed their pleasure at Mr. Brown's words but, naturally, they find difficulty in seeing how the Israelis are going to be forced into compliance. Since they are West Bankers they are slightly critical of King Hussain for refusing to arm the West Bank villagers and the P.L.O. but are prepared to concede that he could not do so while the latter was calling for his removal. Shaikh Hamdan, while sorry for King Hussain, is critical of the latter for rushing into an alliance with Nasser and so into the war.

3. The Ruler has also given me his views generally on the Middle East situation. His principal point has been that the Arabs are becoming increasingly aware that Russia let them down. There is now a strong reaction against the Russians and all the Arab Governments must realise that they should not rely on any Great Power but must find their own salvation amongst themselves. Also, Egypt must be cut down to size. America is very pleased to see Russia embarrassed in the Middle East and will do nothing to help the Russians out of their current embarrassment. As for Nasser, he does not know what to say in the present situation. Having taken all the blame upon himself in his resignation speech, and the Arab people will realise more and more that the blame does rightly fall on Nasser, he is finding it impossible to work out a new policy. This leaves the field open to Boumedienne of Algeria to declare a policy for the Arabs which the latter will find difficulty in refusing to follow: no Arab Government can accept peace with, and recognise, Israel. Boumedienne's aggressive policy, in which he is abetted by Syria and also by Iraq, could lead to another war in the future between the Arabs and Israelis. Even if Jordan, Saudi Arabia and the Lebanon did not want it they would not be able to stop it. As for Egypt, Algeria, Syria and Iraq would not wish Egypt to participate and would probably mount any further military operations from Syria. The only solution is to ring

/Israel

Sir Stewart Crawford, K.C.M.G., C.V.O.,
BAHRAIN.

CONFIDENTIAL

-2-

Israel with United Nations troops and to stop any fighting until Nasser, Boumedienne and other hot-heads leave the scene and more tolerant courses prevail.

4. As you will see, the Ruler is not optimistic about an early general settlement in the Middle East; and Boumedienne is taking over from Nasser as his No. 1 bogeyman.

5. I am sending a copy of this letter to the other Political Agents and to the Consul-General in Muscat.

(A.T. Lamb)

EN CLAIR AND BY BAG

F L A S H FOREIGN OFFICE & COMMONWEALTH OFFICE TO CERTAIN MISSIONS

GUIDANCE NC. 174

4 JULY 1967

UNCLASSIFIED

TODAY AFTER OUR LONG DELIBERATIONS IN THE SECURITY COUNCIL AND IN THIS ASSEMBLY WE COME TO TAKE ACTION. WE ON OUR PART HAVE MADE OUR PURPOSES CLEAR AND ON THESE PURPOSES WE BELIEVE THAT THERE IS IN FACT A WIDE AND GROWING MEASURE OF GENERAL AGREEMENT IN THIS ASSEMBLY.

WE SHALL VOTE FOR WITHDRAWAL OF ISRAEL FORCES FROM THE ARAB TERRITORY THEY HAVE OCCUPIED AND WE WANT TO ACHIEVE WITHDRAWAL WITHOUT DELAY. AT THE SAME TIME WE WISH TO TAKE ACTION HERE AT THE UNITED NATIONS THAT WILL END ANY CLAIMS TO BELLIGERENCY, AND ACHIEVE A STABLE AND SECURE SETTLEMENT.

WE WISH TO LAY THE FOUNDATIONS OF A DURABLE PEACE. WE WISH TO BRING URGENT RELIEF TO THOSE WHO HAVE SUFFERED IN THE CONFLICT, AND WE WISH TO BRING THEM JUSTICE TOO. WE WISH TO BRING LASTING SECURITY TO EVERYONE CONCERNED. WE WISH TO RESPECT THE THE RIGHT TO ALL THE STATES CONCERNED TO LIVE IN TRUE DIGNITY AND REAL FREEDOM AND ASSURED PEACE. WE WISH NOT ONLY TO MAKE DECLARATIONS BUT TO TAKE IMMEDIATE STEPS TO PUT THESE PURPOSES INTO PRACTICAL EFFECT.

WE HAVE DECLARED THESE PURPOSES, AND WE ARE DETERMINED TO PURSUE THEM.

HOW CAN THEY BEST BE ACHIEVED ?

I SHOULD FIRST OF ALL SAY THAT ON THE RESOLUTION ON JERUSALEM PUT FORWARD BY PAKISTAN AND OTHERS WE SHALL VOTE IN FAVOUR. WE HAVE HEARD JUST NOW WHAT HAS BEEN SAID BY THE DISTINGUISHED FOREIGN MINISTER OF ISRAEL. BUT WE ON OUR SIDE WOULD WISH TO REASSERT WHAT WE HAVE SAID AND EMPHASIZED BEFORE. IT IS OUR CONTENTION THAT NOTHING SHOULD BE DONE NOW WHICH IS PREJUDICIAL TO THE FUTURE STATUS OF THE CITY.

/ WE SHALL ALSO

- 2 -

WE SHALL ALSO VOTE IN FAVOUR OF THE ADMIRABLE RESOLUTION PUT FORWARD BY SWEDEN AND OTHERS DEALING WITH QUESTIONS OF RELIEF OF SUFFERING.

'' IN PARTICULAR, WE SUPPORT THE APPEAL IN THE OPERATIVE PARAGRAPH 9 OF THAT RESOLUTION, THE APPEAL TO ALL GOVERNMENTS AND OTHERS CONCERNED TO HELP TO SOLVE ONE OF THE PROBLEMS ON WHICH THE INTERNATIONAL COMMUNITY CAN NOW TAKE PRACTICAL ACTION. INDEED, IT IS TIME FOR A GREAT INTERNATIONAL EFFORT TO ASSIST THE FURTHER DEVELOPMENT OF THE WHOLE REGION ''.

NOW WE HAVE BEFORE US TWO OTHER RESOLUTIONS WHICH COMMAND SUBSTANTIAL SPONSORSHIP. NEITHER IS FULLY SATISFACTORY, IN OUR OPINION, TO ACHIEVE ALL THE PURPOSES WE HAVE STATED.

I TAKE FIRST THE RESOLUTION PROPOSED BY YUGOSLAVIA AND OTHER DELEGATIONS. IN ITS ORIGINAL FORM IT WAS UNACCEPTABLE TO US AND TO MANY OTHERS LARGELY BECAUSE IT DID NOT TAKE ACCOUNT OF ALL THE REALITIES OF THE SITUATION AND THUS WOULD NOT CONTRIBUTE TO THE AIM IT SET. IT WAS INADEQUATE TO ACHIEVE ITS OBJECTIVE. INDEED IT MIGHT WELL PREVENT THE VERY PURPOSE IT DECLARED.

WE RECOGNISE HOWEVER THAT AN EFFORT HAS BEEN MADE TO MAKE SUBSTANTIAL IMPROVEMENTS. IN PARTICULAR THE COUNTRIES WHICH HAD SPONSORED THE RESOLUTION HAVE DECLARED THEMSELVES IN FAVOUR OF THE APPOINTMENT OF A SPECIAL REPRESENTATIVE OF THE SECRETARY-GENERAL TO MAKE CONTACT WITH THE PARTIES CONCERNED. WE HAVE STRONGLY ADVOCATED SUCH A PROPOSAL. WITHOUT SUCH A PRESENCE IT IS DIFFICULT TO SEE HOW PRACTICAL PROGRESS CAN BE MADE. IT IS A PROPOSAL WHICH HAS OUR WHOLEHEARTED SUPPORT.

WE ARE ALSO SPECIALLY GLAD THAT THIS RESOLUTION INCLUDES REFERENCE TO THE PRINCIPLES OF THE CHARTER AND IN PARTICULAR THOSE CONTAINED IN ARTICLES 2 AND 33. THIS SEEMS TO US A MOST VALUABLE ADDITION. WE DO NOT THINK THAT THE IMPORTANCE OF THIS CAN BE OVER-EMPHASIZED, AND OTHER IMPORTANT CHANGES WERE PROPOSED TODAY.

BUT THE RESOLUTION STILL HAS CERTAIN ESSENTIAL DEFECTS TO WHICH I WILL RETURN IN A MOMENT. IT IS STILL AN UNBALANCED RESOLUTION.

I TURN TO THE RESOLUTION PRESENTED TO US ON FRIDAY LAST BY THE REPRESENTATIVES OF TRINIDAD AND TOBAGO ON BEHALF OF EIGHTEEN STATES

/ OUR MAIN

- 3 -

OUR MAIN CRITICISM OF THAT RESOLUTION IS THAT IT DOES NOT INCLUDE SPECIFIC PROVISION FOR THE APPOINTMENT OF A SPECIAL REPRESENTATIVE OF THE SECRETARY-GENERAL. THIS SEEMS TO US A SERIOUS OMISSION, THOUGH IT DOES NOT OF COURSE PRECLUDE THE SECURITY COUNCIL FROM REACHING A CONCLUSION ON THAT OR ON ANY OTHER ACTION REQUIRED.

WE HAVE SOME RESERVATIONS ON OTHER SECTIONS OF THIS RESOLUTION. FOR INSTANCE, WHILE WE ARE IN FAVOUR OF FULL FREEDOM OF ACCESS TO THE HOLY SITES, WE DOUBT IF IT WILL BE WISE TO ATTEMPT TO STATE ANY CONCLUSION AT THIS STAGE ON THE PROPOSAL TO ESTABLISH AN INTERNATIONAL REGIME FOR THE CITY OF JERUSALEM.

NEVERTHELESS IN SPITE OF THESE RESERVATIONS WE BELIEVE THAT THIS RESOLUTION CONTAINS VERY VALUABLE AND SUBSTANTIAL PROVISIONS, AND WE GREATLY ADMIRE, IF WE MAY SAY SO, THE SINCERE AND PERSISTENT EFFORT TO MAKE AN EFFECTIVE AND CONSTRUCTIVE CONTRIBUTION WHICH THE LATIN AMERICAN STATES HAVE MADE. THE RESOLUTION PROVIDES FOR WITHDRAWAL FROM OCCUPIED TERRITORY. IT PROVIDES FOR THE END OF BELLIGERENCY. IT PROVIDES FOR FREEDOM OF TRANSIT THROUGH INTERNATIONAL WATERWAYS IT STATES ESSENTIAL PRINCIPLES, AND WE WARMLY WELCOME THE REFERENCE TO THE NEED FOR A FULL SOLUTION OF THE PROBLEM OF THE REFUGEES. THROUGHOUT IT HAS BEEN ONE OF OUR MAIN PURPOSES TO ASSIST IN ANY WAY WE CAN THE INTERNATIONAL EFFORT TO DEAL WITH THE WIDESPREAD AND ACUTE SUFFERING WHICH THE CONFLICT HAS CAUSED.

NOW THEN WE HAVE TO DECIDE WHICH OF THESE RESOLUTIONS WE SHALL SUPPORT. IN REACHING THIS DECISION WE APPLY THE TEST OF EFFECTIVENESS WE APPLY THE TEST OF WHICH RESOLUTION CAN MAKE PROGRESS TO BRINGING ABOUT THE PURPOSES OF WITHDRAWAL AND SECURITY AND A DURABLE PEACE. IT IS ON THAT TEST THAT WE DECIDE THAT THE SECOND RESOLUTION, THE LATIN AMERICAN RESOLUTION, NOT ONLY CONFORMS WITH THE PURPOSES WHICH WE HAVE SET BUT ALSO OFFERS THE BEST PROSPECT OF ACHIEVING THEM.

WE BELIEVE THAT THE FIRST RESOLUTION PROPOSED BY YUGOSLAVIA AND OTHERS WOULD NOT ACHIEVE THOSE PURPOSES MAINLY BECAUSE ESSENTIAL PROVISIONS ARE OMITTED. WE SHALL VOTE FOR WITHDRAWAL BUT WE MUST VOTE FOR A BALANCED RESOLUTION. THE RESOLUTION PROPOSED BY YUGOSLAVIA AND OTHERS IS STILL NOT BALANCED. ON THE OTHER HAND
/ WE FIRMLY

FOREIGN OFFICE & COMMONWEALTH OFFICE TELEGRAM GUIDANCE 174 TO CERTAIN
MISSIONS

- 4 -

WE FIRMLY BELIEVE THAT THE RESOLUTION PROPOSED BY TRINIDAD AND TOBAGO AND OTHERS CAN CONTRIBUTE TO A SETTLEMENT. MY DELEGATION THEREFORE CANNOT SUPPORT THE FIRST RESOLUTION. BUT WILL CERTAINLY VOTE IN FAVOUR OF THE SECOND RESOLUTION.

WE NOW REACH THE CRITICAL STAGE IN OUR DELIBERATIONS. WHAT WE DO NOW OR WHAT WE FAIL TO DO WILL HAVE IMMEDIATE AND FAR-REACHING EFFECTS NOT ONLY TO THE MILLIONS OF PEOPLE DIRECTLY CONCERNED BUT ALSO TO THE FUTURE OF THE UNITED NATIONS ORGANISATION ITSELF. IT IS OUR CONVICTION THAT THE RESOLUTION INTRODUCED BY YUGOSLAVIA MIGHT WELL HAVE THE EFFECT OF POSTPONING AND INDEED POSSIBLY FRUSTRATING THE VERY OBJECTIVES WHICH THE RESOLUTION ITSELF AIMS TO ACHIEVE. ON THE OTHER HAND THE RESOLUTION WE SUPPORT, THE LATIN AMERICAN RESOLUTION, WILL OPEN THE WAY TO A REALISTIC ADVANCE. FOR THAT REASON WE EARNESTLY TRUST THAT RESERVATIONS AND DIFFERENCES WILL NOW BE PUT ASIDE, THAT THE NEED FOR POSITIVE ACTION WILL NOW PREVAIL AND THAT THE SECOND RESOLUTION WILL TODAY RECEIVE AN OVERWHELMING MAJORITY.

SOSFA/CROSEC

SENT 1313Z 5 JULY 1967

BY TELEGRAM:-

JEDDA
KUWAIT

[ALL FLASH]

ANKARA
ATHENS
COPENHAGEN
THE HAGUE
PARIS
ROME
BELGRADE
STOCKHOLM
MOSCOW
H.C. ADEN

BONN
BRUSSELS
OSLO
VIENNA
COLOMBO
VALLETTA

ALGIERS
CAIRO

AMMAN
BAHRAIN
BEIRUT
JERUSALEM
TEHRAN
TEL AVIV
ABU DHABI
DOHA
DUBAI
RABAT

[ALL IMMEDIATE]

BUENOS AIRES
RIO DE JANEIRO
DAKAR
PRETORIA
LAGOS
NICOSIA

[ALL PRIORITY]

KHARTOUM
BENGHAZI
TUNIS

TRIPOLI
ADDIS ABABA
KABUL
OTTAWA
CANBERRA
WELLINGTON
NEW DELHI
RAWALPINDI
KUALA LUMPUR
SINGAPORE

BANGKOK
DJAKARTA
SINGAPORE (POLAD)
TOKYO
NAIROBI
KINGSTON
PORT OF SPAIN

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J.I.P.G.D.

SSSSS

LW

1. Bnln 22.12
2. Hmja 16-11-66
to Prin
for
EN CLAIR AND BY BAG 3 PA.

IMMEDIATE FOREIGN OFFICE AND COMMONWEALTH OFFICE TO CERTAIN MISSIONS
GUIDANCE NO. 173 4 JULY, 1967 (IP)
UNCLASSIFIED

IMMEDIATELY PRECEDING GUIDANCE.

EMERGENCY SPECIAL SESSION: MIDDLE EAST.

THE FOLLOWING SUMMARISES THE OPERATIVE PARAGRAPHS OF THE TWO MAIN
RESOLUTIONS UNDER CONSIDERATION.

NON-ALIGNED DRAFT:

1. CALLS FOR QUOTE IMMEDIATE UNQUOTE ISRAELI WITHDRAWAL TO POSITIONS
HELD PRIOR TO 5 JUNE.
2. REQUESTS U THANT TO ENSURE COMPLIANCE WITH THE RESOLUTION AND TO
SECURE, WITH THE ASSISTANCE OF UNTSO, STRICT OBSERVANCE OF THE
GENERAL ARMISTICE AGREEMENT.
3. REQUESTS U THANT TO DESIGNATE A PERSONAL REPRESENTATIVE TO ASSIST
IN HIS TASK UNDER PARA. 2 AND TO BE IN CONTACT WITH THE PARTIES.
4. CALLS ON ALL STATES TO ASSIST U THANT IN IMPLEMENTING THIS
RESOLUTION.
5. REQUESTS U THANT TO REPORT ON COMPLIANCE WITH THE RESOLUTION.
6. REQUESTS THE SECURITY COUNCIL TO CONSIDER ALL ASPECTS OF THE
SITUATION AND TO SEEK A SOLUTION THROUGH APPROPRIATE CHANNELS,
GUIDED IN PARTICULAR BY ARTICLES 2 AND 33 OF THE CHARTER.

LATIN AMERICAN DRAFT.

1 REQUESTS

(A) ISRAEL TO WITHDRAW ALL ITS FORCES FROM ALL TERRITORIES OF ARAB
STATES OCCUPIED AS A RESULT OF THE CONFLICT:

(B) THE PARTIES IN CONFLICT TO END THE STATE OF BELLIGERENCY, TO
ENDEAVOUR TO ESTABLISH CONDITIONS OF CO-EXISTENCE, AND TO HAVE
RECOURSE TO THE PROCEDURES FOR PEACEFUL SETTLEMENT INDICATED IN THE
CHARTER.

/ 2. REAFFIRMS

-2-

2. REAFFIRMS THAT NO STABLE INTERNATIONAL ORDER CAN BE BASED ON THE THREAT OR USE OF FORCE AND THAT THE VALIDITY OF OCCUPATION OR ACQUISITION OF TERRITORIES BROUGHT ABOUT BY SUCH MEANS SHOULD NOT BE RECOGNISED.
3. REQUESTS THE SECURITY COUNCIL TO CONTINUE EXAMINING THE SITUATION WORKING DIRECTLY WITH THE PARTIES AND RELYING ON THE PRESENCE OF THE U.N. TO
 - (A) CARRY OUT PARAGRAPH 1(A):
 - (B) GUARANTEE FREEDOM OF TRANSIT ON INTERNATIONAL WATERWAYS:
 - (C) ACHIEVE A SOLUTION TO THE REFUGEE PROBLEM AND GUARANTEE THE TERRITORIAL INVIOABILITY AND INDEPENDENCE OF STATES IN THE REGION THROUGH MEASURES INCLUDING ESTABLISHMENT OF DEMILITARISED ZONES.
4. REAFFIRMS THE DESIRABILITY OF ESTABLISHING AN INTERNATIONAL REGIME FOR JERUSALEM.

SOSFA/CROSEC

SENT 2130Z 4 JULY

BY TELEGRAPH:

ANKARA
ATHENS
COPENHAGEN
THE HAGUE
PARIS
ROME
BELGRADE

BONN
BRUSSELS
OSLO
VIENNA
UKMIS NEW YORK
BIS NEW YORK
WASHINGTON
BUENOS AIRES

STOCKHOLM
MOSCOW
TEHRAN
TEL AVIV
ADDIS ABABA
OTTAWA
CANBERRA

RIO DE JANEIRO
DAKAR
BANGKOK
DJAKARTA
KABUL
POLAD SINGAPORE
TOKYO

WELLINGTON
NEW DELHI
RAWALPINDI
KUALA LUMPUR
SINGAPORE

[ALL IMMEDIATE]

COLOMBO
LAGOS
NAIROBI
VALLETTA
NICOSIA
KINGSTON
PORT OF SPAIN

[ALL PRIORITY]

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CYPHER/CAT A AND BY BAG

IMMEDIATE FOREIGN OFFICE AND COMMONWEALTH OFFICE TO CERTAIN MISSIONS
GUIDANCE NO. 172 4 JULY 1967 (IP)

1. Encl 20.11.67
2. HMYR
Mr. A. H. Scar
3. PA.

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EMERGENCY SPECIAL SESSION: MIDDLE EAST.

THE GENERAL ASSEMBLY DEBATE IS ABOUT TO END AND THE DRAFT RESOLUTIONS BEFORE IT MAY COME TO THE VOTE TONIGHT: OF THE FIVE RESOLUTIONS ADDRESSED TO THE BROAD ARAB/ISRAELI CONFLICT, ONLY TWO (ONE SPONSORED BY "NON-ALIGNED" COUNTRIES AND THE OTHER BY THE LATIN AMERICANS) HAVE BEEN SERIOUSLY AT ISSUE. I.F.T. SUMMARISES THEIR OPERATIVE PARAGRAPHS. IF THERE ARE NO FURTHER AMENDMENTS, WE WILL VOTE AGAINST THE NON-ALIGNED DRAFT AND ABSTAIN ON ALL THE OPERATIVE PARAGRAPHS. IF THEY ARE PUT TO SEPARATE VOTE, WE WILL VOTE FOR THE LATIN AMERICAN DRAFT. IT IS STILL POSSIBLE THAT SOME OTHER COMPROMISE RESOLUTION MAY EMERGE AND THAT THE NON-ALIGNED RESOLUTION MAY NOT COME TO THE VOTE.

2. LORD CARADON HAS SPOKEN IN EXPLANATION OF VOTE ON THE BASIS OF THE RESOLUTIONS NOW BEFORE THE ASSEMBLY. THE TEXT IS IN SECOND I.F. GUIDANCE.

IN ANSWERING ENQUIRIES ABOUT THE UNITED KINGDOM POSITION YOU SHOULD DRAW AS NECESSARY ON THIS TEXT. YOU SHOULD IN PARTICULAR NOTE THAT LORD CARADON SAID HE "COULD NOT SUPPORT" THE NON-ALIGNED RESOLUTION.

3. THE NON-ALIGNED RESOLUTION HAS ARAB SUPPORT. ITS SPONSORS HAVE MADE VARIOUS EFFORTS TO WIN WIDE SUPPORT BY REMOVING CONTROVERSIAL ELEMENTS. AT THE LAST MOMENT THEY DELETED A SPECIFIC REQUEST TO THE SECRETARY GENERAL TO REPORT ON ISRAEL'S COMPLIANCE WITH THE RESOLUTION (FIFTH OPERATIVE PARAGRAPH). THEY ALSO
/DELETED

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F.O./C.O. GUIDANCE NO. 172

-2-

DELETED FROM THE SIXTH OPERATIVE PARAGRAPH THE PROVISION THAT THE SECURITY COUNCIL SHOULD CONSIDER THE SITUATION ONLY AFTER THE COMPLETION OF ISRAELI WITHDRAWAL. IT IS STILL THE CASE THAT ISRAEL IS TO WITHDRAW IMMEDIATELY, WHILE THE SECURITY COUNCIL IS TO CONSIDER (AND NO LONGER EVEN URGENTLY) ACTION ON OTHER POINTS. IF EFFECT, THEREFORE, THIS IS STILL A CALL FOR UNCONDITIONAL WITHDRAWAL.

4. MOREOVER, THE RESOLUTION IS LESS SATISFACTORY THAN THE LATIN-AMERICAN RESOLUTION BECAUSE IT MAKES NO MENTION OF OTHER PRACTICAL PROBLEMS, EG ESPECIALLY THE END OF BELLIGERENCY, AND ALSO FREEDOM OF TRANSIT THROUGH INTERNATIONAL WATERWAYS AND THE NEED FOR A FINAL SOLUTION OF THE REFUGEE PROBLEM. THE RESOLUTION IS, THEREFORE, EVEN IN ITS AMENDED FORM, FUNDAMENTALLY LACKING IN BALANCE. IN PARTICULAR IT IS UNREALISTIC TO EXPECT THAT IT WILL ACHIEVE AN ISRAELI WITHDRAWAL. WE MUST STILL THEREFORE CAST A NEGATIVE VOTE AGAINST IT.

5. THE ARABS MAY CHOSE TO BLAME US IN THE LIKELY EVENT THAT THE DRAFT RESOLUTION THEY SUPPORTED FAILS. THIS IS NONSENSE. WE SHALL BE VOTING WITH A LARGE NUMBER OF COUNTRIES WIDELY REPRESENTATIVE OF ALL GROUPS IN THE ASSEMBLY.

6. IN SPEAKING ABOUT OUR VOTE FOR THE LATIN AMERICAN TEXT, YOU SHOULD

(A) NOT IMPLY THAT OUR SUPPORT FOR IT (ESPECIALLY OPERATIVE
/PARAGRAPH

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CONFIDENTIAL

F.O./C.O. GUIDANCE NO. 172

-3-

PARAGRAPH 1(B)) INVOLVES RECOGNITION THAT A STATE OF BELLIGERENCY EXISTED BEFORE THE FIGHTING BEGAN, AND (B) IF NECESSARY, CLARIFY OUR UNDERSTANDING OF OPERATIVE PARAGRAPH 3 (B) AS MEANING THE RIGHT OF INNOCENT PASSAGE THROUGH STRAITS RECOGNISED BY THE GENEVA CONVENTION ON THE TERRITORIAL SEA AND AS BEING SYNONYMOUS WITH FREEDOM OF PASSAGE THROUGH INTERNATIONAL CANALS.

SOSFA/CROSEC

SENT 0320Z 5 JULY 1967

BY TELEGRAPH:

| | |
|------------|--------------|
| ANKARA | TEHRAN |
| ATHENS | TEL AVIV |
| COPENHAGEN | ADDIS ABABA |
| THE HAGUE | OTTAWA |
| PARIS | CANBERRA |
| ROME | WELLINGTON |
| BELGRADE | NEW DELHI |
| STOCKHOLM | RAWALPINDI |
| MOSCOW | KUALA LUMPUR |
| | SINGAPORE |

[ALL IMMEDIATE]

| | |
|----------------------|---------------|
| BONN | COLOMBO |
| BRUSSELS | LAGOS |
| OSLO | NAIROBI |
| VIENNA | VALLETTA |
| U.K.MISSION NEW YORK | NICOSIA |
| B.I.S. NEW YORK | KINGSTON |
| WASHINGTON | PORT OF SPAIN |
| BUENOS AIRES | BANGKOK |
| RIO DE JANEIRO | DJAKARTA |
| POLAD SINGAPORE | KABUL |
| TOKYO | DAKAR |

[ALL PRIORITY]

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08264402

FM ASOLHY NR 988

TO OO ASOLDQ 88705

GR 155/10

Following received from UKMIS New York.

Addressed to F O Telegram No. 1650 of 4 July, RFI to Amman, Beirut, Bahrain, Benghazi, Algiers, Jedda, Kuwait, HC Aden, Rabat, Tunis, Tel Aviv, Tripoli, Khartoum and Savig to Cairo.

Middle East...

Emergency special session. Voting took place in the General Assembly this evening on inter Alia the "non-aligned" draft sponsored by various Afro-Asian States, and the Latin-American draft Resolution. Both Resolutions failed. Voting figures were as follows;

(a) for the non-aligned draft ... Yes 53 No 46 (including United Kingdom) Abstained 20.

(b) Latin-American draft... Yes 57 (Including United Kingdom) No 43 Abstained 20.

F O pass immediate to Tel Aviv 289, Beirut 78, Benghazi 4, Bahrain 9, Algiers 7, Jedda 55, Kuwait 9, Rabat 9, Amman 143, Tunis 24, Tripoli 5, HC Aden 31, Khartoum 10, and Savig to Cairo 80.

SOSFA

RECD 1140/5 July

1. Encl
2. H. M. 2.15h
in P. M. 7.00p
3. M. P.

CONFIDENTIAL

BRITISH POLITICAL AGENCY,

ABU DHABI.

3 July, 1967.

(107b-7)

Middle East Situation

The Ruler of Abu Dhabi told me on 2 July that a representative of the Syrian Ambassador in Kuwait had been visiting the Trucial States (he had come to Abu Dhabi from Dubai) soliciting financial contributions for the Syrian Army. The Ruler asked for my advice.

2. I advised the Ruler against making a contribution to the Syrian or any other Arab Army, pointing out that H.M.G. and other countries were working for a peaceful solution to the problems of the Middle East. His international image would not benefit from a Syrian announcement that he was contributing to Syrian military expenditure. The Ruler said that he accepted my argument but he could not return a flat "No" to the Syrian request. Did I see any harm in his making a contribution "to remove the effect on the people of the destruction caused by the war". I said I could see none provided it was quite clear that his contribution was for civilian distress relief. The Ruler said that he would think about it. He might send two representatives to deliver his contribution in Damascus in order to ensure that its purpose was properly understood. We should also broadcast it on Saut as-Sahil.

3. I am sending a copy of this letter to the other Political Agents, to the Consul-General in Muscat and to Stirling in Arabian Department of the Foreign Office.

(A.T. Lamb)

Sir Stewart Crawford, E.C.M.G., C.V.O.,
BAHRAIN.

CONFIDENTIAL

In other words
to ensure he
is not offended in
Damascus.

BRITISH POLITICAL AGENCY,

ABU DHABI.

(1074/67)

3 July, 1967.

Middle East Crisis

In paragraph 8 of my letter 1074/67 of 17 June to you I said that I would be reporting further after more conversations with Zaid. I hope this letter will also serve as the long-term view of the emergency called for in your letter 1073/162/67 of 9 June to Tony Parsons.

2. There are no conclusions to be drawn for internal affairs from the actual course of events in Abu Dhabi, except that when it comes to the push Zaid can be as forceful as Shakhbut in controlling his people, and more successful because he knows when and how much to give way.

3. At this distance of time, four points emerge clearly from the whole depressing affair. First, the interests of the oil companies and H.M.G. do not coincide. The two companies here were prepared to comply without any argument with whatever orders the Ruler gave them. Indeed, at a time when I had persuaded the Ruler to wait for a further twenty-four hours before taking any action on oil, it was the local representative of one of the oil companies who suggested to him that a way out of his difficulty would be to impose a ban on loading U.S./U.K.-bound tankers. In the circumstances prevailing at the time the oil companies may have been right to take this line; but they have established the principle, which I do not suppose will ever be broken, that political control of their activities lies with their host-, not their parent-country. It amounts to instant nationalisation without expropriation. A joking remark by Zaid to Nadim Pachachi may illustrate the way his mind is working. Zaid said that the oil companies should be careful about making difficulties about an accounting problem which Pachachi is discussing with them. The oil companies generally were not beloved in the Middle East at present and if ADMA and ADPC made difficulties he would broadcast their unhelpful attitude on Saut as-Sahil.

True. But this is common international practice.

At the root of this is the fact that they have Israel for some 3 reasons. First is that she is the creation of the alien British & Americans.

4. Second, H.M.G. are established as being pro-Israeli and anti-Arab in the eyes of everyone, whether they believe the "big lie" or not. Our neutrality is misrepresented as support for Israel; even neutrality they cannot understand. The Arabs are our friends; why then do we not support them? Whether the oil embargo is lifted or not, whether a trade boycott is imposed or not, for years to come the Arabs even of the Gulf will feel in their hearts that Britain has let them down. I suspect that we shall in the future meet with more caution and reserve, even from such intelligent and well-disposed people as Zaid.

/5.

Sir Stewart Crawford, K.C.M.G., C.V.O.,
BAHRAIN.

5. Third, "Gulfery" appears to have been non-existent during the recent crisis. If Abu Dhabi is any guide to the behaviour of the Gulf Rulers, they wanted occasionally to know what the other Rulers were doing but it never entered their heads to exchange views and to concert their positions. They do not appear to have regarded themselves as Gulf Rulers with something in common but as individual members of the Arab nation. With, however, a useful adviser/information officer/sounding board in their Political Agent: I have not spent so much time in such a short period (at all hours of the day and night) with Zaid since last August immediately following his Accession.

6. Fourth, Abu Dhabi is now with our consent firmly established on the (Arab) international stage. We have allowed Zaid to correspond with foreign powers and to send his oil adviser to the Baghdad Conference. The Exclusive Treaty will be as exclusive as Zaid wishes it to be (please see below) but the open-ended defence commitment by H.M.G. will remain. The result of this is that Zaid will be working hard from now on to strengthen his international position.

7. He has said to me that now, when all the Arab countries are seeing more or less eye to eye, is the time for the Gulf States to obtain full Arab recognition of their existence and independence. To this end they should participate in all inter-Arab conferences and make their own voices heard, since the results of these conferences affect the Gulf States no less than the other Arab countries. Such recognition and participation would, in Zaid's view, have a special importance for Abu Dhabi since they would inhibit Saudi Arabia from pursuing its territorial claims.

8. I warned Zaid that if he wished to play a part on the Arab stage the other actors would wish to have agents in Abu Dhabi: i.e. he would come under pressure to admit Arab diplomatic or consular representatives. His illogical reply was that his Agreement with H.M.G. would protect him from foreign representatives, who would inevitably interfere in his internal affairs: this he would not tolerate. He would take his line from Bahrain and Qatar on the admission of foreign representatives.

9. Whatever emerges from Zaid's thinking as set out in the preceding two paragraphs and from his other thought, reported in my letter under reference, that the Middle East situation would make it more difficult for H.M.G. to defend their special position in the Gulf against Parliamentary and public criticism in the United Kingdom, I am sure that he will wish

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He will now pursue Arab nationalist policies & in the process secure Arab buy backing of such countries as Egypt in our territorial dispute with S. Arabia, at the cost of damage to the supply of oil to U.K. - Angle from his point of view right.

-3-

to present a more dignified appearance to the eyes of the world. I should not be surprised if, when he has studied the copies of the treaties which we are to give him, he asks for a new agreement which might not go so far as the 1961 Exchange of Letters in Kuwait, because he would wish to shelter behind us from "revolutionary Arab" subversive activity (please see paragraph 8 above), but would nevertheless go a long way towards it. If, as I understand is the case, we cannot consider a revision of the treaties, we shall have to be thinking of what alternative answer we can give Zaid, who wants the best of both worlds.

10. I am sending copies of this letter to the other Political Agents and to the Consul-General at Muscat.

(A.T. Lamb)

(10212/1/67)



From Tripoli to Bahrain

Addressed to F.O. tel. No. 609 of 3 July repeated for information to TPS Cyrenaica for Wakefield, TPS Malta RAF El Adem HQ NEAF MOD 031130Z Ankara 1 Madrid 4, Paris 7, Rome 21, Athens 2, Washington 95, Jedda 16, Kuwait 13, Bahrain 11, Algiers 22, Khartoum 8, Beirut 13.

My tel. No. 603 (not to all)

In lengthy policy statement (translation by bag) issued on evening of 2 July new Libyan Government outlined main points of its internal and external policies. Main points of interest were:

(a) It had been decided to resume the export of oil to the countries not covered by the decision of the Arab petroleum ministers conference in Baghdad, among whom France, Spain, Turkey Greece and Italy and other friendly countries and to maintain the interdiction on export to Britain, the U.S.A. and any other country to whom the Arabs agreed to forbid the export of oil.

(b) The liquidation of foreign bases and withdrawal of foreign troops from Libya was a national objective which the new government was determined to carry out without delay. The Government was pleased to announce that the two governments concerned had agreed to the Libyan request to begin negotiations over a programme of withdrawal. Committees would very soon begin their work to implement this objective. See MIFT. MOD pass priority to Service addresses.

SARELL.

Received 1506/3 July.

1. E.W. D. 147.
2. *Handwritten signature* *W. M.*
Mr. P. M. *"R.P."*
3. P.A.

(1073/389/67)

Kuwait

Bahrain

19 JUL 67
109'

ROUTINE

Addressed to Foreign Office tel. No. 377 of 1 July, repeated for information to Amman, Tel Aviv, Jerusalem, Beirut, Jedda, Bahrain, and Savig to Tripoli, Benghazi, Rabat, Algiers, Tunis, Khartoum, UKMIS New York, Washington, Moscow and Holy See.

My tel. No. 362. The Kuwait National Assembly today resolved to urge the Parliaments of all Islamic and other states to oppose both the measures taken by Israel to annex old Jerusalem, and any attempts to bring about the internationalisation of the city.

1. Rulu Dist
2. Xon HMYK
Xr Parl- hman
Hla

CYPHER/CAT A

From: Foreign Office

Telegram No: Guidance 167

Date: 30 June 1967

PRIORITY

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Soviet/U.A.R. Relations.

Bah!
Eye-wash. (Friday article by Heikal, Editor of Cairo newspaper quote Al Ahram unquote, which indulges in some self criticism of Egyptian failures as regards presentation and too extreme language, seeks to present current U.A.R. policies as moderate and bent on cultivating wide international support.

2. It is interesting to compare this Egyptian attempt to appear as climbing back on to the non-aligned rank, with the report in todays times from Moscow of an article in the Soviet weekly "Abroad". This suggests a clear soviet intention "Now that Egypt is more dependent than ever on Soviet Diplomatic, Military and Economic support" to press for "Basic Political changes" and "A reconstruction of the machinery of government to become Arab Socialist".

(C.F. F O Guidance Number 151 paragraph 30.

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2. Hmyk 6m
3. PA
14/7

Summary of Bahrain Despatch No. 19
of 23 June, 1967: The Southern Gulf
States and the Middle East Crisis

1. These States came through with comparatively little disturbance considering the tragic nature of the events as seen by the Arabs, and their conviction that Her Majesty's Government's attitude was pro-Israel (paragraphs 1 and 2).
2. More trouble in Doha and Dubai than in Bahrain. All quiet in the Sultanate and virtually so in Abu Dhabi (paragraph 3).
3. Position in Trucial Oman Scouts, where two Arab officers resigned. Sawt al Sahil radio station was effective (paragraph 4).
4. Action taken by the Rulers to contain popular pressures on them. Position on oil exports (paragraph 5).
5. The crisis has drawn the Southern Gulf more into the Arab world than before, especially over Palestine issue. The people think our policy is anti-Arab and it will be hard to correct this. Nasser's position, at least in the short run, appears strong. Events here will be largely determined by what London, Cairo and Washington do and say. The Gulf States' oil policy will tend to follow fairly closely that of the other main Arab

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oil producing countries despite desire of the Rulers to avoid damage to us (paragraph 6).

6. Situation remains very uneasy and there is need for pro-Arab statements by Her Majesty's Government, particularly on territorial issues. Otherwise we risk growing difficulties over which Rulers will be less able to help than in the past. Continued stability in the Gulf as important as ever, but more dependent than in the past on our policies in Northern part of Arab world (paragraph 7).

7. There may now be more speculation by Rulers about the long-term future but the basic problems of the Southern Gulf have not been changed by the crisis. We must continue with present policies and maintain confidence of Rulers in our remaining to help them. Above all we must avoid adoption of a target date for withdrawal, since this would become known and seriously increase our difficulties in finding an alternative security system in the Gulf which would enable us eventually to withdraw.

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BRITISH RESIDENCY,
BAHRAIN.

Despatch No. 19
(1073/312/67)

23 June, 1967

Sir,

I have the honour to report on events in the Southern part of the Persian Gulf resulting from the recent Arab-Israel crisis which culminated in the fighting of the week beginning the 5th of June. 2. The Southern Gulf States came through these events with comparatively little surface disturbance considering the magnitude of the crisis, the depth of feeling among all urban and literate Arabs about the Palestine problem, the extent of the humiliation suffered by the Arab countries in the war, and the widespread conviction that Israel had the moral and political, if not the physical, backing of Britain and America. This latter conviction is based on the bitterly hostile propaganda against Britain and America which has poured from the radio stations in the northern part of the Arab world and which was to a large extent echoed by the broadcasts of Kuwait; the most was made of the accusation that in standing up for international freedom of passage through the /Straits

The Right Honourable
George Brown, M.P.,
Etc., Etc., Etc.,
Foreign Office, S. W. 1.

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Straits of Tiran we were supporting a policy aim of the Israel Government, and of the accusations made against us by the U.A.R. Government that our aircraft had joined in the fighting on the Israel side. The need for an alibi for the Arab defeat provided an additional reason why these accusations were and continue to be believed by many; they have probably now acquired the status of a myth which rational argument cannot eradicate, and have left behind a dangerous legacy of hatred for us, especially among the young. Against this background, it is surprising that there was not more violence against British and American agencies, firms and people.

3. The chief surprise was in Bahrain. For a variety of reasons, including the success with which the Ruler handled his people and their demands for action in support of the Arab cause, skilful control of the police, and the deterrent effect of the presence of a battalion of British troops in the background, the Island came through the crisis remarkably peacefully, with only minor instances of overt damage and sabotage. The Bahrain situation has been analysed by the Political Agent, Bahrain /in his

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in his report enclosed with my Despatch No. 18. On the other hand, both in Doha and in Dubai, demonstrations were accompanied by some violence until the Rulers took vigorous and effective action to suppress it. In Doha, where the Palestine Liberation Organisation is strong and active and where, fortuitously, local tension had recently arisen as a result of contamination of flour in a Palestinian bakery which caused the poisoning of a large number of people, of whom seven died, there was a serious demonstration on the 5th of June, when the Political Agency suffered a number of broken windows and other minor damage. Later in the week, when the news of the U.A.R.'s defeat and of Nasser's resignation reached the security force, which contains a substantial number of men of Yemeni/Yafei origin, there was a temporary breakdown of order, fortunately confined to the Police Fort, where the Deputy Ruler had to intervene in person, with the assistance of family retainers, before order could be restored. There were also some instances of damage caused by sabotage to the Qatar Petroleum Company's pipelines and to a well-head. In Dubai there was serious rioting on the /7th and the

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the 7th and the 8th of June, led by Palestinians and exploited by hooligans of a variety of racial origins, in which extensive damage was done to property, including a number of buildings of British firms, though no serious personal injuries were caused. The troublemakers seem to have been encouraged by the Kuwait State Office and by some of the nationalist-minded local merchants; the scale and violence of the rioting took the authorities by surprise, but it was then quickly suppressed by the Ruler's police. In Sharjah there were some minor acts of destruction, including the cutting of the cable between the studio and transmission room of the Sawt al Sahil radio station. In Ras al Khaimah there were demonstrations and some stone-throwing but that was all. By contrast, in Abu Dhabi the police had no difficulty in controlling the small demonstrations that took place and there was no violence; nor is there even now much anti-British sentiment. In the Sultanate there was no public manifestation of feeling whatsoever, and probably only a few of the town dwellers of Muscat and Mattrah felt themselves involved at all. To sum up, it was only in the towns of Manama and Muharraq in Bahrain, Doha /in Qatar,

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in Qatar, and Dubai and Sharjah, that serious demonstrations occurred and only in Doha and Dubai, in both of which there live a substantial number of Palestinians, that there was any violence to speak of and, even there, it was by Middle East standards small. In none of the States did the Rulers have any difficulty in restoring order once it was threatened, though in Qatar the Ruler had to have recourse to his own retainers, the "fidawi", who proved in this particular situation more reliable and effective than the security force with its large Yemeni element. I should add that the Yemenis in the Bahrain State Police played their part loyally.

4. A particular mention is needed of the Trucial Oman Scouts, whose assistance was called upon in Dubai. There was no need for them to take a hand in suppressing the rioters, but they were helpful in guarding the Political Agency and other key points and on escort duties. They carried out without hesitation all they were asked to do, despite some indications before the fighting started that they had been emotionally affected by events in the north. However, at the end of the crisis, the two senior Arab officers, both belonging to the

/Qasimi

In the late
fifties, the
security forces
were reckoned
to be the
strongest only.
When the war
broke out, it was
always the
fidawi who
compelled.

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Qasimi family which provides the Rulers of Sharjah and Ras al Khaimah, submitted their resignations; both agreed to take leave in order to think about the matter further, but both are reported to have visited Kuwait at the time of the Arab Foreign Ministers meeting on the 17th of June. It seems probable that one or both will in the end leave the force. It is doubtful whether these two officers have much of a following among the Scouts, where men of Northern Trucial States' origin are in a minority; nevertheless, their attitude is a pointer to the need for a close watch to be kept on the state of feeling of the Scouts should Her Majesty's Government's policy over Palestine continue for long to be under heavy attack by the principal Arab countries. This is simply one, but an important, aspect of the need for us to pay particular attention to Arab opinion in determining our Middle East policy. Despite the sabotage of a cable and other difficulties, the Sawt al Sahil radio station which operates in the Trucial Oman Scouts camp, maintained its broadcasts and balanced presentation of news throughout the crisis, increased its audience and enhanced its reputation with the local Rulers.

5. The Rulers of all the principal States handled the crisis successfully and I do not think that their position has been weakened. All kept in /close

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Some or both
the Scouts are
likely to show
a coup; and
the news we
get is the first
of indicating the
more of a danger
and is likely
to become.

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close touch with the respective Political Agents, all managed to combine the right degree of firmness in keeping order or restoring it once it had broken down, with the making of adequate concessions to popular feeling, whether in the sending of messages, the opening of recruiting offices and the despatch of volunteers, the sanctioning of the collection of money or the imposition of restrictions on oil exports. The latter was the subject which was of most direct concern to ourselves and caused the most difficulty to the Rulers. Given the strength of feeling about Israel throughout the Arab world, the belief in our support for Israel and the passage of the sanctions resolution by the Arab oil conference in Baghdad, it was inevitable that the Rulers of the oil-producing states of Bahrain, Qatar and Abu Dhabi should come under heavy pressure to follow their larger neighbours, despite their own strong preference to stand aside. They had also to reckon with their own labour force, who had the whip-hand at the loading terminals. After some anxious moments all three came into line with the position as they understood it in Kuwait and Saudi Arabia, and imposed a ban, they hope temporary only, on loadings for Britain and the U.S.A. The Ruler of Qatar initially banned also the loading of British and /American

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American tankers, regardless of destination, but has now withdrawn this further restriction; his example was not followed in the other two States: British tankers have been loaded at Das Island, Abu Dhabi, as a result of a firm order given by the Ruler, and a Royal Fleet Auxiliary has loaded in Bahrain, though not as yet a British or United States warship. So far as I can judge the restrictions imposed so far cause us inconvenience rather than damage, but I hope that Saudi Arabia and Kuwait do not adopt greater restrictions than these, or the Rulers will come under pressure to follow them. As a contrast, the Sultan of Muscat expressed to me his regret that oil exports had not yet started from his territory, since he would have been glad to see oil going to Britain and America. Exports on a regular basis are not expected to start until the end of September this year, but when they do so, there will then be an alternative source near the Gulf, both for crude and for bunker fuel. In the other oil-producing States, however, the situation will continue uneasy, despite the concern of their Rulers to do nothing to cause us any serious harm.

6. It is too soon to draw any profound conclusions from the events of the last month,

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except that they have probably had a permanent effect on the situation of the Southern Gulf, as in other parts of the Middle East. With the exception of the Sultanate, the Southern Gulf States are now likely, in different degrees, to be drawn even more than in the past within the general ambit of the Arab world and to be exposed more directly than before to its political cross-currents. Because the Palestine question has been the catalyst, many Arabs for whom Palestine was not in the recent past a serious issue, will now be strong partisans, and will use this issue as the touchstone for judging our attitude towards them and their cause. It will be very difficult in the time ahead to convince the people here that our policy has not been anti-Arab. Whether or not they come eventually to doubt the truth of the accusation that we and the United States gave military help to the Israelis during the fighting, they will believe that we gave at least moral support and encouragement. It is too early to judge whether and how far President Nasser's reputation will in the long run suffer from the Arab defeat; although the Rulers would undoubtedly all be happy if he were to disappear, their people or at any rate those of them living in and near the towns, can be assumed still

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to see Nasser, in the short-term at any rate, as their leader and spokesman, almost more firmly entrenched than ever and they will be at least as much as in the past influenced by his speeches. Events here are thus likely to be influenced less by local developments than by policy pronouncements made and attitudes adopted in London, Cairo, Washington, New York and possibly Moscow. Although we have got through this crisis with remarkably little violence and, apart from the gesture of the ban on oil exports to Britain and America, no damage to our position, feelings against us, particularly among many young Arabs, will be bitterly hostile and the situation will continue to be very disturbed underneath the surface, especially when the general population comes more completely out of the state of shock into which it was plunged by the suddenness and completeness of the Arab defeat. Finally, the way in which the embargo on oil exports to Britain and America has been imposed on unwilling Rulers by the consensus of the main Arab oil-producing countries and by the members of their labour forces, teaches us that in the future we must expect the political aspects of oil policy in these States, other than the Sultanate, to tend to follow fairly closely those of the other main Arab oil-producing countries.

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7. All these considerations point to the importance of Her Majesty's Government taking a pro-Arab line in their statements of policy, particularly on the crucial territorial issues which have to be settled during the long and difficult months ahead, to balance what the Arabs have convinced themselves to be manifestations of a pro-Israel policy on our part. The clear position we have taken up, that war must not lead to territorial aggrandisement will, I hope, make its mark; public opinion will, however, be more affected by what is said about particular territorial issues, and your emphatic call in the General Assembly to the Israel Government not to hold on to the Old City of Jerusalem will I am sure be especially welcomed, particularly by the vocal minority of Palestinians in the Gulf States. The effect would be more notable if you, Sir, could say something similar about Jordan's West Bank territory as a whole. The danger is that if in this and other ways we cannot persuade the Arab population of our sympathy for them, we shall encounter growing difficulties over oil exports, over commercial relations and perhaps over facilities for the Armed Forces. We have the
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unquestioned goodwill of all the principal Rulers, who have done as little to inconvenience us as they felt they could get away with, but the freedom of decision of most of them (I except the Sultan of Muscat and Oman) has now become more circumscribed than it was before. The maintenance of stability in the Gulf area, with our help, remains as important as ever, but it has now become more dependent than previously on our pursuing a policy in the northern part of the Arab world acceptable to the Arabs as a whole. I trust that, as the aftermath of the crisis evolves, this will be given full weight in deciding on the policy to be followed in the Middle East for the protection of British interests, which must undoubtedly be our primary guiding principle.

8. I should like to make one final comment. The crisis has given this area a shock and it would be surprising if this shock were to have no effect on the thinking of the Rulers about the future. I do not believe any of them will turn against us, although we must expect Shaikh Saqr of Ras al Khaimah to be even more careful about keeping a line out to Cairo. We may, however, find the principal Rulers speculating more openly than in the past about our

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eventual departure from the Gulf and perhaps making certain dispositions, whether the strengthening of their own local security forces or reinsuring more actively with Saudi Arabia. This may be no bad thing and in any case we cannot prevent it. But we must remember that the basic situation in the Gulf has not changed; there are still unsolved territorial disputes and local threats to stability, the principal States have still a good way to go in terms of economic, social and administrative development before they can stand on their own feet, and the exploitation of the new oil resources of the Southern part of the area is still in its early stages and the financial benefits are only just beginning to be felt. Moreover, we have to get the Gulf through the period of our withdrawal from South Arabia and the possibly disturbed aftermath. These continue to be very strong reasons why the Gulf States will need our presence for some time to come, and why we should continue steadily along our present course, despite the possible increase of difficulties caused by the recent crisis. Above all, it remains essential that the Rulers should continue to have confidence in our doing so. This is material to any consideration which may now be given by Her

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be able to
stand on their
own feet.

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Majesty's Government to our long-term policy in the Middle East and to our defence programme. Any adoption of a programme which envisaged our withdrawal by a target date would, if it became known, as it could hardly fail to do, administer an irreparable shock to the Rulers' confidence in us and in many ways increase and not reduce our difficulties in finding an alternative security system in the Gulf which would enable us eventually to withdraw our forces.

9. I am sending a copy of this despatch to H.M. Representatives at Aden, Amman, Beirut, Jedda, Karachi, Kuwait, Tel Aviv and Washington, to the Commander-in-Chief, Middle East Command, Aden, to the Political Agents at Bahrain, Doha, Abu Dhabi and Dubai, and to H.M. Consul-General at Muscat, and to the Ministry of Defence and Ministry of Power in London.

I have the honour to be,
with the highest respect,
Sir,
your obedient servant.

(R. S. Crawford)

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Details Of Events Leading Up To Six Day War; Soviet Influence In Middle East Described;
Details Of U.N. Resolutions On Conflict. Arab-Israeli 'Six Day' War: Middle East Crisis.
23 June 1967. MS Middle East Online: Iraq, 1914-1974: Selected files from series AIR,
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